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Abstract
In large-scale networks, many things can go wrong: routers can be misconfigured, programs can be buggy, and
computers can be compromised by an attacker. As a result, there is a constant need to perform network
diagnostics and forensics. In this dissertation, we leverage the concept of provenance to build better support
for diagnostic and forensic tasks. At a high level, provenance tracks causality between network states and
events, and produces a detailed explanation of any event of interest, which makes it a good starting point for
investigating network problems.
However, in order to use provenance for network diagnostics and forensics, several challenges need to be
addressed. First, existing provenance systems cannot provide security properties on high-speed network
traffic, because the cryptographic operations would cause enormous overhead when the data rates are high. To
address this challenge, we design secure packet provenance, a system that comes with a novel lightweight
security protocol, to maintain secure provenance with low overhead. Second, in large-scale distributed
systems, the provenance of a network event can be quite complex, so it is still challenging to identify the
problem root cause from the complex provenance. To address this challenge, we design differential
provenance, which can identify a symptom event’s root cause by reasoning about the differences between its
provenance and the provenance of a similar “reference” event. Third, provenance can only explain why a
current network state came into existence, but by itself, it does not reason about changes to the network state
to fix a problem. To provide operators with more diagnostic support, we design causal networks – a
generalization of network provenance – to reason about network repairs that can avoid undesirable side effects
in the network. Causal networks can encode multiple diagnostic goals in the same data structure, and,
therefore, generate repairs that satisfy multiple constraints simultaneously. We have applied these techniques
to Software-Defined Networks, Hadoop MapReduce, as well as the Internet’s data plane. Our evaluation with
real-world traffic traces and network topologies shows that our systems can run with reasonable overhead, and
that they can accurately identify root causes of practical problems and generate repairs without causing
collateral damage.
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ABSTRACT
SECURE DIAGNOSTICS AND FORENSICS WITH NETWORK
PROVENANCE
Ang Chen
Andreas Haeberlen
In large-scale networks, many things can go wrong: routers can be misconfig-
ured, programs can be buggy, and computers can be compromised by an attacker.
As a result, there is a constant need to perform network diagnostics and forensics.
In this dissertation, we leverage the concept of provenance to build better support
for diagnostic and forensic tasks. At a high level, provenance tracks causality be-
tween network states and events, and produces a detailed explanation of any event
of interest, which makes it a good starting point for investigating network problems.
However, in order to use provenance for network diagnostics and forensics, sev-
eral challenges need to be addressed. First, existing provenance systems cannot pro-
vide security properties on high-speed network traﬃc, because the cryptographic
operations would cause enormous overhead when the data rate is high. To address
this challenge, we design secure packet provenance, a system that comes with a novel
lightweight security protocol, to maintain secure provenance with low overhead.
Second, in large-scale distributed systems, the provenance of a network event can be
quite complex, so it is still challenging to identify the root cause of a problem from
the complex provenance. To address this challenge, we design diﬀerential prove-
nance, which can identify a symptom event’s root cause by reasoning about the dif-
ferences between its provenance and the provenance of a similar “reference” event.
ird, provenance can only explain why a current network state came into existence,
but by itself, it does not reason about changes to the network state to fix a problem.
vi
To provide operators with more diagnostic support, we design causal networks – a
generalization of provenance – to reason about network repairs that can avoid unde-
sirable side eﬀects in the network. Causal networks can encode multiple diagnostic
goals in the same data structure, and, therefore, generate repairs that satisfy multi-
ple constraints simultaneously. To validate these techniques, we have applied them
to Software-Defined Networks, Hadoop MapReduce, as well as the Internet’s data
plane. Our evaluation with real-world traﬃc traces and network topologies shows
that our systems can run with reasonable overhead, and that they can accurately iden-
tify root causes of practical problems and generate repairs without causing collateral
damage.
vii
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1
Introduction
Distributed systems have become critical infrastructure in our life. ey enable
many important network services, including online banking, video streaming, and
electronic medical records, and they interconnect a wide range of devices, rang-
ing from desktop computers, mobile phones, to Internet-of-ings devices, such
as networked printers and cameras. Over time, these systems have also grown in
size and complexity – commercial data centers typically consist of tens of thousands
of servers [19], and even campus networks can have hundreds of thousands of ac-
cess control list rules and forwarding entries [101]. Moreover, due to the advent
of Software-Defined Networks (SDN), today’s distributed systems are also highly
dynamic, as their configurations can be constantly changed by software controllers.
In such large-scale, complex systems, many things can go wrong. As the many
incident reports on Outages [15] and NANOG [25] mailing lists can attest, even
well-maintained networks can experience a variety of problems – links can fail [70],
nodes can be misconfigured [167], and software controllers can have bugs [168]. In
the infamous AS7007 incident [6], for instance, a domain accidentally announced
1
routes to a large portion of the Internet and caused disconnectivity for two hours. In
a more recent case, Amazon’s S3 storage service went down for more than four hours
simply due to a mistyped command, bringing down 150,000 websites with it [3].
ese outages are very costly – major data centers can lose half a million dollars in
a five-minute outage [1], and Amazon’s typo command alone was estimated to have
caused an overall economic loss of $150 million [2].
To respond to these problems, network operators need to perform diagnostics –
understanding why a symptom event came about, e.g., why a packet was misrouted,
identifying the problem root cause, e.g., a certain misconfigured flow entry, and
rolling out a fix to bring the network back to a good state. Unfortunately, this can
be quite challenging due to the complexity of today’s distributed systems. Blindly
digging through system logs and configurations is no easier than finding needles in
a haystack. Operators’ jobs would be easier if there is a way to understand the causal
relations between network events. However, this is not straightforward in a com-
plex network, because it requires reasoning about the interplay between a myriad
of factors in the network, and problems can happen due to seemingly “oﬀ-path”
causes [162]. e diﬃculty in reasoning about causality also complicates the net-
work repair process, because pushing out a configuration change has network-wide
eﬀects and may accidentally cause damage. In fact, there is no shortage of “death-
by-recovery” incidents from major data centers [62, 72, 129].
Adding to this complexity, problems can also happen due to adversarial attacks,
ranging from brute-force Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [26] to vulnerability ex-
ploits [61] to subtle side channel [164] or covert channel attacks [49]. Handling
attacks is even trickier, because attackers may lie about their actions and plant false
data to cover their tracks [10]. erefore, we also need the ability to perform net-
work forensics to track down attackers. Forensic techniques need to be robust even in
an adversarial environment, because unreliable forensics can lead to false accusations
or even send innocent people to jail [160, 16, 22].
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A" B"
link(@B,"Google,"1)"link(@A,"B,"1)"
link(@B,"A,"1)"
route(@X,"Y,"cost)":9"link(@X,"Y,"cost)"
route(@B,"Google,"1)"
route(@B,"A,"1)"
route(@A,"B,"1)"
route(@A,"Google,"2)"
route(@X,"Y,"cost)":9"route(@X,"Z,"cost1),"link(@Z,"Y,"cost2),"cost=cost1+cost2"
Rou$ng'protocol:'
Figure 1.1: An example network with two routers that run a routing protocol. A
link(@X,Y,C) (route(@X,Y,C)) representation means that there is a link (route) be-
tween X and Y with the cost of C. e routing protocol computes network routes
from links.
1.1 A provenance-based approach
Over the years, researchers have proposedmany systems to implement diﬀerent diag-
nostic and forensic tasks [118, 110, 37, 157, 113, 41, 98, 99, 162, 64, 80, 119, 135],
but they tend to be point solutions that address specific problems. For instance, IC-
ING [135] proposes to extend the Internet architecture so that users can validate
network paths that packets have taken, NetReview [80] proposes to allow network
domains to audit each other, detect BGP problems, and attribute the problems to
misbehaving domains, Paris-traceroute [41] aims to uncover load-balanced paths in
the Internet, and Netdiﬀ [119] aims to measure and compare performance diﬀer-
ences of ISPs. Each of these tasks represents an important goal. However, many
of the existing solutions tend to be problem-specific – solutions developed for one
task rarely help with other tasks. As a result, in order to address all identified prob-
lems, it is necessary to deploy all solutions, which can be cumbersome and costly.
Moreover, sometimes, the proposed solutions may require extensions that are in-
compatible with each other.
In this dissertation, we propose to build better support for diagnostics and foren-
sics in a more systematic fashion using a technique called network provenance [183].
3
link(@B,)Google,)1))
link(@A,)B,)1)) route(@B,)Google,)1))
route(@A,)Google,)2))
Provenance)tree)root)
Basic)states)
Figure 1.2: An example provenance tree that describes why there is a route between
A and Google with a cost of 2.
At a high level, provenance tracks causality between network states and events in
the form of a directed graph, where vertexes represent network states and events,
and edges represent causality. Consider the network in Figure 1.1 as a simplified
example, which consists of two routers (each with its local routing table), two links,
and a server. When applied to this scenario, provenance would track the causality
between routes and links, based on how the routing protocol executes.
Such tracked causality can be helpful for diagnostics and forensics, because it
can explain why a certain network state or event came about – for instance, how
a particular route was computed. A user can ask provenance queries, e.g., about a
certain route, and the provenance system would return its provenance tree, where the
root represents the event of interest, its children represent the direct causes, until we
arrive at the leaves in the tree, which represent basic states and events in the network.
Figure 1.2 shows an example provenance tree for route(@A,Google,2), or the route
between A and Google with a cost of 2, in the example network in Figure 1.1. Since
network provenance only tracks the relevant factors for a particular diagnostic task,
operators can safely leave out any irrelevant factors. For instance, to understand
why the route was computed, an operator can narrow down her focus to the nodes
present in the route’s provenance tree.
ere has been existing work on networking provenance, including ExSPAN [183]
and DTaP [182] that maintain provenance for distributed systems, SNP [180] that
cryptographically signs the provenance data to provide security, and Y! [169] that
4
explains why a certain expected network event failed to happen. However, there are
at least three challenges that have not been addressed in previous work. First, basic
provenance does not provide the security and privacy properties needed for Internet
diagnostics and forensics, where networks span multiple domains, carry high-speed
data, and could even be compromised. SNP [180] is a useful starting point for secur-
ing provenance data, but it does not scale to high-speed traﬃc on the Internet’s data
plane, nor does it provide the privacy properties needed in multi-domain setting.
Second, existing work has mostly focused on maintaining network provenance, but
not how to leverage it for root-cause analysis. In a large-scale distributed system, the
provenance of an event of interest can be quite complex [169]. erefore, having
the provenance data is not enough, as operators still face the challenge of identifying
a concise “root cause” from the complex provenance. Last but not least, provenance
by itself only explains how a current network state came into existence, but it does
not reason about potential ways of changing the network state to fix a problem while
avoiding undesirable side eﬀects caused by the change.
1.2 Thesis
In this dissertation, we argue that network provenance can be a powerful tool that en-
ables better support for network diagnostics and forensics, and we demonstrate this
by developing novel techniques and systems that address the identified challenges.
First and foremost, in order to use provenance for Internet diagnostic and forensic
tasks, we need to capture secure provenance data in high-speed networks. is requires
addressing two challenges: a) overhead, and b) privacy. Since the Internet’s data
plane has very high data rates, capturing secure provenance on the data plane can
lead to substantial computation and storage overheads. Moreover, since there is often
a need to perform diagnostics and forensics across domains, the diagnostic process
also needs to preserve the privacy of users and ISPs. erefore, we need to design
a practical provenance system that can operate on high-speed data and provide the
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necessary security and privacy properties.
Second, although having a practical provenance system can be helpful, the abil-
ity to capture provenance is only a starting point. In large-scale distributed systems,
the provenance of an event of interest can also be quite complex: in many SDN
scenarios, for instance, typical provenance trees can contain hundreds or even thou-
sands of tuples [169]. Operators still need additional help in digesting the collected
provenance when performing diagnostics. erefore, we need to develop techniques
to process the provenance data and identify the root cause of a network problem.
Ultimately, network operators need to find a repair to fix network problems.
Provenance by itself merely explains why the current network state came into exis-
tence, but it does not oﬀer support to reason about repairs, or changes, to the current
state. is step is challenging because the repair process can have network-wide ef-
fects – it is necessary to ensure that a repair not only just fixes the symptom at hand,
but also does not cause undesirable side eﬀects elsewhere in the network. erefore,
we need to develop techniques that generate high-quality network repairs that avoid
collateral damage to the network.
1.3 Contributions
In Chapter 2, we start by discussing related work on network diagnostics and foren-
sics, and introduce more background on network provenance. We then address the
challenges identified above and make the following contributions:
1. In Chapter 3, we present secure packet-level provenance, a system that can pro-
vide security and privacy properties on high-speed Internet traﬃc.
Our key insight is that many identified diagnostic and forensic tasks share a
common functional core, and that provenance is a good primitive for support-
ing this core. We design a provenance system called SPP that can maintain and
query secure provenance at line rate in the presence of Byzantine adversaries.
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We show that SPP can support a wide range of diagnostic and forensic tasks
in the Internet. Using software and hardware prototypes, we also demonstrate
that SPP has low computation, storage and bandwidth overheads.
2. In Chapter 4, we present diﬀerential provenance, a technique to identify the
root causes of network problems from complex provenance data.
Our key insight is that network problems are often anomalies rather than the
norm, so we typically have “working” and “non-working” instances ready avail-
able – for instance, a packet that was misrouted, and a similar packet that was
routed correctly. When such “reference” events exist, it is often eﬀective to
reason about the diﬀerences between the provenance of the symptom event
and of the reference event to identify the root causes.
We present an algorithm that can generate diﬀerential provenance, and a sys-
tem called DiﬀProv that implements the algorithm. Our evaluation in the
context of SDNs and Hadoop MapReduce demonstrates that DiﬀProv can
identify problem root causes very accurately.
3. In Chapter 5, we propose causal networks – a generalization of provenance –
that can generate network repairs while avoiding undesirable side eﬀects.
Our observation is that network operators often expect a successful repair to
satisfy multiple constraints – for instance, the repair should make a server re-
ceive DNS traﬃc, and another server to receive HTTP traﬃc. Existing prove-
nance systems only reason about individual events, not complex goals that in-
volve multiple events. We add support for this capability by generalizing net-
work provenance to causal networks, which can encode multiple constraints
in a single data structure, and be used to generate network repairs that satisfy
complex diagnostic goals simultaneously.
We present an algorithm that leverages causal networks to perform network
repair, and a prototype debugger called NetGenie that implements the algo-
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rithm. Our evaluation shows that NetGenie can generate repairs for SDNs
without causing collateral damage.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we conclude the dissertation with potential future work.
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2
Background
In this chapter, we discuss related work on network diagnostics and forensics in
Section 2.1, and we then provide more background on provenance in Section 2.2,
as well as its applications in distributed systems in Section 2.3.
2.1 Network diagnostics and forensics
Over the years, many researchers have considered the problem of network diagnostics
and forensics, and addressed a variety of challenges in this space.
2.1.1 Network diagnostics
Many debuggers have been proposed for diagnosing distributed systems. Like tra-
ditional debuggers, they can produce a form of “backtrace” to help operators un-
derstand what happened in a distributed system. For instance, ndb [86] and Net-
Sight [87] are two example systems that can produce “packet histories” in SDNs.
As packets traverse SDN switches, the switches can assemble “postcards” about the
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packets and send them to centralized NetSight servers. e servers can then answer
diagnostic queries on what happened to a particular packet. SDN traceroute [28]
considers the problem of performing traceroutes without causing the network state
to change upon the probe traﬃc. CherryPick [161] also traces packets in SDNs,
and it aims to reduce the tracing overhead by only recording a small number of
traversed links that can represent an end-to-end path. OFRewind [171] provides a
record-and-replay technique in SDNs that can generate traces that are temporally
consistent in split forwarding architectures such as OpenFlow. X-Trace [66] is a
tracing framework that can tag network operations with task identifiers, and trace
the requests across diﬀerent layers of a distributed system.
Debugging can also be done by dynamic testing, such as in ATPG [174],
BUZZ [63], DEMi [150], and MCS [151]. ATPG [174] can generate a mini-
mal set of test packets that can exercise all rules in a network for testing purposes.
BUZZ [63] can generate test cases for stateful networks with context-dependent
policies, and help uncover policy violations. MCS [151] can identify a minimal
sequence of inputs in SDNs that triggers a certain bug. DEMi [150] uses delta
debugging to minimize faulty execution traces in distributed systems.
Statistical learning can also be an eﬀective approach to diagnostics. NetMedic [97]
uses an inference-based approach to find likely root causes based on historical be-
haviors of system components. PeerPressure [167] applies Bayesian estimation to
configurations collected from a large number of machines in order to diagnose
misconfigured machines. NetPoirot [39] uses machine learning on TCP statistics
to identify responsible entities for an observed network problem. NetPrints [29]
accumulates and retrieves shared knowledge of home PCs and uses decision trees to
perform configuration mutations, or fixes.
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2.1.2 Network forensics
Researchers have also worked on diﬀerent aspects of network forensics. Source
authentication and path validation systems are one class of forensic techniques.
AIP [34] uses self-certifying addresses to detect and prevent spoofed network traf-
fic. Passport [113] can verify whether a certain packet originated from a particular
source domain. SPIE [157] can trace a packet’s traversed path and determine the
source of spoofed traﬃc. HAL [82] can attest to the transmission of a particular
packet. ICING [135] not only authenticates the source addresses of network traﬃc,
but also validates its traversed paths.
Performance accountability systems can help verify the SLA of service providers.
Argyraki et al. [36] propose that, whenever a packet is dropped, the corresponding
network component generates a feedback report (a “packet obituary”) that is sent
back to the source; previous hops remember each packet for a short while and add
some path information when they see an obituary pass by. A later system, AudIt [37],
adds the security features but drops the per-packet granularity in favor of aggregate
delay and loss rates. Network Confessional [38] provides similar properties, but
allows individual domains to tune the amount of statistics reporting.
Researchers have also proposed solutions to address specific kinds of networkmis-
behaviors. For instance, Liberatore et al. [111] investigate the problem of child porn
traﬃcking and propose to enhance the evidence of child porn possession by tagging
application-level data with forensic tags, Glasnost [58] and NetPolice [178] perform
end-to-end measurements to detect traﬃc diﬀerentiation, and Web Tripwires [145]
introduces self-checks into web pages to detect in-flight modifications.
2.1.3 Verification and synthesis
Recently, there has been an active line of research that uses verification and synthesis
techniques to ensure the correctness of networks before deployment, in contrast to
diagnosing problems after they happen.
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Verification can eliminate bugs for certain types of networks. Anteater [120],
Header Space Analysis [101], NetPlumber [100], VeriFlow [102], and Libra [175]
can perform static analysis on data planes and detect violation of a high-level specifi-
cation. Batfish [65] can derive data planes that would emerge from a set of configu-
rations, and check whether desirable properties hold on these data planes. Con-
figChecker [31] and FlowChecker [30] convert network rules into Boolean for-
mulas and check network invariants on them. Flowlog [137], NetKAT [35], and
Kinect [104] are new domain-specific languages for programming SDNs.
Although verification can be a powerful technique, a full verification of complex
networks is still hard to achieve, and most existing verification eﬀorts are restricted
to stateless networks [101, 100, 102, 35]. Diagnostics and forensics, however, is a
less ambitious goal – it does not aim to prevent problems from happening, and in
return, these techniques are oftentimes applicable to more complex networks, even
distributed systems in general. Moreover, verification does not obsolete diagnostics,
as they are orthogonal problems – if the verification process finds a violation, one
still needs to (manually) identify the root cause and roll out a fix.
e goal of synthesis is to produce a network that satisfies a high-level specifica-
tion. For instance, NetEgg [173] can synthesize SDN policies from from example
scenarios, Condor [149] can synthesize network topologies that satisfy high-level
requirements expressed in a Topology Description Language, [123] can synthesize
network updates and their correct ordering. Like network verification, synthesis is
also restricted to relatively simple types of networks, and it requires a human oper-
ator to explicitly write down her specification. Network diagnostics, on the other
hand, does not aim to synthesize a network from scratch; rather, it aims to find a
small change to an existing network to fix observed problems.
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2.2 Provenance
Now that we have provided a high-level overview on the literature on network diag-
nostics and forensics, we turn to introduce more background on provenance in this
section.
e concept of provenance was first developed in the database community [47]
to describe the origin and history of data. Over time, several notions of provenance
have been proposed [52], including why-provenance, where-provenance, and how-
provenance, and they capture diﬀerent aspects of the data lineage. Why-provenance
associates a query result with a set of database tuples that it has been computed
with. One of its applications is to address the “view deletion” problem – finding a
set of input data items to delete, so that a result tuple in a particular view can be
deleted [48]. How-provenance is a further generalization, as it also captures how
the result tuple came about following the query execution steps. It has been used,
for instance, in data sharing systems to assign trust to tuples according to how they
have been computed [75]. Diﬀerent than why-provenance and how-provenance,
where-provenance does not describe how a result tuple was computed, but rather
where a particular data field has been copied from. One example application of
where-provenance is to propagate annotations from source data items to a particular
view [44].
Over the years, provenance has become a rich problem domain in the database
community. Green et al. [74] lay the theoretical foundation of provenance as a
semiring algebraic structure, and Amsterdamer et al. [32] further extend the struc-
ture to semimodules to capture aggregate queries. Meliou et al. [125, 124, 126] use
provenance to analyze how to make a particular query answer appear or disappear,
which can help diagnose wrong database queries or problematic source data. Ives et
al. [91] apply random walk algorithms to provenance graphs for ranking and rec-
ommending data items. Davidson et al. [55] consider the problem of answering
provenance queries when the privacy of data items or of the workflow is a concern.
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Figure 2.1: Another example network with a shortest-path routing protocol.
In fact, provenance has found its use in many other application domains beyond
databases. In an operating systems context, LPM [43] maintains provenance in the
Linux kernel and uses it for data loss prevention. For storage systems, PASS [132]
leverages provenance to detect system changes and to perform intrusion detection,
and Muniswamy-Reddy et al. [133] further extend PASS for cloud storage systems.
On mobile platforms, Quire [57] tracks provenance on Android to defend against
confused deputy attacks. For distributed systems, SPADE [69] is a middleware for
cross-platform provenance collection, and ExSPAN [183] uses network provenance
to explain why a certain network state came into existence.
2.3 Network provenance
is dissertation is particularly related to network provenance [183], which uses a
declarative networking model [115] that views networks and distributed systems as
databases, and network events and states as database tuples. Here, a distributed
system consists of a set of nodes that are interconnected by a network, and they
communicate with each other by sending and receiving messages. Each node has a
set of states, or tuples, that are stored in a database. For instance, BGP routers would
have a route relation, and an entry route(@X,Y,C) in the relation would mean that
router X has a path to router Y with cost C. e symbol @ describes the distributed
nature of the system–it specifies the location where a particular relation is hosted;
in the above example, the entry is hosted on router X. ere is a set of intensional
tuples that represent basic facts about the system; for instance, the fact that there
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r1: route(@S,D,C) :- link(@S,D,C)
r2: route(@S,X,C) :- route(@S,X,C1), link(@X,D,C2), C=C1+C2
r3: sroute(@S,D,MIN<C>) :- route(@S,D,C)
Figure 2.2: e rules for shortest-path routing.
exists a link with a cost of C between two routers can be represented by a tuple
link(@X1,X2,C). ere is also a set of extensional tuples that are derived from the
intensional tuples; for instance, a one-hop route route(@X1,X2,C) can be derived
from a direct link link(@X1,X2,C). In Figure 2.1, we show an example network that
is slightly more complex than our earlier example in Figure 1.1.
e nodes run a distributed protocol that specifies how tuples should be derived
when and where; derived tuples can also be sent and received via the network as mes-
sages. e distributed protocol can be written as a set of declarative rules in Network
Datalog (NDlog) [115], which is a Datalog variant with an extension that specifies
tuple locations with the @ symbol. NDlog rules are of the form q:-p1,p2,  ,pk,
which means that the head tuple q (i.e., the conclusion) should be derived whenever
the body tuples p1 through pk (i.e., the predicates) are all present.
For instance, consider the shortest-path routing protocol shown in Figure 2.2
with three rules. e first rule, r1: route(@S,D,C) :- link(@S,D,C), describes
that whenever there is a link from S to D with the cost C, a one-hop route from S to
D with the same cost should be derived. e second rule, r2: route(@S,D,C) :-
route(@S,X,C1),link(@X,D,C2), C=C1+C2, describes that a route from S to D with
a cost of C can be derived by a route from S to an intermediate hop X with a cost of
C1, together with a direct link from X to D with a cost of C2, where C=C1+C2. e
final rule, r3: sroute(@S,D,MIN<C>) :- route(@S,D,C), describes that the shortest
distance from S to D is obtained by aggregating all routes between them and picking
the minimum cost.
Under this model, a network execution can be viewed as a series of tuple inser-
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Figure 2.3: e provenance tree of the state sroute(@A,B,2).
tions and deletions. An execution is always triggered by the insertion or deletion of
base tuples, which are entries in the intensional relations, or external events, e.g., a
network operator installs a new configuration, a packet arrives at a border router,
etc. ey will then trigger a set of NDlog rules, and generate additional derived tu-
ples in the extensional relations, e.g., a new configuration results in a routing table
update, a received packet gets forwarded to the next hop, etc. NDlog programs are
executed using pipelined semi-naïve evaluation [115], where each received tuple can
be immediately processed. We also assume that, after a set of updates, the system
eventually stabilizes and converges to a fixedpoint.
is declarative model makes provenance very easy to see. For instance, Fig-
ure 2.3 shows the provenance tree of the routing state sroute(@A,B,2) on the node A
in Figure 2.1. It can be interpreted as follows. e shortest-path routing protocol has
derived a routing state sroute(@A,B,2) from route(@A,B,2) and route(@A,B,3)
using the rule r3. erefore, the provenance of sroute(@A,B,2) is simply the ex-
istence of the states route(@A,B,2) and route(@A,B,3), as well as the execution of
the rule r3. In turn, the provenance of the state route(@A,B,2) is the application of
rule r2 on the states route(@A,C,1) and link(@C,B,1), where node C is the inter-
mediate hop between A and B. Finally, the provenance of the states route(@A,B,3)
and route(@A,C,1) is the application of r1 on the basic states link(@A,B,3) and
link(@A,C,1), respectively.
Using the above system model, ExSPAN [183] has opened up a line of work
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on network provenance by tackling a set of challenges in maintaining and querying
provenance in a distributed setting, and showing that network provenance is prac-
tical for a range of distributed protocols, such as BGP and Chord. DTaP [182]
further adds a temporal dimension in the provenance data, because network states
– unlike traditional database tuples – tend to be short-lived. SNP [180] addresses
challenges that arise due to adversaries in distributed systems that may corrupt or
fabricate provenance data. Y! [169] uses counterfactual reasoning to explain why
a missing event in a distributed system failed to happen. Meta provenance [168]
generalizes the notion of provenance to capture both data and program code to re-
pair SDN controller software. Chen et al. [51] propose a technique to compress
distributed provenance data for storage savings. is dissertation is related to these
work on network provenance, and indeed, builds on some of the above projects; but
it addresses several open challenges in network provenance, as we have explained in
Section 1.2.
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Secure Packet Provenance
Diagnostics and forensics were not among the top priorities for the original design of
the Internet [53], and as a result, the architecture oﬀers relatively little direct support
for them. At the interdomain level, the only features that are likely to be available
are ICMP and a few IP header options, and even these are often disabled [81] or
implemented inconsistently [153]. us, when an operator encounters a problem
that is not limited to her own network (such as bad performance on a given path),
there is relatively little tool support; the best option is still often to post a message
to a mailing list like NANOG, or to call other operators on the phone.
Over the years, a variety of diagnostic and forensic challenges have been iden-
tified. ese include diagnosing high delay, reordering, or loss [118, 110, 37],
identifying the source of attack traﬃc [157, 113], localizing failures [41, 98, 99],
detecting prefix hijacking [179], testing for traﬃc diﬀerentiation [178], topology
mapping [153], finding the root cause of routing problems [162, 64], collecting ev-
idence of cybercrimes [111], and verifying SLAs between ISPs [80, 119, 135], and
so on. Each of these challenges involves a specific problem deep within the network,
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which is diﬃcult to diagnose without network-level support.
In the absence of direct support from the network, most existing work takes one
of the following two approaches. e first is to approximate the missing functional-
ity by creatively “abusing” a feature that exists for some other purpose (such as cer-
tain header options [153] or ICMP responses [41]). is is often surprisingly eﬀec-
tive, but it typically relies on underspecified behavior and/or idiosyncrasies of certain
router implementations, which can diminish data quality and require an enormous
amount of ingenuity to work around (e.g., [153, 98]). e second approach is to
extend the architecture with a new feature of some kind (e.g., [135, 34]), such as
a new protocol, header field, etc. Such extensions provide a “clean” solution for
the problem at hand, but deploying new features in the entire network is extremely
diﬃcult – so diﬃcult, in fact, that hardly any of the proposed solutions have been
widely deployed so far. To make matters worse, existing proposals typically focus on
solving one particular problem and do not help with any of the other diagnostic and
forensic problems that have been identified; thus, a comprehensive solution would
require deploying all of the proposed extensions in combination. Given the ISPs’
reluctance to make major changes to the network, this seems unrealistic.
In this chapter, we ask the following question: If ISPs were willing to deploy
only one new primitive in the network to help with diagnostics and forensics, what
should that primitive be? Our key observation is that, while the existing solutions
seem very diﬀerent at first glance, they all essentially answer variants of the same ques-
tion: “What were the causes and/or eﬀects of a given past event in the network?”. If
the network could remember recent events (such as packet transmissions) and the
corresponding causes and eﬀects, even for a short amount of time, many forensic
problems would be easy to solve. For instance, reverse traceroute [98] could locate
the source of packet drops simply by following packets on their way from the sender
to the receiver (and potentially back), and note the point at which they no longer
made progress. Other forensic problems would require some post-processing: for
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instance, WhyHigh [110] could find the source of high latencies by inspecting the
diﬀerences between packet transmission and arrival times, and Netdiﬀ [119] could
calculate the throughput on each path segment to find the bottleneck. However,
this processing could be done at the edge without further changes to the core.
ere is one additional feature that some forensic systems require: the ability to
prove the correctness of a given answer [80, 180, 113, 34, 135]. is is necessary
because attackers may falsify evidence to cover their tracks [109]. Although the
strength of proofs and the properties being proven sometimes vary, in essence they are
all concerned with the presence or absence of particular entries in our hypothetical
ledger: for instance, the PoPs in ICING [135] essentially correspond to a chain of
entries that connects a packet to a particular sender, the signatures in Passport [113]
and AIP [34] correspond to the beginning of this chain, and the logs in SNP [180]
correspond to causal connections along the chain.
is commonality suggests that it may be possible to deploy a single primitive in
the network, once and for all, and then re-implement the previously proposed diag-
nostic and forensic systems as “applications” on top of it, without further changes
to the network core. In this chapter, we propose one specific candidate for such a
primitive that we call secure packet provenance (SPP). SPP is based on the concept
of data provenance from the database literature [47], which has already been used
for diagnostics and forensics in other contexts, such as operating systems [89] and
distributed systems [180, 183, 170]. However, as we show experimentally in Sec-
tion 4.5, existing solutions would be completely overwhelmed with the high data
rates at the network data plane. SPP solves this problem by avoiding cryptographic
operations on the fast path and by relying mostly on ephemeral state; as a result, it
outperforms the state-of-the-art secure provenance system by several orders of mag-
nitude.
While the key insights of this chapter are architectural (that there can be a single
shared primitive, and that SPP is a good candidate), we have also designed and im-
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plemented a concrete protocol that could provide SPP in the Internet. Other than
a small link-layer header, our protocol does not require any changes to the current
data plane and can be implemented eﬃciently in hardware. (We demonstrate this
with a NetFPGA prototype that runs at 10 Gbps.) We also used SPP to approxi-
mate six diﬀerent diagnostic primitives from the literature, and we show that with
SPP, each primitive can be implemented with just a few lines of code. Our main
contributions are:
• Two architectural insights: that a single shared primitive can support a wide
variety of diagnostic and forensic tasks, and that provenance is a good candidate
for such a primitive (Section 5.1);
• the definition of a secure provenance model for the Internet’s data plane (Sec-
tion 3.2);
• SPP, a concrete protocol for maintaining secure provenance (Section 5.3);
• case studies showing that SPP can approximate a number of existing diagnostic
systems (Section 3.4);
• software and hardware prototypes (Section 4.4); and
• an experimental evaluation, as well as proof-of-concept implementations of six
diagnostic primitives on SPP (Section 4.5).
We discuss deployment strategies and their implications in Section 3.7, and we
present related work in Section 4.6.
3.1 Overview
Diagnostics and forensics were not among the top priorities for the original Inter-
net [53], as it was small in scale and experimental in nature. But today’s Internet,
with its broad range of applications, has attracted problems of all kinds [144, 110,
88, 95, 21, 109], which sometimes cause losses of millions of dollars [76]. But
the available tools are far from adequate: packet traces, IP addresses [22], and even
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thumbnail images [16] are serving as evidence; due to the lack of reliable forensics,
innocent users have been falsely accused of wrongdoings [160, 16, 22]. We believe
that it is time to add better support for diagnostics and forensics.
3.1.1 Goal: A single primitive
ere is a rich body of work on diagnostic and forensic systems that solve specific
variants of this problem, typically by extending the Internet in one way or an-
other [110, 34, 38, 41, 58, 59, 82, 87, 113, 98, 118, 130, 135, 145, 148, 157,
159, 178]. However, the resulting variety of problem-specific, mutually incompati-
ble extensions represents a challenge for widespread deployment. Hence, rather than
trying to improve any individual one of these systems, we ask: Is there a single prim-
itive that could be added to the Internet to solve a wide range of diagnostic and forensic
challenges? Such a primitive would not necessarily match the eﬃciency of the more
specialized solutions, since a shared primitive would need to provide a strict super-
set of the functionalities of the individual primitives; but it could certainly be more
eﬃcient than deploying all of them together. Moreover, if so many existing diagnos-
tic and forensic systems are based on some variant of this primitive, we have good
reasons to believe that it will be useful for solving future, as-yet-unknown foren-
sic challenges as well – which is a key requirement for any possible addition to the
network architecture.
In this chapter, we propose secure packet provenance as a candidate for such a
primitive. At a high level, provenance [47] tracks how data flows through the net-
work by recording each event, e.g., the transmission of a packet, or the installation
of a new route, and its direct causes and eﬀects. With this information, any event
of interest can be explained by recursively looking up the causes of the event until a
set of “root causes” (such as the transmission of a new packet at an end host, or the
origination of a new route) is reached. Additionally, our proposed primitive collects
cryptographic evidence of network-level events; this can be used to authenticate the
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provenance even in adversarial settings.
3.1.2 Challenges
Intuitively, maintaining a secure provenance graph for the Internet would be suﬃ-
cient for diagnostics and forensics, since it contains a complete and accurate descrip-
tion of what happened, why, when, and where. However, two key challenges need
to be solved to make this approach practical.
Challenge #1: Overhead. A complete provenance graph of the entire Internet data
plane would quickly consume any amount of space that could realistically be pro-
vided. We propose to solve this by keeping the full provenance only very briefly,
and by oﬀering a way to save (and later authenticate) any parts of the graph that
are relevant for ongoing diagnostic and forensic tasks. To keep the computational
overhead low, our proposed solution relies mostly on cryptographic primitives that
can work at high speeds, such as hashing, and it applies several optimizations, such
as batching.
Challenge #2: Privacy. Collecting all the provenance in a central location would
be a privacy disaster. Our proposed solution avoids this by distributing the graph,
and by allowing each network-level component to keep the part of the graph that
pertains to itself. Also, we do not allow “global” queries of the form “show me all the
packets that Bob sent” – users can only explore the provenance graph hop by hop,
starting from a vertex they already know about. In eﬀect, users can only query the
provenance of packets they have already seen in their entirety. Moreover, we allow
ISPs to restrict the visibility of their own subgraph; for instance, an ISPmight permit
its local admins to see its complete provenance, including routing policies and link
statuses, but it might limit queriers from other domains to only forwarding-related
information, e.g., the path that packets were sent on.
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3.2 The provenance graph
We begin by defining the data model for the provenance information we wish to
provide. A common way to represent the provenance is as a provenance graph [183] –
a DAG in which each vertex represents an event and edges connect causes to eﬀects.
In this graph, the explanation of an event is simply the tree that is rooted as the
corresponding vertex.
3.2.1 What is the right layer?
For a single provenance model to work for heterogeneous networks, it needs to be
detailed enough to encode useful debugging information, but also general enough
to abstract away hardware-specific features. We observe that this challenge resembles
that of the original Internet, which needed to interconnect a variety of diﬀerent net-
work types and protocols. e answer in the original design was IP’s “narrow waist”,
which was itself universal but permitted diversity at layers above and below. us, if
our provenance model captures the network’s operation at the IP layer, it will form
a basis that diﬀerent networks could agree on. As we will show in Section 3.2.4, op-
erations on other layers can still be encoded as extensions to the IP-level provenance
graph.
Network model: We model the network as a graph whose nodes are IP-capable
devices. Each node has a number of ports, which can be connected to ports on other
nodes using links. Nodes can transmit packets on their ports to some or all of the
nodes that are connected to the corresponding (unicast or multicast) link. erefore,
this model not only includes routers and middleboxes, but also end hosts. Packets
can be lost or corrupted in transmission, and nodes can mutate, duplicate, or drop
any packet. Moreover, each node has a set of rules that decide how packets should
be processed, and an increment-only local timer to obtain timestamps.
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3.2.2 The provenance graph G
For clarity, we define the provenance graph G := (V;E) from the perspective of a hy-
pothetical global observer that can observe every single event in the network – i.e.,
every time a packet is sent or received, a link goes up or down, and a rule is inserted
or deleted. G is a DAG and contains one vertex for each event, as well as a directed
edge (v1;v2) whenever v2 causally depends on v1. Vertexes can have multiple incom-
ing edges; for instance, a node might send a packet on a particular port because a)
it received the packet earlier, b) it had a rule that matched the packet and specified
this port, and c) the link on that port was up. Specifically, we define six vertex types,
using a provenance model similar to the one from DTaP [182]:
• When a link l goes up/down on node N at time t, add a vertex (N,t,l) /
(N,t,l).
• When a node N adds/removes a rule r at time t, add a vertex (N,t,r) /
(N,t,r).
• When a node N receives a packet p on port P at time t, insert a vertex
v:=(N,p,P,t) to V ; also, find the vertex v1:=(N,t,l) for the link l
that is currently connected to P, and add an edge (v1;v) to E.
• When a nodeN sends a packet p on port P at time t, add a vertex v:=(N,p,P,t)
to V . If p is sent because a packet p0 was previously received by N at time t 0
on port P0 and is forwarded to port P because of a rule r, find the vertexes
v2:=(N,t 00,r) and v3 :=(N,p0,P0,t 0) in V and add edges (v2;v)
and (v3;v) to E.
G is, in eﬀect, a complete chronicle of everything that happened in the network: in
principle, it is possible to “replay” the entire execution of the network in simulation.
us, if a question can be answered in this very detailed simulation, it must also be
possible to answer it using the information in G. In particular, to explain why an
event e has occurred, we can simply find the corresponding vertex v in G and look
25
at the subtree that is rooted at it, the leaves of which are the “root causes” that, in
conjunction, have caused e to occur. Later, we will describe a distributed algorithm
that maintains a close approximation of G without assuming a central entity. is
is based on the observation that each vertex v 2G has a natural “home”: the node N
that appears as the first entry will store the vertex v.
3.2.3 Querying and evidence
We allow users to examine the graph G with a query primitive (v) that returns
v’s adjacent vertexes in G. us, users could start with a vertex they know (say,
the transmission or arrival of a packet at their local node) and explore the graph
by invoking  recursively. However, recall that G is distributed, and that each
node stores the vertexes that pertain to it. So a malfunctioning or compromised
node could fabricate or destroy vertexes that it stores locally. To prevent this, nodes
are required to store not only the vertexes themselves, but also evidence to prove
that the adjacent vertexes exist. e evidence ev of a vertex v can be thought of
as a statement that is signed by the “home” node of v saying that v is a part of G.
Conceptually, nodes exchange evidence whenever they add an edge toG between two
of their vertexes. us, each node can use the evidence to prove to any third-party
that the other end of the edge must exist in G.
Hence, we augment the query primitive with evidence. (v,ev) returns two
sets of vertexes: all the predecessors and successors of v in G. Each returned vertex v0
is accompanied with evidence that 1) v0 is in V , and that 2) the relevant edge ((v0;v)
for predecessors and (v;v0) for successors) is in E. As before, users can use 
to explore a larger portion of G by invoking  recursively, starting from some
vertex they know and have evidence for.
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3.2.4 Extensions
e above data model only captures IP-level provenance. But as we discussed in
Section 3.2.1, operations above and below the IP layer can be encoded as extensions
to this basic provenance graph to support richer diagnostic and forensic capabilities.
Below, we briefly sketch two examples.
Control-plane diagnostics: In the basic provenance model from Section 3.2.2,
changes to link statuses and rules are “root causes” that cannot be explained fur-
ther. However, it would be easy to add more entries to the TELs to further explain
the provenance of these events. For instance, NetReview [80] already records a type
of secure provenance for the BGP control plane; this provenance could be integrated
with the IP-level model to further explain the  vertexes. Provenance tools that
do not understand the new vertex types in the TEL could simply ignore them and
continue to treat the  vertexes as basic events in the provenance graph.
Summarizations: To enable longer-term forensic queries, it could be useful to have
a less detailed but smaller version of the IP-level provenance graph (say, a flow-level
version); thus, the detailed version could be discarded after a few seconds, while the
aggregated version could remain available for hours, or even days. Our basic model
can accommodate such extensions by having routers commit to the basic graph and
its summarizations simultaneously. As long as both endpoints of a link generate the
summarizations in the same way (e.g., by using the same sampling technique), they
can verify correctness exactly as in the basic IP-level version.
Visualization: To help operators to better understand the diagnostic results, the
evidence can be displayed using provenance visualizers such as NetTrails [181].
3.2.5 Does G reveal too much information?
End users might be concerned that  could be used to spy on their traﬃc.
But our design prevents this: to query a vertex in G, the querier must already have
27
evidence for an adjacent vertex. So, in order to access the provenance of a packet p
that was sent from A to B, the querier must have some evidence of p’s existence –
which is only available at the sender A, the recipient B, and the ASes along the path,
all of whom have already seen p in its entirety. us, there are only two cases: 1) the
querier already knows that p exists, and what exactly it contains; in this case, 
will reveal where p came from, where it went, and what exactly happened along the
way. Or 2) the querier does not yet know that p exists; in this case, the querier learns
nothing from  because the invocation will fail.
ISPs could have similar concerns about the topology and the configuration of
their own infrastructure. But the Internet’s topology can already be learned in great
detail today [153], so G does not reveal much additional information – it merely
reduces the eﬀort that is needed to obtain it. Moreover, networks can protect policy-
related information by hiding certain vertexes: each node can implement its own
policy to decide which vertexes should be hidden. For instance, a network may
want to reveal  and  vertexes only to its own admins, and hide them from
users in other domains. us, each querier is presented with a view of the provenance
graph, and can explore only the parts that are visible to her. To preserve usability,
our provenance model prescribes that the  and  vertexes be included in
any view. erefore, queries with a restricted view, e.g., inter-domain queries, can
only trace packet paths from the returned  and  vertexes; queries with
an admin’s view, e.g., intra-domain queries, can additionally learn why, i.e., from the
 and  vertexes.
3.3 The SPP protocol
We now describe a distributed algorithm called SPP that implements the proposed
provenance graph.
28
Rule	  table	  
epoch	  buﬀer	  
incoming	  packets	   NIC	  buﬀer	  
H
forwarding	  
M	  
ac=on	  buﬀer	  
epoch	  buﬀer	  
H
MHT	  
MHT	  
COMMIT	  COMMIT	  
Figure 3.1: Data flow in the commitment protocol.
3.3.1 Assumptions and threat model
We design SPP based on the following assumptions:
• ere is a hash function H() that is pre-image resistant and collision resistant.
• Each node i has a key pair pi/si that can be used to sign messages. A node i’s
signatures cannot be forged without knowing i’s private key si.
• If a link i! j exists, then j has a back channel for sending a small number of
messages back to i.
e first assumption could be satisfied, e.g., by SHA-256. e second assumption
could be satisfied with a small extension to the RPKI. e third assumption holds
trivially for all bidirectional links; for other links, it could be satisfied by using a
diﬀerent link for the back channel.
reat model: We assume that nodes can fail or be compromised by a Byzantine
attacker, i.e., we make no special assumptions about the aﬀected nodes, other than
that they cannot break cryptographic keys. In particular, these nodes can drop, alter,
or fabricate packets, they can destroy or tamper with any local state, and/or collude
with each other.
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3.3.2 Commitment protocol
e purpose of the commitment protocol (illustrated in Figure 3.1) is to generate
evidence for the provenance graph. e protocol runs between the two endpoints
A and B of each link A! B; bidirectional links run two separate instances of the
protocol, and nodes with multiple ports run separate instances for each local port.
By this protocol, A would be able to prove that the packets it has sent have been
received by B, and B would be able to prove that the packets it has received were
indeed sent by A. is is done as follows.
Sender: A uses its local timer to divide time into epochs of some fixed length, e.g.,
100ms, and both A and B maintain a small number of epoch buﬀers in which they
record information about the packets they have sent or received. A begins a new
epoch Ei by sending a message (i) to B. After that, whenever A sends a
packet p to B, A appends the hash H(p) to the buﬀer and then prepends an index j
of packet in the epoch buﬀer as a small extra header before p. A ends Ei by sending
message (i,n) to B, where n is the total number of packets it has sent to B
in this epoch.
Receiver: B has meanwhile forwarded each packet as usual, but it has also recorded
in its own epoch buﬀer the hashes of all the packets it has received correctly – i.e.,
without link-layer errors or CRC mismatches – from A; moreover, B has identified
any missing index numbers (by looking for gaps in the sequence of numbers) and
has recorded these in a small separate buﬀer M, so it can later report them to A.
When A’s message arrives, B computes aMerkle Hash Tree [127] (MHT)
over the hashes in the epoch buﬀer, extracts the top-level hash h0, writes an entry
sB := (A ! B; i;h0) to its tamper-evident log (see Section 3.3.3), and
returns a message (i, aB, (aB;sB), M) back to A. aB is an authenticator
(defined in Section 3.3.3), and (aB;sB) is a hash chain that connects aB to
sB. (is is used to enable audits later on.) By sending this message, B commits to
having received the packets in its epoch buﬀer.
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Agreement: While B is working on its commitments, A continues to forward pack-
ets, and it records the corresponding hashes in other epoch buﬀers to avoid being
stalled. However, once the  message arrives, A locates the corresponding
buﬀer, removes the packets with sequence numbers in M, and then computes a
MHT over it in the same way as B, which should yield the same top-level hash
h0. A then records an entry sA := (A! B; i;h0;aB;(aB;sB)) in its
local tamper-evident log and returns a (i, aA, (aA;sA)) message to B,
which records a (i;aA; (aA;sA)) entry in its log. At this point, A and B
have agreed on the set of packets that have been sent over the link in this epoch, and
they both hold evidence of this fact (the authenticators and hash chains) in their re-
spective logs. Note that this does not attempt to make packet transmissions reliable,
but merely enables the endpoints to agree on the set of correctly transmitted packets.
Actions: Nodes not only have to remember each packet they received, but also
what happened to it, so that it can be tracked down a path. SPP represents this
information as 1) a time oﬀset to the beginning of the epoch to indicate the time
when the packet was received; 2) a set of links to which the packet was forwarded
(i.e., to capture both unicast and multicast protocols), if any; and 3) for each such
link, a list of rule identifiers and mutations that were applied. Such information is
collected in action buﬀers that are “parallel” to the epoch buﬀers. e nodes commit
to their actions by building an MHT over the action buﬀer, just as it does for the
epoch buﬀers; and the top-level hash ha0 is recorded in an entry (A! B; i;ha0)
in its tamper-evident log, just after the  entry.
SPP uses the action buﬀers to produce the  vertexes that link a (p)
vertex to its (p0i) vertex. is is crucial because some nodes can apply mutations
to packets in transit: for instance, a NAT will change the port numbers and IP
addresses in the header, and many routers will decrement the TTL field. In these
cases, the hash H(p0i) of the forwarded packet will diﬀer from the hash H(p) of the
packet that was received. But given the recorded actions, an auditor whose view
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includes the  vertexes can reapply them to p and verify whether H(p0i) is the
correct hash.
Epoch faults: If any of the required messages does not arrive, or if A and B compute
diﬀerent top-level hashes, they report this as an epoch fault to their local administra-
tor, e.g., by incrementing an SNMP counter. Absent link failures and attacks, epoch
faults can only occur due to undetected packet corruption that has not been handled
at the MAC layer, or due to loss of control packets (which could be avoided with
extra FEC on these packets, or by sending control packets multiple times.) ere-
fore, a non-trivial number of epoch faults suggests either a link failure or an attack,
and should be investigated immediately by an administrator.
3.3.3 Tamper-evident log
To prevent nodes from “changing history” and from presenting diﬀerent views of
their history to diﬀerent auditors, each node maintains an append-only tamper-
evident log (TEL) [84]. e TEL consists of entries of the form si := (t;hi;E ;c),
where t is a timestamp, E is an entry type, c is the content of the entry, and hi :=
H(hi 1 jj t jjE jjH(c)) forms a hash chain of the entries. SPP has nine entry types:
• (r;R) / (r): A rule R with rule ID r was added or deleted;
• (l) / (l): Link l went up or down;
• (l;E;h0) / (l;E;h0;a;c): e top-level hash of the
local/remote MHT for an epoch E on link l was h0. a and c are the remote
node’s authenticator and hash chain.
• (l;E;a;c): e final authenticator and hash chain for epoch E on link l
were a and c, respectively.
• (l;E;ha0): e top-level hash of the action buﬀer for an epoch E on link
l was ha0.
• (C): C contains a snapshot of the node’s current link statuses and
rules.
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e TEL can be used to authenticate past entries as follows. Recall from Sec-
tion 3.3.2, any node A can commit to the contents of its TEL up to some entry
sk by sending an authenticator ak := (k;hk; sA(k jjhk)) to another node. If A ever tam-
pers with a previously recorded entry s j, j  k, this change will invalidate the hash
values of all subsequent entries and be inconsistent with ak, as well as any other au-
thenticators that the node has sent since s j. erefore, suppose that A wants to prove
to B that an entry s j was part of the log that was authenticated by ak, k  j. en A
can provide a hash chain (ak;s j) that consists of (tx;Ex;H(sx)); j < x k; using
this information, B can recompute h j;h j+1; : : : ;hk; if hk matches the value in ak and
ak is properly signed with A’s secret key, B can be sure that the claim is valid [84].
e TEL has two other uses. First, it can be used to reconstruct previous states,
e.g., a rule that was used in some past epoch, by loading the most recent checkpoint
before that epoch and replaying all the subsequent actions until the epoch of interest
has been reached. Second, SPP does not require synchronized clocks across the
network; the  and  entries in the TEL provide a form
of timeline entanglement [121], which limits how much a compromised node can
distort the timing of events to the length of a single epoch.
Notice that the data in the TEL is needed to respond to queries; if a node’s
TEL is lost or corrupted, that node will no longer be able to respond and thus will
(appropriately) register as faulty. However, the loss of the TEL will also prevent a
more detailed diagnosis. If this is undesirable, the system can maintain replicas of
the TEL.
3.3.4 Query processing protocol
We now describe how to query the evidence in the TELs.
Querier: A can query the fate of some packet p it has previously sent to B as follows.
A scans its epoch buﬀers for the hash H(p) and identifies 1) the epoch i in which p
was sent, 2) its index j, and 3) the commitment c := sB(A! B jj i jjh0) with which B
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System Goal Information oﬀered
Capabilities
Secure Supports Covers entire Fine-grained Fine-grained
evidence forensics Internet entities traces
Tulip [118] Fault localization Loss, delay, reordering   X X(Routers) X(Packets)
NetPolice [178] Traﬃc diﬀerentiation detection Loss   X  (ISPs)  (Flows)
SPIE [157] IP traceback Backward routes  X X X(Routers) X(Packets)
NetSight [87] Network debugging Packet histories  X  X(Routers) X(Packets)
Netdiﬀ [119] ISP performance benchmarking Delay   X  (ISPs) X(Packets)
Paris-traceroute [41] Load-balancer detection Load-balanced routes   X X(Routers) X(Packets)
HAL [82] Packet attestation Packet transmissions X X  X(Links) X(Packets)
AudIt [37] Performance accountability Loss, delay   X  (ISPs) X(Both)
SPP Single network-level primitive All of the above X X X X(Routers) X(Packets)
Table 3.1: Comparison between SPP and some existing diagnostic and forensic
primitives.
has acknowledged p’s receipt. A then constructs a containment proof (c;H(p)),
which shows thatH(p) is a leaf node in theMHT rooted at h0, and invokes (p)
on B with the tuple u := (c;(c;H(p)).
Responder: When B receives the query, it first verifies that the provided com-
mitment is genuine. If so, it uses the epoch number and the link identifier in
c to locate the corresponding action buﬀer, which will tell B the rule that it has
applied to p, and which link(s) p was forwarded to. Finally, B provides the fol-
lowing response: 1) for each link B! C to which p was forwarded, the commit-
ment cC := sC(B ! C jj j jjhC; j0 ); 2) the new hash H(p0); 3) a containment proof
(cC;H(p0)); 4) the relevant entry sp in the action buﬀer, and 5) a contain-
ment proof (cC;H(sp)). 1)–3) give A all it needs to invoke  on the next
hopC (or, if the packet was cloned, on each next hop), and to generate the  and
 vertexes for the next-hop link(s); 4) and 5) allow A to apply the mutations
in sp and verify that p0 is the same packet as p.
3.3.5 Retroactive freezing protocol
So far, we have explained SPP as if each node kept all of its epoch buﬀers forever.
In practice, SPP allows each node to expire old epoch buﬀers after some time TE ,
while ensuring that malicious nodes cannot discard their buﬀers freely to cover their
tracks, and that normal queries are given enough time to complete.
SPP uses a retroactive freezing protocol, where a node A can request that the
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evidence for a packet p be frozen into stable storage, so that it can be inspected on
human timescales. A does so by sending a special freeze packet p0 = (H(p)) on
the same port as p before TE elapses. p0 and pmaintain the same header so that they
will likely take the same path. But if path divergence happens or p0 gets dropped, SPP
can be recursively applied to p0 to investigate such instances. Moreover, the freeze
packet is sent retroactively, up to several seconds after the packet was originally sent,
so that a compromised node cannot predict which packets will be frozen, and then
treat these packets diﬀerently to avoid detection; by the time the freeze packet arrive,
the nodes will have forwarded the packets and committed to their actions. e end
users can choose which packets to freeze according to their needs, or randomly freeze
a subset of their traﬃc. To prevent the freeze primitive from being abused (e.g., for
DoS attacks), nodes can limit the rate at which they are willing to freeze packets: if
a node receives too many freeze requests from a neighbor, it can record the requests
and the corresponding commitment, and then deny the excess request. If that node
is challenged later because it did not respond to a request, it can show the saved
requests to prove its innocence.
3.3.6 Properties
Next, we discuss the properties of SPP. In the presence of Byzantine nodes, the
provenance graph Ge constructed from the collected evidence e is only an approxi-
mation of the “actual” provenance graph G; for example, a faulty node may refuse
to provide an explanation consistent to e in response to a  request. However,
Ge is a close enough approximation of G, providing the following guarantees:
• Ge is accurate. Ge faithfully reproduces all the vertexes on correct nodes, that
is, 1) if a vertex v on a correct node exists in Ge, then v must also exist in G,
with the same predecessors and successors; and 2) a correct node will never be
accused as faulty.
• Ge is complete. Given evidence e from correct nodes, 1) each vertex in G on
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a correct node also appears in Ge, and 2) when some node is detectably faulty,
recursive  invocations will identify at least one faulty node.
In other words, although we cannot force faulty nodes to cooperate, SPP will always
generate provenance that reflects the actual execution of all correct nodes, and SPP
can correctly expose at least one faulty node with non-repudiable evidence.
In terms of privacy guarantees, a node is not allowed to audit or otherwise learn
about packets it has not processed:
• Ge is private. Given an evidence e collected through recursive , Ge con-
structed by node v contains only  and  vertexes for packets that
are visible to v. We say a packet p is visible to a node v, if 1) p is received or
sent by v, 2) p is mutated and forwarded as p0 that is visible to v, or 3) a visible
packet p0 is mutated and forwarded as p.
3.3.7 Limitations
SPP is designed for diagnostics and forensics on the Internet’s data plane, and there
are at least three classes of problems that SPP cannot diagnose directly: a) faults of
a remote node that do not aﬀect any external messages, such as CPU overload; b)
faults that happen outside of the Internet data plane, such as BGP prefix hijacking;
and c) faults that need aggregate information about the packets, such as high per-
flow latencies. Next, we explain these categories in more detail, and discuss potential
ways of addressing some of them.
Non-observable faults: Not all problems on a node can be detected from only its
externally visible inputs and outputs. For instance, if a bit flips in a node’s memory,
its CPU load is high, or its disk has failed, the network packets that the nodes sends
may not be aﬀected initially (or ever). Even if the problem does aﬀect a network
packet, detection may still be impossible if the nodes that receives the packets is also
faulty. is limitation is inherent [83] and also aﬀects other systems that attempt to
detect or diagnose faults based on network events.
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Control-plane diagnostics: SPP, as described here, generates an IP-level provenance
graph on the Internet’s data plane; it does not provide visibility into control-plane
events. us, SPP’s  primitive cannot detect faults thatmanifest entirely on the
control plane, such as BGP prefix hijacking, routing policy violations, and the like.
is limitation is not inherent, and it should be possible to remove it by extending
the provenance model to capture control-plane events, as discussed in Section 3.2.4.
Aggregate information: SPP’s  primitive returns information about individ-
ual packets, so it cannot directly diagnose problems that are related to aggregate
properties of multiple packets or entire flows. For instance, if a flow is experienc-
ing low throughput, this cannot be detected based on what happened to individual
packets in that flow. One way to get around this would be to implement the sum-
marization extension from Section 3.2.4; an even simpler way would be to query
multiple packets and to do the analysis as a post-processing step. e precision of
the second approach would be limited by the accuracy of the nodes’ timestamps
(recall that SPP does not assume synchronized clocks); however, previous work has
shown [38] that useful performance measurements are possible even when the clocks
are only loosely synchronized.
3.4 Case studies
Next, we describe four classes of common diagnostic and forensic tasks for which
specialized solutions already exist. We explain how SPP can approximate these so-
lutions, and how they could be re-implemented on top of SPP. Table 3.1 provides a
summary.
Traceback: Traceback is the process of identifying the sender of a (potentially
spoofed) packet. is is diﬃcult in the current Internet because packets contain
no secure data about their source or the paths they have traversed. Source authen-
tication systems like AIP [34] and Passport [113] aim to prevent spoofing using
cryptographic signatures. Path verification systems aim to reconstruct a packet’s
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path, e.g., by securely recording it in a header [135], by probabilistically marking
packets [148], or by keeping digests of packets at each router [157]. Both types
of traceback essentially require access to the path a received packet has taken, which
is a part of the packet-level provenance that SPP oﬀers (although SPP does not
proactively prevent spoofing).
Routing and performance problems: A common diagnostic task is to determine
why a particular path has unusually high packet loss, delay, or has become unavail-
able [110, 41, 159]. To overcome the limited visibility deep within the network,
proposals have been made to extract more diagnostic information, e.g., by using
more vantage points [98], adding network extensions [118, 38, 143], or using his-
torical data [59, 157]. NetSight [87] even remembers packet “histories” that are
similar to the provenance in SPP (though in an intra-domain setting). In essence,
those systems want to know the path a transmitted packet has taken, along with some
timing information for each hop. SPP exposes a superset of the information needed:
packet-level properties are visible directly; flow-level properties can be extracted by
some post-processing on a set of frozen packets.
Intrusions and misbehavior: Internet-related evidence is appearing in many court
cases, but forged packets and IP addresses can lead to judicial errors [82] and bogus
actions [142]. One possible solution is to enable the use of packet traces as secure
evidence using source or packet authentication. AIP [34] and Passport [113] pro-
vide the former, and HAL [82] provides the latter; ICING [135], Clue [27], and
DRKey [105] support both. In some cases, the ISPs themselves have an incentive to
manipulate unwanted traﬃc [58] or to inject advertisements [145]. Systems to de-
tect such misbehaviors include, e.g., Glasnost [58] and NetPolice [178] that detect
traﬃc diﬀerentiation, and Web Tripwires [145] that detects in-flight packet mod-
ifications. However, to ultimately resolve such situations, one also needs evidence:
since the recipient of the packet (the victim) is usually diﬀerent from the entity that
takes action (e.g., a judge), it is necessary to verify that a particular evidence is au-
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thentic. SPP’s authenticators are designed for this purpose.
Topology discovery: Topology mapping is useful for latency prediction and mod-
eling [153]. However, in the absence of direct support, people must generally rely
on low-quality data, e.g., from traceroutes or IP record-route options, which require
great ingenuity to collect and clean up. It would be much easier if the network
provided explicit and unambiguous information, so that there would be no need for
“guesswork” based on subtle idiosyncrasies of network hardware.
3.5 Implementation
We have implemented two prototypes of SPP: a software-only implementation of
the entire system, and a NetFPGA prototype of the parts that would need to run at
line speed.
Software prototype: Our software prototype is written in C/C++. It can be con-
figured to run 1) as a Click router module [107], or 2) as a standalone program.
In Click mode, SPP runs with live traﬃc forwarding; we performed functionality
checks and prototyped six common diagnostic routines in this mode. In standalone
mode, SPP still runs the entire protocol but disables traﬃc forwarding; we used this
mode to evaluate SPP’s protocol overhead as a very conservative lower-bound. Both
modes are trace-based, so they are not limited by the speed of our physical NICs. We
used SHA-1 for the hash function1 and RSA-2048 for the cryptographic signatures,
as implemented in the OpenSSL library v1.0.1.f. Our Click mode implementation
is based on Click v2.1.
NetFPGA prototype: As we will show in Section 4.5, the dominating cost in SPP
comes from packet hashing and MHT construction. To evaluate its performance in
realistic deployment, we have built an additional implementation of those two com-
ponents in hardware, on a NetFPGA-10G [46] platform. Our platform contains
1After the recent discovery of a collision [158], SHA-1 is no longer considered secure. Future
implementations should use a more recent hash function, such as SHA-256.
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a Xilinx Virtex 5 (65nm) FPGA (xc5vtx240tﬀg1759-2 [90]), as well as four SFP+
modules that can each support 10 Gbps traﬃc. We have implemented SPP as part
of the Output Port Lookup module (somewhat analogous to the design in [134]),
so that it can run in parallel with the traﬃc forwarding path. Our logic is divided
into 13 fully pipelined stages. e first stage contains a state machine that parses
packets from NetFPGA’s AXI4-Stream interconnects; the second stage computes
per-packet hashes; and the remaining 11 stages construct the MHTs. Our imple-
mentation builds on NetFPGA and open-source hashing libraries, and consists of
2,588 lines of Verilog code.
e first stage routes 64 bits of packet data per cycle from the AXI4-Stream in-
terconnects, so it can send a minimum-sized packet to the hashing stage every eight
cycles. Our hasher also accepts 64 bits per cycle, but it incurs a 14-cycle delay after
the packet’s last-bit signal is asserted. To nevertheless keep up with the incoming
data rate, the hashing stage contains four separate instances of the hasher and uses
them in a round-robin fashion. Each of theMHT stages consists of a buﬀering phase
and a hashing phase: the buﬀering phase uses a fallthrough FIFO in SRAM to hold
the hashes produced by the previous stage, and the hashing phase dequeues hashes
from its FIFO, hashes them in pairs, and then enqueues the new hash at the next
FIFO.e last stage’s hasher produces the MHT roots. Since the data rate decreases
as hashes pass through the MHT stages, we are able to do rate matching using 15
hashers: four for the first MHT stage, two for the second MHT stage, and one per
each of the remaining stages. We have used SHA-3 (Keccak) in the hardware imple-
mentation for its good performance; to make the results comparable to those from
the software prototype, we use only the last 160 bits to match the length of SHA-1.
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate SPP’s performance overhead and demonstrate how com-
mon diagnostic functionalities can easily be built with it. We first evaluate SPP’s
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protocol overhead with our software prototype, including storage, bandwidth, and
computation costs, both with real high-speed traﬃc, and in worst-case scenarios; in ad-
dition, we report our hardware microbenchmarks to show that the seemingly high
computation cost in software could be easily handled by oﬀ-the-shelf hardware tech-
nology. (Note that the storage and bandwidth overheads, unlike the computation
cost, would not diﬀer across hardware and software platforms.)
We obtained our real traﬃc from CAIDA’s live capture on a 10 Gbps OC-192
link on Jan. 19, 2012, in which 4.6 million packets were sent with an average rate of
2.46 Gbps. For the worst-case scenarios, we synthesized traﬃc at 100Mbps, 1 Gbps,
and 10 Gbps in which all packets have the minimum size, and thus the traﬃc has
the maximum packet rate (which is unlikely to occur with real traﬃc). We also
used an epoch length of T = 100ms, and 10-bit sequence numbers in the link-layer
headers, allowing the numbers in the header to wrap: the full sequence number can
be reconstructed as long as loss bursts are below 210. Our software experiments were
run on a Dell OptiPlex 9020 workstation, which has a 3.40 GHz Intel i7-4770 CPU
(with 8 cores), 16 GB of RAM, and a 500 GB hard disk. e OS was Ubuntu 14.04
with kernel version 3.8.0.
3.6.1 Recording: Computation cost
SPP requires each network component to regularly generate commitments for the
traﬃc it sends and receives, and to verify its neighbors’ commitments. We first used
our software prototype to quantify this cost. We generated synthetic traces that con-
sisted entirely of 40-byte packets (the smallest valid TCP packet, 84 bytes on the
wire [96], and thus the worst case for SPP) with rates of 100 Mbps, 1 Gbps, and
10 Gbps. We then ran all four traces through our software prototype, measured the
computation time to generate and verify the commitments, and normalized the cost
to the performance of an individual core. For instance, if one core took 2 seconds
to process the commitments for packets sent in 1 second, we report this as 2 cores.
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Figure 3.2: Computation cost of SPP’s commitment protocol, normalized to the
power of one core. e cost of hashing dominates. (e other bars are too low to
see.)
(SPP trivially scales to multiple cores, as the cores can work on diﬀerent epochs inde-
pendently.) We report a decomposition of the cost of hashing, signature generation,
and signature verification.
Figure 3.2 shows that the dominant computational cost of SPP is hashing, es-
pecially at higher link speeds. is is good news because hashing is easy to do in
hardware [68, 136], and it is also the reason why our NetFPGA prototype focuses
on hashing: the remaining computations have a moderate cost, so routers should
be able to perform them in software. Figure 3.3 shows results from a similar ex-
periment where the two highest-cost traces still maintain the same rates, but have
diﬀerent packet sizes (and 14-byte Ethernet headers). e figure shows that the
overhead drops quickly as the packet size increases. is is because the number of
internal hashes in the MHT depends only on the number of packets, but not on
their size. At a more typical packet size of 300 bytes [156], the cost is 54% lower.
Hardware prototype: For our NetFPGA prototype, computation cost is not a good
metric; instead, we quantify the maximum supported bitrate and the number of
hardware elements that it requires. Our NetFPGA prototype can be synthesized
to run at 200 MHz (5 ns per clock cycle), which achieves a theoretical through-
put of 12.8 Gbps, and an eﬀective throughput of 10 Gbps with the existing SFP+
modules. We note that these results are consistent with other benchmarking ef-
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Figure 3.3: Computation cost for diﬀerent packet sizes in the two traces with the
highest costs.
Resource Used Total available Utilization
Slice registers 53,964 149,760 36%
Slice LUTs 109,040 149,760 72%
Block RAMs 28 324 8%
Table 3.2: Hardware cost for hashing and building MHTs.
forts [67, 122, 42]. We have listed the hardware utilization in Table 3.2, in terms
of LUTs (LookUp Tables), registers, and Block RAMs used. ey are well within
the resources available on Virtex-5 FPGAs, and would be only a fraction if mapped
on more recent FPGAs: for instance, NetFPGA-SUME’s Virtex-7 has nearly three
times as many logical elements [185]. We also note that 10 Gbps is not the limit:
for 100 Gbps routers, there are optimized hashers that could achieve 34.27 Gbps
per hasher on Virtex-5 FPGAs [128], which is about ten times faster than the hash
module we have used. e performance of our hardware prototype represents a lower
bound on the performance that a hardware implementation of SPP can achieve; in
a real-world deployment, the packet processing would be performed on ASICs in
high-speed routers, which are much faster than FPGAs.
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3.6.2 Recording: Bandwidth cost
Since SPP’s bandwidth and storage overheads do not vary with the underlying hard-
ware or software platforms - unlike the computation speed - we evaluated them on
our software prototype. SPP requires an extra link-layer header, as well as some new
control messages for exchanging commitments. Both consume some fraction of the
raw link capacity that is no longer available for sending traﬃc. To quantify this ef-
fect, we measured the fraction of the raw link capacity that was used by SPP. We sent
R = 3 replicas of each control message, to conservatively account for message loss,
and we assumed a link-level packet loss rate of 1%, which is orders of magnitude
above typical rates today [20, 14]. We show results for 40-byte packets (the worst
case) and a more typical packet size of 300 bytes.
Figure 3.4 shows our results. For the 100 Mbps trace with 40-byte packets, SPP
only consumes about 2.06% of the available link capacity. Moreover, the overhead
drops with increasing link speeds and increasing packet size. is is because the
overhead has two components: one consists of three fixed-size messages (,
, and ) that are sent once per epoch, regardless of the link speed
and the number of messages, and the other consists of the link-layer headers and
the entries in the missing packet list (), which are both proportional to the
number of packets. At 1 Gbps and with the more typical 300-byte packets, the
overhead is only 0.42%. For the most realistic case of the OC-192 link, the overhead
is only 0.16%.
3.6.3 Recording: Memory
SPP requires a certain amount of RAM for epoch buﬀers, action buﬀers, and the list
of lost packets. Next, we quantify how much memory these data structures require.
In our implementation, an entry in the epoch buﬀer requires 20 bytes (the size of
a hash value), an entry in the action buﬀer requires 30 bytes (the size of a timestamp,
a destination port number, and up to 3 mutation records), and an entry in the loss
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Figure 3.4: Bandwidth consumption of SPP’s commitment protocol, as a fraction
of the raw link capacity.
buﬀer requires 10 bits (the size of a sequence number). For each received packet,
SPP adds one entry to each of the first two buﬀers, and for each missing sequence
number, it adds an entry to the third buﬀer. We also dimension the buﬀers for
the worst case. If we assume a 1 Gbps link, an epoch length of T = 100ms, and a
minimum packet size of 40 bytes (i.e., up to 312,500 packets per epoch), the epoch
and action buﬀers would require 6.25MB and 9.38MB of memory, respectively;
with a link-level loss rate of 1%, the loss buﬀer would require 3.91 kB. Since all sizes
are proportional to the link speed, a 10 Gbps link would require ten times as much.
e number of buﬀers depends on the number of ports the node has, and on
the latency that is needed to finish the commitment protocol, which depends on the
link’s RTT. (Recall that the sender must retain the hashes until the receivers’ 
message arrives.) If we conservatively assume a per-link RTT of up to 100ms, 2 
(100=T ) = 2 buﬀers would be needed per port, so a node with twenty 1 Gbps ports
would need 625 MB of RAM. Note that the hashes are written at much lower rates
than the links’ bitrates, so expensive SRAM is not required – commodity DRAM
is enough, e.g., NetFPGA-SUME has 8 GB of DDR3 synchronous DRAM with a
238.8 Gbps peak memory throughput [185].
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3.6.4 Recording: Disk space
SPP requires disk space to store the packet-level evidence that has been “frozen” by
queriers, as described in Section 3.3.5. To quantify how much storage is needed, we
ran the traces through SPP and randomly froze a certain fraction f of the packets.
Figure 3.5 shows the amount of data written to disk due to audits. It is expected
that the amount of frozen evidence increases with f . However, the increase is not
linear: for small f , SPP must store not only the hash of each frozen packet but
also the hashes of internal nodes along the path to the root. But, as f increases,
there is more and more overlap between the paths, which reduces the number of
additional hashes that need to be stored for each new frozen packet. Note that the
next-hop authenticator needs to be stored only once per epoch, so the necessary
space is comparatively small. From the figure we can see that, an auditing rate of
f = 1% can be well supported by the throughput of a hard disk, and f = 15% with
a commodity SSD.
Summarizations: Summarizations (Section 3.2.4) can further reduce the stor-
age consumption. To demonstrate this, we have designed a flow-level summariza-
tion that contains less detail but can be retained longer. Analogous to NetFlow, this
summarization describes the flows the router has seen, the number of packets in each
flow, and the size of each flow (but not per-packet information, such as the content
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hashes). We note that naïvely extracting flow-level information by examining every
packet in the epoch buﬀers would be prohibitive. erefore, we design an approxi-
mate yet eﬃcient summarization method by exploiting the heavy-tail distribution of
Internet flow sizes: a flow-level summarization will only achieve a high compression
ratio on large, “elephant” flows, but not on small “mice”. So our approach attempts
to recognize “elephant” flows and summarize their packets only, leaving packets in
“mouse” flows as is. Elephants could be eﬃciently identified with an algorithm such
as ElephantTrap [117], or simply by sampling a small fraction of the packets; if both
endpoints of a link use the same method for summarization, they will arrive at the
same result, and can thus use the commitment protocol to agree on it.
We have implemented a simple, sampling-based flow-level summarization in our
SPP prototype, and demonstrated that this is indeed practical. We make two passes
over each epoch to summarize the packets. In the first pass, we randomly sampled
20% of its packets and record their flow identifiers as summarization targets. In the
second pass, we summarize target flows into flow-level summaries that only include
i) number of packets in a flow, ii) size of a flow, and iii) the flow identifier itself.
We then write i) the flow-level summaries for the target flows, and ii) packet-level
evidence for the unsummarized flows into disk. e computation cost for summa-
rization is 0:23 cores. e data rate is only 8:8MBps for the OC-192 link; therefore,
a 100 GB disk would be able to store the flow-level summaries for 25:3 hours, or
more than a day.
3.6.5 Querying
Computation: Upon a query, SPP must freeze and retrieve the evidence that is
needed to answer it. e evidence can be constructed by building a MHT with
packets in the queried epoch, and tracing the relevant paths from the root to the
queried packets. Querying multiple packets in the same epoch only costs marginally
more than querying only one packet from that epoch, because queries for packets in
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Figure 3.6: Computation cost for answering queries.
the same epoch can be buﬀered until the end of the epoch and answered altogether.
erefore, the worst-case cost is whenMHTs for all epochs need to be reconstructed.
Note that this is a simple repetition of the MHT construction at recording time
(Section 3.6.1), only this timewe do not need to hash the packets again. We show the
computation cost for diﬀerent link speeds in Figure 3.6, and note that our NetFPGA
prototype could achieve this at a 10 Gbps rate.
Bandwidth: e bandwidth needed for freezing is low (a single 40-byte packet),
so we focus on the bandwidth for retrieving the evidence. Recall that to query the
provenance of a packet p on a node n, the querier provide nwith p’s hash, the number
of the epoch pwas sent in and the corresponding authenticator, p’s index in the epoch
buﬀer, and a containment proof that links the authenticator to the hash; the response
contains the same information for the next hop, along with the relevant entry from
the action buﬀer. For a given choice of hash function and signature algorithm, the
size of all fields is fixed, except for the containment proof, which grows with the
height of the per-epoch MHT. For a 1Gbps link with T = 100ms, the size of a single
query in our implementation is 680 bytes; for a 10Gbps link, the MHT grows by
four levels, and thus the size of a query grows to 760 bytes. Responses are 30 bytes
larger because of the additional action buﬀer entry. Both queries and responses are
small enough to fit into a single packet.
We now estimate the worst-case bandwidth cost of querying. e cost for a sin-
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Core functionality LoC
Trace a transmitted packet’s path [92] 8
Trace a received packet’s traversed path [157] 8
Identify node on path that drops a packet [118] 8
Attest to the transmission of a packet [82] 9
Identify link on path with highest delay [110] 24
Compute a link’s average throughput [119] 26
Table 3.3: Several applications we built with SPP, and the lines of code (LoC) they
required. e code can be found in the appendix.
gle query (with freeze packet and headers for request and response) is 40+680+
710+228=1486 bytes, or 4.95 times the average packet size of 300 bytes. us,
if a node allows up to 1% of its traﬃc to be queried, query-related packets would
account for 4.7% of its traﬃc.
3.6.6 Comparison with SNP
We next compare SPP with SNP [180], the state-of-the-art system for secure prove-
nance. SNP has been applied to BGP, Chord, and Hadoop, but it is not designed
to handle the high data rates on the network data plane. To demonstrate this, we
ran SNP and SPP side by side, and we streamed packets through both of them; we
report the results we have obtained on the 1Gbps trace with 40B packets.
Disk space: At an auditing rate of 1%, SPP wrote 65% less evidence on disk than
SNP. is is because SPP’s evidence mostly consists of 20-byte hashes and not the
longer RSA signatures that SNP requires.
Bandwidth: SPP consumes 98:2% less bandwidth than SNP. is is because SPP’s
can commit to a batch of packets using a single root hash, whereas SNP has to
commit to each packet one by one.
Computation: On the same trace, SPP runs 1378:5 times faster than SNP. is is
because SPP only performs two hashes per packet and one RSA signature per batch,
whereas SNP needs to sign every single packet. At this speed, SNP would require
the equivalent of more than a thousand CPU cores to process 1 Gbps of traﬃc in
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void tracert(Packet *p, Evidence *e) {
IP *nextHop = gatewayIP;
Packet *p0 = p;
do {
query(&p, &e, nextHop);
print(nextHop+" "+(e.time-p0.time));
} while (nextHop != END_OF_PATH);
}
Figure 3.7: Code for tracing a packet’s traversed path.
software, whereas SPP can do the same with a single core.
3.6.7 Building applications with SPP
To determine whether SPP can fulfill its key promise of supporting a wide variety
of diagnostic and forensic tasks, we implemented the core functionalities of six di-
agnostic and forensic systems from the literature on top of the  primitive that
SPP provides. Table 3.3 shows a list of the six systems, along with the lines of code
(LoC) in our implementations. e LoC numbers are very low: our most com-
plex application consists of 26 LoC, and four of the six applications have less than
10 LoC. For concreteness, Figure 3.7 shows the slightly simplified code for tracing
the path a transmitted packet p has traversed; the code simply iterates through the
sequence of hops, starting with the evidence it received when p was originally sent,
and outputs the IPs and latencies it encountered along the way.
e low number of LoC may seem surprising, but the reason is that most of the
complexity in the original applications was in the special-purpose network primi-
tives they proposed, or in smart techniques for leveraging and working around ex-
isting primitives (such as ICMP TTL Exceeded) that were originally introduced for
some other purpose. With SPP in place, the applications we tried reduce mostly
to gathering the relevant evidence and/or performing some simple post-processing.
erefore, SPP does deliver its key benefit: a single primitive that can handle most
existing – and hopefully future – diagnostic and forensic tasks.
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3.7 Deployment
As with most extensions to the Internet architecture, getting SPP deployed at scale
would not be easy, so it would be unrealistic to expect that all ASes would imme-
diately install SPP on all their switches, routers and middleboxes. However, SPP
has a number of properties that could help facilitate its deployment. Below, we
discuss possible strategies for deploying SPP partially and the guarantees a partial
deployment would provide, ways of using SPP with existing router hardware, and
incentives for ISPs to deploy SPP.
3.7.1 Partial deployment
SPP can be usefully deployed at an individual ISP to diagnose ISP-local problems, so
there is no need for a global “flag day”. Its benefits increase gradually with the size of
the deployment: the more ISPs have support for SPP, the more coverage SPP would
have, and the higher the chances that a problem will occur on a path segment that
is SPP-enabled (and can thus be diagnosed with SPP). is is very diﬀerent from a
protocol like S-BGP, which must be deployed almost universally to be useful.
For a strategic first deployment, one possible approach would be to first secure
cross-domain links with SPP-enabled NICs, and retain legacy NICs for internal
links. Similar to the strategy in NetReview [80], an AS can periodically disseminate
the authenticators its border routers have received to its neighboring ASes. In such
a partial deployment model, we would lose the capability of tracing a packet all the
way down its path, as a recursive invocation of  would terminate at the first
hop without an SPP deployment. Nevertheless, we still gain useful guarantees with
regard to neighboring ASes with cross-domain SPP links. e generated evidence
at border routers can be used to detect problems and resolve dispute as to which
AS misbehaved. More concretely, this would be suﬃcient to localize problems to
a particular AS (or, from the perspective of adjacent ASes, suﬃcient to show that
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the problem was not caused by them). It would not help with AS-local diagnostics,
but this capability could be added gradually by enabling SPP on additional devices
within the AS.
Impact on guarantees: If a path contains both SPP-enabled and SPP-agnostic de-
vices, provenance information is only available for the segments of the path that are
SPP-enabled. In other words, the provenance graph has “holes”. Vertexes at the rim
of a “hole”—say, a  from an SPP-enabled switch to an SPP-agnostic one—are
not verifiable because SPP-agnostic devices do not provide evidence. We call such
vertexes rim vertexes. However, all other vertexes are verifiable as before.
Within a contiguous SPP-enabled path segment,  can be used as previously
described. However, in a sparse deployment, there could be multiple short segments,
so it would be useful for queriers to continue their query across the rim vertexes and
onto the next segment. is is possible, though it would require some additional
mechanism. e two key challenges are 1) finding the next SPP-enabled node on
the path, and 2) handling packet mutations, such as decremented TTL values or
other header option changes. One possible way to handle this, at least within a
single AS, would be to use tunneling; it should also be possible to guess a small set
of possible next-hop nodes based on the packet’s destination IP, and to try all of these
to find the one that the packet actually went through. Simple mutations could be
handled by excluding the relevant fields from the packet hash, as, e.g., in SPIE [157],
In terms of the accuracy, completeness, and privacy guarantees discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.6, the accuracy and privacy guarantees would still hold, but we would lose
the completeness guarantee on SPP-agnostic nodes because the evidence pertaining
to them cannot be collected in a verifiable manner.
More concretely, the provenance graph Ge is still accurate, as the integrity of
evidence is protected by the cryptographic signatures in the commitment scheme:
correct nodes can still be trusted to generate evidence pertaining to them, while faulty
nodes still cannot implicate correct nodes by generating false evidence on their own.
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e provenance graph is still private because queriers still cannot use SPP’s 
interface to learn information about packets that are not already visible to them –
queriers cannot correctly guess the authenticator that is required to initiate a query.
However, the completeness guarantee only holds for links on which both end-
points implement SPP. Recall that the first condition in the completeness guarantee
says that each vertex in G will also appear in Ge, the graph generated by the collected
evidence. Clearly, in a partial deployment, Ge is restricted to capturing only those
events that are secured by SPP. e second condition says that detectably faulty
nodes will be exposed by a recursive invocation of . But since nodes that do
not support SPP would break the capability of recursively invoking  through
them, queries will have to stop at the first hop without SPP support. As a result,
there might exist faulty nodes that “hide” beyond the “broken” SPP chain that can
otherwise be detected by a full SPP deployment.
erefore, in a partial deployment where SPP is only enabled on the border
routers, we would have the following properties. Any events that happen on those
border nodes will retain the desirable properties of completeness, accuracy, and pri-
vacy. However, if faults happen deep within a network (where SPP has not been
deployed yet), or recursive tracing is necessary to trace faults down a path, fault
detection would be more diﬃcult. We note that this still seems to be a useful guar-
antee, given that a) events within the same domain fall under the administration of
a single trust root, so they can be examined relatively easily by an operator; and b)
events that cross neighboring trust domains (where most of the peering contracts
take place) can still be verified and attributed by the use of the SPP protocol.
3.7.2 Using existing routers
Deploying SPP does not necessarily require new equipment. Consider a cross-
domain link on which neither side has implemented SPP in their routers, but they
would still like to use SPP. is is still achievable by attaching a separate machine
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or FPGA, i.e., an SPP proxy, to each endpoint of the link, and mirroring all traf-
fic to them. e proxies can make commitments and enable audits according to the
SPP protocol, while the routers themselves forward traﬃc as they would with today’s
routing fabric. Similarly, if a cross-domain link has one SPP-enabled router on one
side and one conventional router on the other, a similar standalone proxy could be
used to pair with the SPP-enabled node.
is approximation may cause some inaccuracy when the traﬃc mirroring pro-
cess causes packets to be dropped or garbled. For instance, for a link A! B where
A’s mirroring has caused packet loss or corruption that is not visible by B, the SPP
proxies could generate commitments mismatch when in fact no fault has happened.
But we could handle this ‘false alarm’ by allowing a certain fraction of commitment
mismatches on links with a box-facilitated SPP deployment.
Impact on guarantees: We now discuss the guarantees that can be provided by links
with SPP proxies. ere are two cases: a) only one side of the link installs SPP but
the other side uses a proxy, and b) both sides use proxies. Since case b) is essentially
a simple extension of case a), we primarily focus on case a) in the ensuing discussion.
On a link A!Bwhere A is SPP-enabled but B uses a proxy, the accuracy guarantee
holds only if the traﬃc mirroring process successfully forwards every packet from A
to its proxy. In this case, eﬀectively, the commitment protocol between A’s proxy
and B will work as if both sides had deployed SPP.
However, if routers A and Bwork correctly but the traﬃc mirroring process could
drop or garble some packets from A to its proxy, the accuracy guarantee will be
weakened. In this case, since the SPP module on A’s side works on a separate proxy,
the packets that have been dropped or garbled during traﬃc mirroring will not be
committed on A’s side (though the packets arrived at B without error). So when A’s
proxy and B try to establish agreement, it may appear as if B had generated some extra
packets in the epoch but as a matter of fact this is due to the inaccuracy introduced
by the proxy.
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is translates into the following accuracy guarantee: in the epochs where A and
B are able to establish agreement, SPP’s accuracy holds as with the case without a
proxy; in the epochs where the traﬃc mirroring malfunctions, SPP will lose accuracy
for those epochs only. Since the traﬃc mirroring malfunction is expected to be rare,
links with proxies could allow a small number of commitment mismatch to happen,
and record these epochs where SPP cannot provide guarantees.
e analysis for completeness guarantee is similar: Completeness still holds when
agreement can be established; but for the epochs where agreement cannot be estab-
lished, the completeness guarantee will be weakened since SPP cannot distinguish
between the case where A’s proxy dropped packets and the case where B injected
extra packets.
Privacy still holds because neither side can query packets from each other if they
have no prior evidence, i.e., the packets have to be visible.
3.7.3 Incentives for deployment
One primitive, many applications: As we have argued, it should be possible to
implement a variety of existing diagnostic and forensic systems on top of SPP. us,
although deploying any new feature in the data plane would not be cheap, at least
this eﬀort would have to be spent only once (rather than once for each specialized
solution), and it would yield a solution for a wide range of problems.
Few changes to the protocol stack: SPP leaves the current protocol stack (almost)
untouched; it mostly “sits on the sidelines” and collects information about the traﬃc
it observes. (e one change it does require is the additional link-layer header for the
commitment protocol, which is only visible to the routers on that particular link.)
us, SPP requires much fewer changes than a design that introduces a new kind of
addresses [34] or major packet header changes [135].
Given the above reasons, we believe that ISPs can benefit from deploying SPP.
e large ISPs, such as tier-1 ASes, tend to adopt new technologies and best prac-
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tices early to increase their competitiveness. Given the diagnostic complexities and
security issues in today’s Internet, SPP seems to be an attractive value-added service
to provide to their customers: SPP is designed to support a wide variety of existing
diagnostic and forensic primitives [110, 34, 38, 41, 58, 59, 82, 87, 113, 98, 118,
130, 135, 145, 148, 157, 159, 178], so the rationale for deploying these primitives
should, at least to some extent, apply to SPP as well.
More concretely, since SPP can handle a wide range of diagnostic tasks, it can, in
particular, also handle troubleshooting tasks that are directly useful to an individual
ISP (analogous to NetSight [87]), even without considering the rest of the Internet.
For instance, SPP could serve as a troubleshooting tool, analogous to NetSight [87].
us, each ISP would initially have at least some incentive to deploy SPP in its
own network, independent of what everyone else is doing. SPP is perhaps a bit
heavyweight for any single purpose, and, if this were the only usage scenario the ISP
cared about, it might be better oﬀ with a specialized solution, such as the original
NetSight. However, SPP has a variety of other uses (e.g., detecting compromised
routers), so an ISP might be willing to shoulder some additional cost for the extra
flexibility.
Moreover, SPP can help with cross-domain fault localization, which is notori-
ously diﬃcult. For instance, suppose two adjacent ISPs cannot agree whether a
path performance problem lies in one ISP or the other. Today, this situation might
involve long phone calls between the ISP operator teams, and potentially some cus-
tomer dissatisfaction on both sides, even at the ISP who is not at fault. is creates
a triple incentive to deploy SPP: 1) ISPs might prefer to peer with networks that
support SPP, to better diagnose problems in these networks; 2) ISPs might adopt
SPP in their own network to distinguish themselves from competitors and to high-
light their own reliability; and 3) ISPs might adopt SPP to quickly establish that the
problem an angry customer is reporting is not on their side.
Ideally, these incentives would initially lead to the formation of “deployment
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islands”, which would then slowly grow until they start to merge. In the process,
the fraction of a typical path that would be covered by SPP would slowly increase,
leading to better and better end-to-end diagnostics.
3.8 Related Work
Here, we review existing literature on network diagnostics and forensics that are
particularly related to SPP, and note that related work on network provenance has
been described in Chapter 2.
Specialized primitives: As discussed in Section 5.1, there is a rich literature on
systems that solve a particular diagnostic or forensic problem [110, 34, 38, 41, 58,
59, 82, 87, 113, 98, 118, 130, 135, 145, 148, 157, 159, 178]. To address all of
the underlying problems, it would be necessary to deploy all of these systems in
combination. In contrast, SPP aims to provide a single primitive that can be used
for a broad variety of tasks.
Packet-level diagnostics: SPIE [157], HAL [82], and NetSight [87] resemble SPP
in that they all “remember” every single network packet. However, SPIE cannot
reliably identify a specific packet due to the use of Bloom filters, and HAL only col-
lects per-packet evidence but does not perform diagnosis. NetSight [87] is closest to
SPP: it assembles a “history” of each packet for SDNs. However, NetSight provides
no security guarantees in the presence of compromised nodes, and it is designed
for a data-center setting, where packet traces can be recorded without privacy con-
cerns and data does not need to be shared with other domains. UnivMon [114] and
OpenSketch [172] are recent proposals for flow-level monitoring counters based on
sketches. ese approaches are useful for gathering traﬃc statistics, but, unlike SPP,
they do not provide packet-level provenance data.
Accountability: SPP is similar in spirit to previous proposals for network-level ac-
countability, e.g., “packet obituary” [36] that reports packet drops, or AudIt [37]
that provides secure records of delay and loss rates. Network Confessional [38] uses
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a similar retroactive sampling approach to prevent special treatment of the sampled
packets; however, it focuses on forwarding performance verification, not direct sup-
port for diagnostics or forensics. PAAI [177] also uses retroactive sampling to track
lost packets, but it assumed that end hosts are always honest.
3.9 Conclusion
As the large number of proposed extensions shows, the current Internet architec-
ture does not support diagnostics and forensics very well. However, most existing
proposals are specialized solutions; thus, a comprehensive solution would require de-
ploying several of them concurrently, at a substantial cost – in terms of both overhead
and complexity. In this chapter, we have made a case for a network-level primitive
that can support a variety of diﬀerent diagnostic and forensic applications, and we
have also presented SPP as a concrete proposal. Our evaluation shows that SPP can
be implemented eﬃciently in hardware and can approximate a variety of common
diagnostic and forensic tasks.
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4
Diﬀerential Provenance
Distributed systems are not easy to get right. Despite the fact that researchers have
developed a wide range of diagnostic tools [101, 169, 171, 120, 151, 167, 60],
understanding the intricate relations between low-level events, which is needed for
root-cause analysis, is still challenging.
Recent work on data provenance [183] has provided a new approach to under-
standing the details of distributed executions. Intuitively, a provenance system keeps
track of the causal connections between the states and events that a system gener-
ates at runtime; for instance, when applied to a software-defined network (SDN), it
might associate each flow entry with the parts of the controller program that were
used to compute it. en, when the operator asks a diagnostic question – say, why a
certain packet was routed to a particular host – the system returns a comprehensive
explanation that recursively explains each relevant event in terms of its direct causes.
A number of provenance-based diagnostic tools have been developed recently, in-
cluding systems like ExSPAN [183], SNP [180], and Y! [169].
However, while such a comprehensive explanation is useful for diagnosing a prob-
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lem, it is not the same as finding the actual root causes. We illustrate the diﬀerence
with an analogy from everyday life: suppose Bob wants to know why his bus arrived
at 5:05pm, which is five minutes late. If Bob had a provenance-based debugger,
he could submit the query “Why did my bus arrive at 5:05pm?”, and he would get
a comprehensive explanation, such as “e bus was dispatched at the terminal at
4:00pm, and arrived at stop A at 4:13pm; it departed from there at 4:15pm, and
arrived at stop B at 4:21pm; ... Finally, it departed from stop Z at 5:01pm, and
arrived at Bob’s platform at 5:05pm”. is is very diﬀerent from what Bob really
wanted to know: the actual root cause might be something like “At stop G, the bus
had to wait for five minutes because of a traﬃc jam”.
But suppose we allow Bob to instead ask about the diﬀerences between two events
– perhaps “Why did my bus arrive at 5:05pm today, and not at 5:00pm like yes-
terday?”. e debugger can then omit those parts of the explanation that the two
events have in common, and instead focus on the (hopefully few) parts that caused
the diﬀerent outcomes. We argue that a similar approach should work for diagnos-
ing distributed systems: reasoning about the diﬀerences between the provenance of
a bad event and a good one should lead to far more concise explanations than the
provenance of the bad event by itself. We call this approach diﬀerential provenance.
Diﬀerential provenance requires some kind of “reference event” that produced
the correct behavior but is otherwise similar to the event that is being investigated.
ere are several situations where such reference events are commonly available, such
as 1) partial failures, where the problem appears in some instances of a service but
not in others (Example: DNS servers A and B are returning stale records, but notC);
2) intermittent failures, where a service is available only some of the time (Example:
a BGP route flaps due to a “disagree gadget” [77]); and 3) sudden failures, where a
network component suddenly stops working (Example: a link goes down immedi-
ately after a network transition). As long as the faulty service has worked correctly
at some point, that point can potentially serve as the needed reference.
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At first glance, it may seem that that diﬀerential provenance merely requires find-
ing the diﬀerences between two provenance trees, perhaps with a tree-based edit dis-
tance algorithm [45]. However, this naïve approach would not work well because
small changes in the network can cause the provenance to look wildly diﬀerent. To
see why, suppose that the operator of an SDN expects two packets P and P0 to be
forwarded along the same path S1-S2-S3-S4-S5, but that a broken flow entry on
S2 causes P0 to be forwarded along S1-S2-S6 instead. Although the root cause (the
broken flow entry) is very simple, the provenance of P and P0 would look very dif-
ferent because the two packets traveled on very diﬀerent paths. (We elaborate on
this scenario in Section 4.1.) A good debugger should be able to pinpoint just the
broken flow entry and leave out the irrelevant consequences.
In this chapter, we present a concrete algorithm called DiﬀProv for generating
diﬀerential provenance, as well as a prototype debugger that leverages such infor-
mation for root-cause analysis. We report results from two diagnostic scenarios:
software-defined networks and Hadoop MapReduce. Our results show that dif-
ferential provenance can explain network events in far simpler terms than existing
systems: while the latter often return elaborate explanations that contain hundreds
of events, DiﬀProv can usually pinpoint one critical event which, in our experience,
represents the “root cause” that a human operator would be looking for. We also
show that the cost for the higher precision is small: the run-time overheads are low
enough to be practical, and diagnostic queries can usually be answered in less than
one minute. We make the following contributions:
• e concept of diﬀerential provenance (Section 4.2);
• DiﬀProv, a concrete algorithm for generating diﬀerential provenance (Sec-
tion 4.3);
• a DiﬀProv debugger prototype (Section 4.4); and
• an experimental evaluation in the context of SDNs and Hadoop MapReduce
(Section 4.5).
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Web server	 #1 DPI	device
Web server	 #2
Overly	specific	 rule
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
S6
Internet P P’
Figure 4.1: Example scenario (SDN debugging).
We discuss related work in Section 4.6, and conclude the chapter in Section 5.6.
4.1 Overview
Figure 5.1 shows a simple example of the problem we are addressing. e illustrated
network consists of six switches, two HTTP servers, and one DPI device. e oper-
ator wants web server #2 to handle most of the HTTP requests; however, requests
from certain untrusted subnets should be processed by web server #1, because it is
co-located with the DPI device that can detect malicious flows based on the mir-
rored traﬃc from S6. To achieve this, the operator configures two OpenFlow rules
on switch S2: a) a specific rule R1 that matches traﬃc from the untrusted subnets
and forwards it to S6; and b) a general rule R2 that matches the rest of the traﬃc
and forwards it to S3. However, the operator made R1 overly specific by mistake,
writing the untrusted subnet 4.3.2.0/23 as 4.3.2.0/24. As a result, only some of
the requests from this subnet arrive at server #1 (e.g., those from 4.3.2.1), whereas
others arrive at server #2 instead (e.g., those from 4.3.3.1). e operator would
like to use a network debugger to investigate why requests from 4.3.3.1 went to
the wrong server. One example of a suitable reference event would be a request that
arrived at the correct server – e.g., one from 4.3.2.1.
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EXISTENCE(S6, 
packetForward(@S6, Sip=4.3.2.1), t2) 
EXISTENCE(S6, 
flowEntry(@S6, Pri=High, 
Sip=4.3.2.0/24, Act=Output:1), t4) 
AND 
EXISTENCE(Server #1, 
packet(@Server #1, Sip=4.3.2.1), t1) 
V1#
EXISTENCE(S6, 
packet(@S6, Sip=4.3.2.1), t3) 
The packet arrived at web 
server #1 because it was 
forward by the last-hop 
switch.!
When the packet arrived, it 
matched a high priority flow 
entry that forwards untrusted 
packets to web server #1.!
The packet arrived at  
the last-hop switch . 
...# …
V0#
V2#
V3#
Figure 4.2: An example provenance tree
faulty rule
root
(a) Full provenance of P0 at server #2
root
(b) Full provenance of P at server #1
Figure 4.3: Provenance trees for P0 (a) and P (b) from Figure 5.1. Each circle corre-
sponds to a box in Figure 4.2, but the details have been omitted for clarity. Although
the two full trees have some common subtrees (green), most of their vertexes are dif-
ferent (red). Also shown is the single vertex in (a) that represents the root cause of
the routing error that aﬀected P0.
4.1.1 Background: Provenance
Network provenance [183] is a way to describe the causal relationships between
network events. At a high level, the provenance of an event e is simply a tree of
events that has e at its root, and in which the children of each vertex represent the
direct causes of that vertex. Figure 4.3(a) sketches the provenance of the packet P
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from Figure 5.1 when it arrives at web server #1. e direct cause of P’s arrival is
that P was sent from a port on switch S6 (vertex V1); this, in turn, was caused by
1) P’s earlier arrival at S6 via some other port (V2), in combination with 2) the fact
that P matched some particular flow entry in S6’s flow table (V3), and so on.
To answer provenance queries, systems use the abstraction of a provenance graph,
which is a DAG that has a vertex for each event and an edge between each cause and
its direct eﬀects. To find the provenance of a specific event e, we can simply locate
e’s vertex in the graph and then project out the tree that is rooted at that vertex. e
leaves of the tree consist of “base events” that cannot be further explained, such as
external inputs or configuration states.
Provenance itself is not a new concept; it has been explored by the database and
networking communities, and there are techniques that can track it eﬃciently by
maintaining some additional metadata [47, 69, 169].
4.1.2 Why provenance is not enough
Provenance can be helpful for diagnosing a problem, but finding the actual root cause
can require substantial additional work. To illustrate this, we queried the provenance
of the packet P0 in our scenario after it has been (incorrectly) routed to web server
#2. e full provenance tree, shown in Figure 4.3(b), consists of no less than 201
vertexes, which is why we have omitted all the details from the figure. Since this is
a complete explanation of the arrival of P0, the operator can be confident that the
information in the tree is “suﬃcient” for diagnosis. However, the actual root cause
(the faulty rule; indicated with an arrow) is buried deep within the tree and is quite
far from the root, which corresponds to the packet P0 itself. is is by no means
unusual: in other scenarios that were discussed in the literature, the provenance
often contains tens or even hundreds of vertexes [169]. Hence, extracting a concise
root cause from a complex causal explanation remains challenging.
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4.1.3 Key idea: Reference events
Our key idea is to use a reference event to improve the diagnosis. A good reference
event is one that a) is as similar as possible to the faulty event that is being diagnosed,
but b) unlike that event, has produced the “correct” outcome. Since the reference
event reflects the operator’s expectations of what the buggy network ought to have
done, we rely on the operator to supply it together with the faulty event.
e purpose of the reference event is to show the debugger which parts of the
provenance are actually relevant to the problem at hand. If the provenance of the
faulty event and the reference event have vertexes in common, these vertexes cannot
be related to the root cause and can therefore be pruned without losing information.
If the reference event is suﬃciently similar to the faulty event, it is likely that almost
all of the vertexes in their provenances will be shared, and that only very few will be
diﬀerent. us, the operator can focus only on those vertexes, which must include
the actual root cause.
For illustration, we show the provenance of the reference packet P from our sce-
nario in Figure 4.3(c). ere are quite a few shared vertexes (shown in green), but
perhaps not as many as one might have expected. is is because of an additional
complication that we discuss in Section 4.1.5.
4.1.4 Are references typically available?
To understand whether reference events are typically available in practical diagnostic
scenarios, we reviewed the posts on theOutages mailing list from 09/2014–12/2014.
ere are 89 posts in total, and 64 of them are related to network diagnosis. (e
others are either irrelevant, such as complaints about a particular iOS version, or are
lacking information that is needed to formulate a diagnosis, such as a news report
saying that a cable was vandalized.) We found that 45 of the 64 diagnostic scenarios
(70.3%) contain both a fault and at least one reference event; however, in ten of
the 45 scenarios, the reference event occurred in another administrative domain, so
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we cannot be sure that the operator would have had access to the corresponding
diagnostic data. Nevertheless, even if we ignore these ten events, this leaves us with
35 out of 64 scenarios (or slightly more than half ) in which a reference event would
have been available.
We further classified the 45 scenarios into three categories: partial failures, sud-
den failures, and intermittent failures. e most prevalent problems were partial
failures, where operators observed functional and failed installations of a service at
the same time. For instance, one thread reported that a batch of DNS servers con-
tained expired entries, while records on other servers were up to date. Another class
of problems were sudden failures, where operators reported the failure of a service
that had been working correctly earlier. For instance, an operator asked why a ser-
vice’s status suddenly changed from “Service OK” to “Internal Server Error”. e
rest were intermittent failures, where a service was experiencing instability but was
not rendered completely useless. For instance, one post said that diagnostic queries
sometimes succeeded, sometimes failed silently, and sometimes took an extremely
long time.
In most of the scenarios we examined, the reference event could have been found
in one of two ways: either a) by taking the malfunctioning system and looking back
in time for an instance where that same system was still working correctly, or b) by
looking for a diﬀerent system or service that coexists with the malfunctioning system
but has not been aﬀected by the problem. Although our survey is far from universal,
these strategies are quite general and should be applicable in many other scenarios.
4.1.5 Why not compare the trees directly?
Intuitively, it may seem that the diﬀerences between two provenance trees could be
found with a conventional tree comparison algorithm – e.g., some variant of tree edit
distance algorithms [45] – or perhaps simply by comparing the trees vertex by vertex
and picking out the diﬀerent ones. However, there are at least two reasons why this
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would not work well. e first is that the trees will inevitably diﬀer in some details,
such as timestamps, packet headers, packet payloads, etc. ese details are rarely
relevant for root cause analysis, but a tree comparison algorithm would nevertheless
try to align the trees perfectly, and thus report diﬀerences almost everywhere. us,
an equivalence relation is needed to mask small diﬀerences that are not likely to be
relevant.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, small diﬀerences in the leaves (such as
forwarding a packet to port #1 instead of port #2) can create a “butterfly eﬀect”
that results in wildly diﬀerent provenances higher up in the tree. For instance, the
packet may now traverse diﬀerent switches and match diﬀerent flow entries that in
turn depend on diﬀerent configuration states, etc. is is the reason why the two
provenances in Figures 4.3a and 4.3b still have considerable diﬀerences: the former
has 201 vertexes and the latter 156, but the naïve “diﬀ” has as many as 278 – even
though the root cause is only a single vertex! us, a naïve diﬀ may actually be larger
than the underlying provenances, which completely nullifies the advantage from the
reference events.
4.1.6 Approach: Differential provenance
Diﬀerential provenance takes a fundamentally diﬀerent approach to identifying the
relevant diﬀerences between two provenance trees. We exploit the fact that a) each
provenance describes a particular sequence of events in the network, and that b)
given an initial state of the network, the sequence of events that unfolds is largely
deterministic. For instance, if we inject two packets with identical headers into
the network at the same point, and if the state of the switches is the same in each
case, then the packets will (typically) travel along the same path and cause the same
sequence of events in the network. is allows us to predict what the rest of the
provenance would have been if some vertex in the provenance tree had been diﬀerent
in some particular way.
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is enables the following three-step approach for comparing provenance trees:
First, we locate a pair of “seed” vertexes that triggered the diagnostic event and the
reference event. We then conceptually “roll back” the state of the network to the
corresponding point, make a change that transforms some “bad” vertex into a good
one, and then “roll forward” the network again while keeping track of the new prove-
nance along the way. us, the provenance tree for the diagnostic event will become
more and more like the provenance tree for the reference event. Eventually, the two
trees are equivalent. At this point we output the set of changes (or perhaps only one
change!) that transformed the one tree into the other; this is our estimate of the
“root cause”.
4.2 Differential Provenance
In this section, we introduce the concept of diﬀerential provenance. For ease of ex-
position, we adopt a declarative system model that is commonly used in database
systems when reasoning about provenance. is model describes a system’s states
as tuples, and its algorithm as derivation rules that process the tuples. e key ad-
vantage of using this model is that provenance is very easy to see in the syntax.
Although one can directly program with such rules and then compile them into an
executable [116], few deployed systems are written that way today. However, Diﬀ-
Prov is not specific to the declarative model: in Section 4.4, we describe several ways
in which rules and tuples can be extracted from systems that are written in other
languages, and our prototype debugger has a front-end that accepts SDN programs
that are written in Pyretic [131], an imperative language.
4.2.1 System model
We assume that the system that is being diagnosed consists of multiple nodes that
run a distributed protocol, or a combination of protocols. System states and events
are represented as tuples, which are organized into tables. For instance, the model
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for an SDN switch would have a table called FlowEntry, where each row encodes
an OpenFlow rule and each column encodes a specific attribute of it, e.g., incoming
port (in_port), match fields (nw_dst), actions (actions), and others. As a sim-
plified example, a tuple FlowEntry(5,8,1.2.3.4) may indicate that packets with
destination IP 1.2.3.4 that arrive on port 5 should be sent out on port 8.
e algorithm of the system is described by a set of derivation rules, which encodes
how tuples could be derived when and where. External events to the system, such as
incoming packets, are modeled as base tuples. Whenever a base tuple arrives, it will
trigger a set of derivation rules and cause new derived tuples to appear; the derived
tuples may in turn trigger more rules and produce other derived tuples. Rules have
the form A :- B,C,..., which means that a tuple A will be derived whenever tuples
B,C,... are present; for instance, the model for an SDN switch would have a rule
that derives PacketOut tuples from PacketIn and FlowEntry tuples. Rules can also
specify tuple locations using the @ symbol to encode a distributed operation: for
instance, A(i,j)@X :- B(i)@X,C(j)@Y indicates that an A(i,j) tuple should be
derived on node X whenever a) node X has a B(i) tuple and b) node Y has a C(j)
tuple. Here, i and j are variables of certain types, e.g., IP ranges, switch ports, etc.
e provenance system observes how the primary system runs, keeps track of its
derivation chains, and uses them to explain why a particular system event occurred.
e provenance of a tuple is very easy to explain in terms of the derivation rules:
a base tuple’s provenance is itself, since it cannot be explained further; a derived
tuple’s provenance consists of the rule(s) that have been used to derive it, as well as
the tuples used by the rule(s). For instance, if a tuple A was derived using some rule
A :- B,C,D, then A exists simply because tuples B, C, and D also exist. Without loss
of generality, we model tuple deletions as insertions of special “delete” tuples; this
results in an append-only maintenance of the provenance graph.
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4.2.2 The provenance graph
ere are diﬀerent ways to define provenance, and our approach does not depend on
the specific details. For concreteness, we will use a simplified version of the temporal
provenance graph from [182]. We chose this graph because its temporal dimension
enables the graph to “remember” past events; this is useful, e.g., when the reference
event is something that happened in the past. e graph from [182] consists of the
following seven vertex types:
• (n;t; t), (n;t; t): Base tuple t was inserted (deleted) on node n at
time t;
• (n;t; [t1; t2]): Tuple t existed on node n from time t1 to t2;
• (n;t;R; t), (n;t;R; t): Tuple t was derived (underived) via rule
R on n at time t;
• (n;t; t), (n;t; t): Tuple t appeared (disappeared) on node n at
time t;
e provenance graph is built incrementally at runtime. When a base tuple is in-
serted, this causes an  to be added to the graph, followed by an  (to
reflect the fact that a new tuple appeared), and finally an  (to reflect that the
tuple now exists in the system). Having three separate vertexes may seem redundant,
but will be useful later – for example, whenDiﬀProvmust find tuples that “appeared”
last. If the appearance of a tuple triggers a derivation via a rule, a  vertex is
added to the graph. e remaining three “negative” vertexes (, ,
and ) are analogous to their positive counterparts.
4.2.3 Towards a definition
We are now ready to formalize the problem we have motivated in Section 4.1. For
clarity, we start with the following informal definition (which we then refine in sev-
eral steps):
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Definition attempt 1. Given a “good” provenance tree TG with root vertex vG and a
“bad” provenance tree TB with root vertex vB, diﬀerential provenance is the reason why
the two trees are not the same.
More precisely, we adopt a counterfactual approach to define “the reason”: al-
though the actual provenance of vG is clearly diﬀerent from that of vB, we can look
for changes to the system that would have caused the provenances to be the same.
For instance, in the example from Section 4.1, the actual reason why the packets P
and P0 were routed diﬀerently was an overly specific flow entry; by changing that
flow entry into a more general one, we can cause the two packets to take the same
path. Since any change can be captured by a combination of changes to base tuples,
we can restate our goal as finding some set DB!G of changes to base tuples that would
transform the “bad” tree into the “good” one.
Refinement #1 (Mutability): Importantly, not all changes to base tuples make
sense in practice. For instance, in our SDN example, it is perfectly reasonable to
change base tuples that represent configuration states, but it is not reasonable to
change base tuples that represent incoming packets, since the operator has no con-
trol over the kinds of packets that arrive at her border router. us, we distinguish
between mutable and immutable base tuples, and we do not consider changes that
involve the latter. (Note that this restriction implies that a solution does not always
exist.) We thus arrive at our next attempt:
Definition attempt 2. Given two provenance trees TG and TB, their diﬀerential prove-
nance is a set of changes DB!G to mutable tuples that transforms TB into TG.
Refinement #2 (Preservation of seeds): Even when restricted to mutable tuples,
the above definition is not quite right, because we are not looking to transform TB
into TG verbatim: this contradicts our intuition that TB is about a diﬀerent event,
and that a meaningful solution must preserve the events whose provenance the trees
represent. To formalize this notion, we designate one leaf tuple in each tree as the
seed of that tree, to reflect that the tree has “sprung” from that event, and we require
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function DP(TG;TB)
sG  (TG)
sB  (TB)
if sG 6' sB then 
DB!G  /0
while TG 6' TB do
(tG;tB) (sG;sB)
t 0G  (tG)
(t 0G;tG)
TB  (TB;DB!G)
return DB!G
function (sG;sB)
for each field sG[i] 6= sB[i]
(sG[i];sB[i])
tG  sG, tB  sB
while tG ' tB do
(tG ! parent(tG))
(tB ! parent(tB))
tG  parent(tG)
tB  parent(tB)
return (tG;tB)
function (t 0G, tG)
if BaseTuple(t 0G) then
if ImmutableTuple(t 0G) then 
DB!G  DB!G [ft 0Gg
else
for ti 2 children(tG) do
(tG ! ti)
t 0i  (ti)
if @t 0i then(t 0i ,ti)
return
Figure 4.4: Pseudocode of the DiﬀProv algorithm. e , ,
, and  functions are explained in Sections 4.3.2, 4.3.4,
4.3.5, and 4.3.6 respectively. e , , and  func-
tions are introduced to establish equivalence between corresponding tuples in TG and
TB (Section 4.3.3).
that the seeds be preserved while the trees are being aligned. To identify the seed,
observe that, whenever a tuple A is derived through some rule A:-B,C,D,..., one of
the underlying tuples B, C, D, ... was the last one to appear and thus has “triggered”
the derivation. us, we can follow the chain of triggers from the root to exactly
one of the leaves, which, in a sense, triggered the entire tree.
Refinement #3 (Equivalence): If the changes to TB must preserve its seed, the
question arises how the two trees could ever be “the same” if their seeds are dif-
ferent. erefore, we need a notion of equivalence. For instance, suppose that
pkt(1.2.3.4,80,X) and pkt(1.2.3.5,80,Y) are the seeds, representing two HTTP
packets for two diﬀerent interfaces of the same server. en, when aligning the two
trees, we must account for the fact that the IP addresses and payloads are diﬀerent.
In simple cases, this might simply mean that all the occurrences of 1.2.3.4 in TG
are replaced with 1.2.3.5 in TB, but there are more complicated cases – e.g., when
the controller program computes diﬀerent flow entries for the two IPs, perhaps even
with diﬀerent functions. We will discuss this more in Section 4.3.3.
With these refinements, we arrive at our final definition:
Definition 1 (Diﬀerential provenance). Given two provenance trees TG and TB with
seed tuples sG and sB, the diﬀerential provenance of TG and TB is a set of changes DB!G
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to mutable tuples that 1) transforms TB into an equivalent of TG, and 2) preserves sB.
Figure 4.5 illustrates this definition with a simple derivation rule C(x,y2,z+1):-A(x,
y),B(x,y,z) and three example tuples. e seeds A(1,2) and A(2,2) are considered
to be equivalent (and immutable). To align the two provenance trees, the diﬀerential
provenance of TB and TG would be a change from the mutable base tuple B(1,2,3)
in TB to B(1,2,4), which makes it equivalent to its corresponding tuple B(2,2,4)
in TG. is update will be propagated and further change C(1,4,4) to C(1,4,5) in
TB, which now becomes equivalent to tuple C(2,4,5) in TG.
4.3 The DiffProv algorithm
In this section, we present DiﬀProv, a concrete algorithm that can generate diﬀer-
ential provenance. Initially, we will assume that the two trees are completely mate-
rialized and have been downloaded to a single node; however, we will remove this
assumption at the end of this section.
4.3.1 Roadmap
e DiﬀProv algorithm is shown in Figure 4.4. We begin with an intuitive explana-
tion, and then explain each step in more detail.
When invoked with two provenance trees – a “good” tree TG and a “bad” tree TB –
DiﬀProv begins by identifying the seed tuples of both trees (Section 4.3.2). DiﬀProv
then verifies that the two seed tuples are of the same type; if they are not, TG and TB
are not really comparable, and the algorithm fails. Otherwise, DiﬀProv defines an
equivalence relation that maps the seed of the “bad” tree to the seed of the “good”
tree (Section 4.3.3). is helps DiﬀProv to align a first tiny subtree of the two trees,
which provides the base case for the following inductive step.
Starting with a pair of subtrees that are already aligned, DiﬀProv then identifies
the parent vertexes tG and tB of the two trees and checks whether they are already the
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A(1,2)	   B(1,2,3)	  
C(1,4,4)	  
immutable	   mutable	  
A(2,2)	   B(2,2,4)	  
C(2,4,5)	  
diﬀ	   diﬀ	  
equivalent	  tuple	  
TB TG
Figure 4.5: A simplified example showing the diﬀerential provenance for a one-
step derivation. A(1,2), A(2,2) are the seeds; equivalent fields are underlined, and
diﬀerences are boxed. Diﬀerential provenance transforms B(1,2,3) into B(1,2,4)
to align this derivation.
same under the equivalence relation defined earlier (Section 4.3.4). If so, DiﬀProv
has found a larger pair of aligned subtrees, and repeats. If not, DiﬀProv checks which
children of tG are not present in TB, and then attempts to make changes so as to make
these children appear (Section 4.3.5–4.3.6). In doing so, DiﬀProv heavily relies on
the “good” tree TG as a guide: rather than trying to guess combinations of base tuple
changes that might cause the missing tuples to be created, DiﬀProv creates them in
the same way that they were created in TG (modulo equivalence), which reduces an
exponential search problem to a linear one.
During alignment, DiﬀProv accumulates a set of base tuple changes. Once the
roots of TG and TB have been reached, DiﬀProv outputs the accumulated changes as
DB!G and terminates.
4.3.2 Finding the seeds
Given the two provenance trees TG and TB, DiﬀProv’s first step is to find the seed
of each tree. To do this, DiﬀProv uses the following insight: unlike databases,
distributed systems and networks usually do not perform one-shot computations;
rather, they respond to external stimuli. For instance, networks route incoming
packets, and systems like Hadoop process incoming jobs. us, the provenance of
an output is not a uniform tree; rather, there will be one “special” branch of the tree
that describes how the stimulus made its way through the system (say, the route of an
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incoming packet), while the other branches describe the reasons for what happened
at each step (say, configuration states). e seed of the tree is simply the external
event, which can be found at the bottom of this “special” branch.
At first glance, it may seem diﬃcult to find this stimulus in a given provenance
tree, but in fact there is an easy way to do this. Notice that each derivation is triggered
because its last precondition has been satisfied; for instance, if a tuple A was derived
through a rule A:-B,C,D, then one of the three tuples B, C, and Dmust have appeared
last, when the other two were already present. us, this last tuple represents the
stimulus for the derivation. Conveniently, the provenance graph we have adopted
(see Section 4.2.2) already has a special vertex – the  vertex – to identify this
tuple.
us, DiﬀProv can find the seed as follows. Starting at the root of each tree, it
performs a kind of recursive descent: at each vertex v, it scans the direct children of
v, locates the  vertex with the highest timestamp, and then descends into the
corresponding branch of the tree. By repeating this step, DiﬀProv eventually reaches
a leaf that is of type , which it then considers to be the seed.
4.3.3 Establishing equivalence
Next, DiﬀProv checks whether the seeds of TG and TB are of the same type. It is
possible that they are not; for instance, the operator might have asked DiﬀProv to
compare a flow entry that was generated by the controller program to one that was
hard-coded. In this case, the two trees are not really comparable, and DiﬀProv fails.
Even if the seeds sG and sB do have the same type, some of their fields will be
diﬀerent. For instance, sG might be a packet pkt(1.2.3.4,80,A), and sB might
be a packet pkt(1.2.3.5,80,B); in this case, the two packets have the same port
number (80) but diﬀerent IP addresses and payloads. is is not a problem for the
seeds themselves, since they are equivalent by definition (Section 4.2.3); however, it
is a problem for tuples that are – directly or indirectly – derived from the seeds. For
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instance, if a tuple t:=portAndLastOctet(80,4) was derived from sG via a chain of
several diﬀerent rules, how can DiﬀProv know what tuple would be the equivalent
of t in TB? A human diagnostician could intuitively guess that it should be portAnd
LastOctet(80,5), since the last octet in sB was 5, but DiﬀProv must find some other
way.
To this end, DiﬀProv taints all the fields of tuples in TG that have been computed
from fields of sG in some way, and maintains, for each tainted field, a formula that
expresses the field’s value as a function of fields in sG. In the above example, both
fields of t would be tainted. If X, Y, and Z are the three fields of sG, then the formula
for the first field of t would simply be Y (since it is just the port number from the
original packet), and the formula for the second field would be X&0xFF (since it
is the last octet of the IP address in sG). With these formulae, DiﬀProv can find
the equivalent of any tuple in TG simply by plugging in the values from sB. is
will become important in the next step, where DiﬀProv must make missing tuples
appear in TB.
DiﬀProv computes the taints and formulae incrementally as it works its way up
the tree, as we shall see in the next step. Initially, it simply taints each field in sG and
annotates each field with the identity function.
4.3.4 Aligning larger subtrees
Next, DiﬀProv attempts to align larger and larger subtrees of TG and TB. Each step
begins with a pair of subtrees that are already aligned (modulo equivalence); initially,
this will be just the two seed tuples.
First, DiﬀProv propagates the taints to the parent vertex of the good sub-
tree, while updating the attached formulae to reflect any computations. For in-
stance, suppose the root of the subtree was (foo(1,2,3)), its parent was
(bar(1,7),R), and that we have a derivation rule that states bar(a,d):-foo(a
,b,c),d=2*c+1. en DiﬀProv would propagate the taint from the 1 in foo to the
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1 in bar and leave its formula unmodified. DiﬀProv would also propagate the taint
from the 3 in foo to the 7 in bar, but it would attach a diﬀerent formula to the 7: if
f was the formula used to compute the 3 in the good tree from some field(s) of sG
that were diﬀerent in sB (see Section 4.3.3), then DiﬀProv would attach g:=2*f+1
to the 7, to reflect that it was computed using d=2*c+1.
en, DiﬀProv evaluates the formulae for all the tainted tuples in the parent
to compute the tuple that should exist in the bad tree. For instance, in the above
example, suppose the formulae that are attached to the 1 and the 7 in bar(1,7) are
H+1 and 2*(G+1)+1, where H=9 and G=0 are the values of some fields in TB’s seed (see
Section 4.3.3). en DiﬀProv would conclude that a bar(10,3) tuple ought to exist
in TB, since this would be equivalent to the bar(1,7) in TG based on the equivalence
relation.
If the expected tuple exists in TB and has been derived using the expected rule,
DiﬀProv adds the parent vertexes to both subtrees (as well as any other subtrees of
those vertexes) and repeats the induction step with the larger subtrees. If the expected
tuple does not exist in TB, DiﬀProv detects the first “divergence”, and will try to make
the tuple appear using the procedure we describe next.
4.3.5 Making missing tuples appear
At first glance, it is not at all clear how to create an arbitrary tuple. e tuplemight be
indirectly derived from many diﬀerent base tuples, and attempting random combi-
nations of changes to these tuples would have an exponential complexity. However,
DiﬀProv has a unique advantage in the form of the “good” tree TG, which shows
how an equivalent tuple has already been derived. us, DiﬀProv uses TG as a guide
in its search for useful tuple changes.
DiﬀProv begins by propagating the taints from the parent of the current sub-
tree in TG to the other children of that parent. For instance, suppose that the
current parent in TG is a flowEntry(1.2.3.4,5,8) that has been derived using
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flowEntry(ip,s,d):- pkt(ip,s),cfg(s,d) on a pkt(1.2.3.4,5), which is the
root of the current subtree. en, DiﬀProv can simply propagate any taints, and
their formulae, from the 5 and the 8 in the flowEntry to the corresponding fields
in the config tuple.
Note that, in general, propagating taints from a vertex v to one of its chil-
dren can require inverting computations that have been performed to obtain
a field of v. For instance, if a tuple abc(5,8) has been derived using a rule
abc(p,q):-foo(p),bar(x),q=x+2, DiﬀProv must invert q=x+2 to obtain x=q-2
and to thus conclude that a bar(6) is required. While not all rules are injective
or surjective, or are simple enough to be inverted, in practice, the rules we have
encountered are usually simple enough to permit this. In cases when automatic
inverting is not possible, we depend on the model to provide inverse rules. When
there are several preimages (for example, if q=x2+4), DiﬀProv can try all of them.
DiﬀProv then uses the formulae to compute, for each child in TG, the equivalent
tuple in TB, and it checks whether this tuple already exists. e tuple may exist even
if it is not currently part of TB: it may have been derived for other reasons, or it may
have been created by earlier changes to base tuples (see Section 4.3.6). If a tuple does
not exist, DiﬀProv checks whether it is a base tuple. If not, DiﬀProv looks up the
rule that was used to derive the missing tuple in TG, and then recursively invokes the
current step to make the missing children of that tuple appear. If the missing tuple
is indeed a base tuple, DiﬀProv adds that base tuple to DB!G and then performs the
step we discuss next.
4.3.6 Updating TB after tuple changes
Once a new change has been added to DB!G, DiﬀProv must update TB to reflect the
change. Since DiﬀProv is meant to be purely diagnostic, we do not want to actually
apply the new update directly into the running system, since this would aﬀect its
normal execution. Rather, DiﬀProv clones the current state of the system when it
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makes the first change, and applies its changes only to the clone. (Cloning can be
performed eﬃciently using techniques such as copy-on-write.)
e obvious consequence of each update is that one missing tuple in TB appears.
However, the update might cause other missing tuples to appear elsewhere that have
not yet been encountered by DiﬀProv, or remove existing tuples that transitively
depend on the original base tuple. erefore, DiﬀProv allows the derivations in
the cloned state to proceed until the state converges. ese updates only aﬀect the
cloned state, and are not propagated to the runtime system.
If the seeds of the two trees are of the same type, and if DiﬀProv can successfully
invert any computations it encounters while propagating taints, it returns the set of
tuple changes DB!G as the estimated root cause.
4.3.7 Properties of DiffProv
Complexity: e number of steps DiﬀProv takes is linear in the number of ver-
texes in TG. is is substantially faster than a naïve approach that attempts random
changes to mutable base tuples (or combinations of such tuples), which would have
an exponential complexity. DiﬀProv is faster because of a) its use of provenance,
which allows it to ignore tuples that are not causally related to the event of interest,
and b) its use of taints and formulae, which enables it to find, at each step, a specific
tuple change that will have the desired eﬀect – it never needs to “guess” a suitable
change.
False positives: When DiﬀProv outputs a set of tuple changes, this set will always
satisfy our definition from Section 4.2.3, that is, it will transform TB into a tree that
is equivalent to TG, while preserving the seed sB. ere are no “false positives” in the
sense that DiﬀProv would recommend changes that have no eﬀect, or recommend
changes to tuples that are not related to the problem. However, there is no guarantee
that the output will match the operator’s intent: if the operator inputs a packet P and
a reference packet P0, DiﬀProv will output a change that will make the network treat
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P and P0 the same, even if, say, the operator would have preferred P to take a diﬀerent
path. For this reason, it is best if the operator carefully inspects the proposed changes
before applying them.
False negatives: DiﬀProv can fail for three reasons. First, the seeds of TG and TB
have diﬀerent types – for instance, the “good” event is a packet and the “bad” event
is a flow entry. In this case, there is no valid solution, and the operator must pick
a suitable reference. Second, the solution would involve changing an immutable
tuple – for instance, a static flow entry that the operator has declared oﬀ limits, or
the point at which a packet entered the network. In this case, there is again no valid
solution, but DiﬀProv can show the operator what would need to be changed, and
why; this should help the operator in picking a better reference. ird, DiﬀProv
fails if it encounters rules that cannot be inverted (say, a SHA256 hash). We have
not encountered non-invertible rules in our case studies. However, if such a rule
prevents DiﬀProv from going further, DiﬀProv can output the “attempted change”
it would like to try, which may still be a useful diagnostic clue.
4.3.8 Extensions
Distributed operation: So far, we have described DiﬀProv as if the entire prove-
nance trees TG and TB are materialized on a single node. We note that, in actual
operation, DiﬀProv is decentralized: it never performs any global operation on the
provenance trees, and all steps are performed on a specific vertex and its direct parent
or children. erefore, each node in the distributed system only stores the prove-
nance of its local tuples. When a node needs to invoke an operation on a vertex that
is stored on another node, only that part of the provenance tree is materialized on
demand.
Temporal provenance: WhenDiﬀProv tries to make tuples appear, it must consider
the state of the system “as of” the time at which the missing tuple would have had to
exist, and it must apply the new updates to base tuples “early enough” to be present
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at the required time. DiﬀProv accomplishes the former by keeping a log of tuple
updates along with some checkpoints, similar with DTaP [182], so that the system
state at any point in the past can be eﬃciently reconstructed. DiﬀProv accomplishes
the latter by applying the updates shortly before they are needed for the first time.
4.3.9 Limitations and open problems
We now discuss a few limitations of the DiﬀProv algorithm, and potential ways to
mitigate some of them in future work.
Minimality: We note that the set of changes returned by DiﬀProv is not neces-
sarily the smallest, since it attempts to derive missing tuples only via the specific rule
that was used to derive their counterpart in TG. Other derivations may be possible,
and they may require fewer changes. is is, in essence, the price DiﬀProv pays for
using TG as a guide.
Reference events: DiﬀProv currently relies on the operator to supply the refer-
ence event. is works well for the majority of the diagnostic cases we have surveyed
(Section 5.1.3), where the operators have explicitly mentioned some potential ref-
erence events as starting points. But we are also exploring to automate this process
using inspirations from Automatic Test Packet Generation [174] and the “guided
probes” idea in Everflow [184].
Performance anomalies: Provenance in its plainest form works aims to explain
individual events. We note that debugging performance anomalies, e.g., high per-
flow latencies, resembles answering aggregation queries, and may require similar ex-
tensions to the current provenance model [33] that considers provenance for ex-
plaining aggregation results.
Non-determinism: Replay-based debuggers such as DiﬀProv, ATPG [174], etc.,
assume that the network is largely deterministic. In the presence of load-balancers
that make random decisions, e.g., ECMP with a random seed, DiﬀProv would need
to reason about the balancing mechanism using the seed. Under race conditions,
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DiﬀProv would abort at the point where applying the same rule does not result in
the same eﬀect, and suggest that point as a potential race condition.
4.4 Implementation
Next, we present the design and implementation of our DiﬀProv prototype. We
have implemented a DiﬀProv debugger in C++ based on RapidNet [18], with five
major components: a) a provenance recorder, b) a front-end, c) a logging engine, d)
a replay engine, and e) the DiﬀProv reasoning engine.
Provenance recorder: e provenance recorder can extract provenance infor-
mation from the primary system in three possible modes. First, it can directly infer
the provenance if the primary system explicitly captures data dependencies, e.g., it
is compiled into running code from declarative rules [116]. Since RapidNet is a
declarative networking engine based on Network Datalog (NDlog) rules, DiﬀProv
can infer provenance directly from any NDlog program; we applied this technique
to the first three SDN scenarios.
Alternatively, the primary system can be instrumented with hooks that report
dependencies to the recorder, e.g., as in [132]. We applied this to MapReduce by
instrumentingHadoopMapReduce v2.7.1 to report its internal provenance toDiﬀ-
Prov. Our instrumentation is moderate: it has less than 200 lines of code, and it
reports dependencies at the level of individual key-value pairs (e.g., words and their
counts), as well as input data files, Java bytecode signatures, and 235 configuration
entries.
Finally, we can treat the primary system as a black box, and use external spec-
ifications to track dependencies between inputs and outputs, e.g., as in [180]. We
applied this to the complex SDN scenario in Section 4.5.7, where the recorder tracks
packet-level provenance in Mininet [13] based on the packet traces it has produced,
as well as an external specification of OpenFlow’s match-action behavior.
Front-end: For our SDN scenario, we have built a front-end for controller pro-
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grams that accepts programs written either in native NDlog or in NetCore (part
of Pyretic [131]). When a NetCore program is provided, our front-end internally
converts it to NDlog rules and tuples using a technique from Y! [169].
Logging and replay engines: e logging and replay engines are needed to sup-
port temporal provenance as described in Section 4.3.8, and they assist the recorder
to capture provenance information in one of the following two approaches: a) in
the runtime based approach, the logging engine writes down base events and all
intermediate derivations, so that the provenance is readily available at query time;
b) in the query-time based approach, the logging engine writes down base events
only, and the replay engine then reconstructs derivations using deterministic replay.
Although our prototype supports both approaches, we have opted for the latter in
our experiments as it favors runtime performance – diagnostic queries would take
longer, but they are relatively rare events; moreover, it enables an optimization that
allows the replay engine to selectively reconstructs relevant parts of the provenance
graph only.
Reasoning engine: eDiﬀProv reasoning engine retrieves the provenance trees
from the recorder, performs the DiﬀProv algorithm we described in Section 4.3, and
then issues replay requests to update the trees.
4.5 Evaluation
In this section, we report results from our evaluation of DiﬀProv in two sets of case
studies centered around software-defined networks and Hadoop MapReduce. We
have designed our experiments to answer four high-level questions: a) how well
can DiﬀProv identify the actual root cause of a problem?, b) does DiﬀProv have a
reasonable cost at runtime?, c) are DiﬀProv queries expensive to process?, and d)
does DiﬀProv work well in a complex network with realistic routing policies and
heavy background traﬃc?
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4.5.1 Experimental setup
e majority of our SDN experiments are conducted in RapidNet v0.3 on a Dell
OptiPlex 9020 workstation with an 8-core 3.40 GHz Intel i7-4770 CPU, 16 GB of
RAM, a 128 GB OCZ Vector SSD, and a Ubuntu 13.12 OS. ey are based on a
9-node SDN network setup similar with that in Figure 5.1, where we replayed an
OC-192 packet trace obtained from CAIDA [7], as well as several synthetic traces
with diﬀerent traﬃc rates and packet sizes.
We further carry out an experiment on a larger andmore complex SDN network,
replicating ATPG’s [174] setup of the Stanford backbone network. We replicated
this setup because it is a network with complex policies and heavy background traﬃc,
thus a suitable scenario to evaluate DiﬀProv’s capability of finding root causes in
a realistic setting. Since their setup involves a diﬀerent platform (emulated Open
vSwitch in Mininet [13] with a Beacon [23] controller), we defer the discussion of
this experiment to Section 4.5.7.
Our MapReduce experiments are conducted in Hadoop MapReduce v2.7.1,
on a Hadoop cluster with 12 Dell PowerEdge R300 servers with a 4-core 2.83 GHz
Intel Xeon X33363 CPU, 4GB of RAM, two 250 GB SATA hard disks in RAID
level 1 (mirroring), and a CentOS 6.5 OS. As a further point of comparison, we
also re-implemented the MapReduce scenarios in a declarative implementation, and
evaluated them in RapidNet.
4.5.2 Diagnostic scenarios
For our experiments, we have adapted six diagnostic scenarios from existing papers
and studies of common errors. Our four SDN scenarios are:
• SDN1: Broken flow entry [139]. An SDN switch is configured with an
overly specified flow entry. As a result, traﬃc from certain subnets is mistakenly
handled by a more general rule, and routed to a wrong server (TB), while other
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traﬃc from other subnets continues to arrive at the correct server (TG). is is
the scenario from Section 4.1.
• SDN2: Multi-controller inconsistency [60]. An SDN switch is configured
with two conflicting rules by diﬀerent controller apps that are unaware of each
other. e lower-priority rule sends traﬃc to a web server (TG), and the higher-
priority rule sends traﬃc to a scrubber. However, the header spaces of the rules
overlap, so some legitimate traﬃc is sent to the scrubber accidentally (TB).
• SDN3: Unexpected rule expiration [146]. An SDN switch is configured
with a multicast rule that sends video data to two hosts (TG). However, when
the multicast rule expires, the traﬃc is handled by a lower-priority rule and is
delivered to a wrong host (TB). Notice that in this case the “good” example is
a packet that was observed in the past.
• SDN4: Multiple faulty entries. In this scenario, we extended SDN1 with a
larger topology and injected two faulty flow entries on two consecutive hops
(S2–S3). Although some traﬃc can always arrive at the correct server (TG),
traﬃc from certain subnets is originally misrouted by S1 (TB1), and then by S2
after the first fault is corrected (TB2). As a result, DiﬀProv needs to proceed in
two rounds to identify both faults.
Our MapReduce scenarios are inspired by feedback from an industrial collabora-
tor about typical bugs he encounters in his workflow. Since the workflow is propri-
etary, we have translated the problems to the classical WordCount job example, which
counts the number of occurrences of each word in a text corpus. We have evaluated
them with a declarative implementation in RapidNet (MR1-D andMR2-D) and an
imperative implementation in Hadoop’s native codebase (MR1-I and MR2-I). e
MR1 and MR2 scenarios are:
• MR1-D and MR1-I: Configuration changes. e user sees wildly diﬀerent
output files (TB) from a MapReduce job he runs regularly, because he has ac-
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Query SDN1 SDN2 SDN3 SDN4
Good example (TG) 156 156 156 201/201
Bad example (TB) 201 156 201 156/145
Plain tree diﬀ 278 238 74 278/218
DiﬀProv 1 1 1 1/1
Query MR1-D MR2-D MR1-I MR2-I
Good example (TG) 1051 1001 588 588
Bad example (TB) 1051 848 588 438
Plain tree diﬀ 164 306 240 216
DiﬀProv 1 1 1 1
Table 4.1: Number of vertexes returned by five diﬀerent diagnostic techniques; for
SDN4, the two rounds of DiﬀProv are shown separately. DiﬀProv was able to pin-
point the “root causes” with one or two vertexes in each case, while the other tech-
niques return more complex responses.
cidentally changed the number of reducers. Because of this, almost all the
emitted words end up at a diﬀerent reducer node than before (TG).
• MR2-D andMR2-I: Code changes. e user deploys a new implementation
of the mapper, but it has a bug that causes the first word of each line to be
omitted. As a result, the job now produces a diﬀerent output (TB) than before
(TG) for a previously used input file.
4.5.3 Usability
We begin with a series of experiments to verify that diﬀerential provenance indeed
provides a more concise explanation of the “root cause” than classical provenance.
For this purpose, we ran two conventional provenance queries using Y! [169] to
obtain the “good” and the “bad” provenance trees for each of the five diagnostic
scenarios, as well as a diﬀerential provenance query usingDiﬀProv. We also evaluated
a simple strawman from Section 4.1.5, where we performed a plain tree diﬀ based on
the number of distinct nodes, in the hope that the querier would recognize suspicious
gaps. We then counted the number of vertexes in each result.
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Table 4.1 shows our results. As expected, the plain provenance trees typically
contain hundreds of vertexes, which would have to be navigated and parsed by the
human querier to extract the actual root cause. e plain diﬀ is not significantly sim-
pler – in fact, it sometimes containsmore vertexes than either of the individual trees!
(We have discussed the reason for this in Section 4.1.5.) erefore, it would still
require considerable eﬀort to identify tuples that should not be there (e.g., flow en-
tries that should not have been used) or to guess tuples that are missing. In contrast,
diﬀerential provenance always returned very few tuples.
Inmore detail, for SDN1–SDN4, DiﬀProv returned themissing (or broken) flow
entries as the root cause; for MR1-I, DiﬀProv returned mapreduce.job.reduces –
the field in the configuration file that specifies the number of reducers; for MR2-I,
though DiﬀProv cannot reason about the internals of the actual mapper code, it was
still able to pinpoint the version of the mapper code (identified by the checksum of
its Java bytecode) that caused the error; for MR1-D and MR2-D, DiﬀProv returned
those fields’ declarative equivalents in the NDlog model.
To test how DiﬀProv handles unsuitable reference events, we issued ten addi-
tional queries in the SDN1 and MR1-D scenarios for which we picked a reference
event at random. (We applied a simple filter to avoid picking events that we knew
were suitable references.) As expected, DiﬀProv failed with an error message in all
cases. In three of the cases, the supplied reference event was not comparable with the
event of interest because their seeds had diﬀerent types; for instance, one seed was
a MapReduce operation but the other was a configuration entry. In the remaining
seven cases, aligning the trees would have required changes to “immutable” tuples;
for instance, the packet of interest entered the network at one ingress switch and the
reference packet at another. In all cases, DiﬀProv’s output clearly indicated what as-
pect of the chosen reference event was causing the problem; this would have helped
the operator pick a more suitable reference.
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Figure 4.6: Logging rate for diﬀerent traﬃc rates.
4.5.4 Cost: Latency
Next, we evaluated the runtime costs of our prototype, starting with the latency
overhead incurred by logging. For the SDN setup, we streamed 2:5 million 500-
byte packets through the SDN1 scenario, and measured the average latency inflation
of our prototype to process one packet when logging is enabled. For the MapRe-
duce setup, we processed a 12:8 GB Wikipedia dataset in the MR1-I scenario, and
recorded the extra time it took to run the same job with logging enabled. We ob-
served that the latency is increased by 6:7% in the first experiment, and 2:3% in the
second.
We note that our prototype was not optimized for latency, so it should be possi-
ble to further reduce this cost. For instance, the Y! system [169] was able to record
provenance in a native Trema OpenFlow controller with a latency overhead of only
1:6%, and a similar approach should work in our setting. In the MapReduce sce-
nario, the dominating cost was getting the checksums of the data files in HDFS.
Instead of computing these checksums every time a file is read (as in our prototype),
it would be possible to compute them only when files are created or changed. We
tested this optimization in our prototype, and it reduced the latency cost to 0:2%.
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4.5.5 Cost: Storage
Next, we evaluate the storage cost of logging at runtime. We varied the traﬃc rates
in the SDN1 scenario from 1 Mbps to 10 Gbps, with the packet size fixed at 500
bytes, and then measured the rates of log size growth at the border switch. Figure 4.6
shows that the logging rate 1) scales linearly with the traﬃc rate, and 2) is well within
the sequential write rate of our commodity SSD (400 MB/s), even at 10 Gbps. We
also note that DiﬀProv does not maintain a log for every single switch, but only
for border switches: a packet’s provenance can be selectively reconstructed at query
time through replay (Section 4.4). erefore, if DiﬀProv is deployed in a 100-node
network with three border switches, we would only need three times as much storage,
not 100 times.
We performed another experiment in which we fixed the traﬃc rate at 1 Gbps
and varied the packet sizes from 500 bytes to 1,500 bytes. Figure 4.7 shows that
the logging rate decreases as the packet size grows. is is because 1) a dominating
fraction of the log consists of the incoming packets, and 2) we only store fixed-
size information for each packet, i.e., the header and the timestamp, not unlike
in NetSight [87] or Everflow [184]: the latter has shown the feasibility of logging
packet traces at data-center level with Tbps traﬃc rates. Moreover, the logs do not
necessarily have to be maintained for an extensive period of time, and old entries
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can be gradually aged out to reduce the amount of storage needed.
Finally, we measured the storage cost in ourMapReduce scenarios, where the logs
were very small – 26 kB for the 12:8 GBWikipedia dataset, and 1:5 kB for the 1 GB
text corpus. is is because our logging engine records only the metadata of input
files, not their contents: our replay engine can identify input files by their checksums
upon a query, as long as those files are not deleted from HDFS.
4.5.6 Query processing speed
Diagnostic queries do not typically require a real-time response, although it is always
desirable for the turnaround time to be reasonably low. To evaluate DiﬀProv’s query
processing speed, we measured the time DiﬀProv took to answer each of the queries.
As a baseline, we measured the time Y! [169] took to answer each of the individual
provenance queries for the “bad” tree only.
We first ran our SDN queries on a replay of an OC-192 capture from CAIDA,
and the declarative MapReduce queries on a 1 GB text corpus. Figure 4.8 shows
our result: except for SDN4, all other queries were answered within one minute;
the most complex DiﬀProv query (SDN3) was answered in 53:5 seconds. As the
breakdown in the figure shows, query time is dominated by the time it takes to
replay the log and to reconstruct the relevant part of the provenance graph. As a
result, in each case, DiﬀProv queries took about twice as long as classic provenance
queries using the Y! method: both DiﬀProv and Y! need a replay to query out the
trees, but DiﬀProv replays a second time to update the bad tree after inserting the
new tuple. Moreover, for SDN4, both Y! and DiﬀProv need to repeat this twice,
once for each fault; therefore, both tools spent about twice as long on SDN4 as
SDN1–SDN3.
If the reference event is contained in a separate, T 0-second execution, DiﬀProv
would take an additional T 0 seconds to replay and construct the reference tree. is is
the case for ourMapReduce queries that use a reference from a separate job. DiﬀProv
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Figure 4.8: Turnaround time for answering diﬀerential provenance queries (left),
and Y! queries (right). DiﬀProv’s reasoning time (shown as “Other”) is too small to
be visible.
performs three replays for those queries: once on the correct job, another on the
faulty job, and a final one to update the tree. (In Figure 4.8, we have batched the
first two replays to run in parallel, as they are independent jobs.) We then ran the
imperative MapReduce queries on a larger, 12:8 GB Wikipedia data, without any
batching: this time, Y! spent 349 seconds on MR1-I, and 336 seconds on MR2-I;
DiﬀProv took three times as long as Y! in both cases.
We also observe that the actual DiﬀProv reasoning takes a negligible amount
of time – 3:8 milliseconds in the worst case, as shown in a further decomposition
in Figure 4.9. We can see that detecting the first divergence and making missing
tuples appear took more time, because they involve tracking taints and evaluating
their formulae. e SDN cases took more time in making tuples appear, because the
missing (broken) flow entries were generated with more derivation steps. MR1-D
took the longest time in divergence detection because its trees are deeper than those
in all other cases.
4.5.7 Complex network diagnostics
Now that we have shown that DiﬀProv has a reasonably small overhead, we turn
to evaluating the eﬀectiveness of DiﬀProv’s diagnostics on a complex network with
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stacked its two rounds together.
real-world configurations and realistic background traﬃc.
Basic setup: Our scenario is based on the Stanford University network setup
obtained from ATPG [174]; it represents a realistic campus network setting with
complex forwarding policies and access control rules. e network has 14 Oper-
ational Zone (OZ) routers and 2 backbone routers that form a tree-like topology,
and they are configured with 757;000 forwarding entries and 1;500 ACL rules. e
routers are emulated with Open vSwitch (OVS) in Mininet [13], and controlled
by a Beacon [23] controller. We also replicated their “Forwarding Error” scenario
that involves two hosts and two switches, which we will refer to as H1, H2, and S1,
S2, respectively: in the error-free setting, H1 should be able to reach H2 via a path
H1-S1-S2-H2; however, S2 contains a misconfigured OpenFlow entry that drops
packets to 172:20:10:32=27, which is H2’s subnet. Please refer to [174] for a more
detailed description on the configurations and the diagnostic scenario.
Multiple faults: Large networks are often misconfigured in more than one place,
and their configuration tends to be changed frequently. e resulting “noise” can
be challenging for debuggers that simply look for anomalies or recent changes. To
demonstrate that DiﬀProv’s use of provenance prevents it from being confused by
bugs or changes that are not causally related to the queried event, we injected 20
additional faulty OpenFlow rules; 10 of them were on-path fromH1 to H2, and the
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other 10 were on other OVS switches. We verified that the original fault we wanted
to diagnose remained reproducible after injecting these additional faults.
Background traﬃc: To obtain a realistic data-plane environment, we ran three
diﬀerent applications in the network, and injected a mix of background traﬃc: 1)
an HTTP client that fetches the homepage from a remote server periodically; 2)
a client that downloads a large data file from a file server; 3) an NFS client that
crawls the files in the root directory exported by a remote NFS server; and 4) we
streamed the OC-192 trace from CAIDA through the network. e experiments
took about 10 minutes, and produced 12GB packet captures, in which the tshark
protocol analyzer detected 69 distinct protocol types.
Result: To diagnose the faulty event (i.e., a packet that is dropped midway from
H1 to 172:20:10:32=27), we provided DiﬀProv with a reference event, which is a
packet from H1 to 172:19:254:0=24: this is because we noticed that the subnets
172:19:254:0=24 and 172:20:10:32=27 are co-located in S2’s operational zone, yet
H1 is only able to reach the former. We queried out the provenance trees of the
faulty event and the reference event. e trees are smaller than those in previous
SDN scenarios, as this fault only involves two intermediate hops: they contain 67
and 75 nodes, respectively. Nevertheless, their plain diﬀerences contain as many as
108 nodes. We then used DiﬀProv to diagnose the fault - it correctly identifies the
misconfigured OpenFlow entry on S2 to be the “root cause”, despite the 20 other
concurrent faults and the heavy background traﬃc.
At first glance, DiﬀProv’s resilience to environments with substantial background
traﬃc might seem surprising; in fact, DiﬀProv inherits this from the use of prove-
nance, which captures true causality, not merely correlations. Note that this property
sets our work apart from heuristics-based debuggers, e.g., DEMi [150] that is based
on fuzzy testing, PeerPressure [167] that uses statistical analysis to find the likely
value of a configuration entry, NetMedic [97] that ranks likely causes using statisti-
cal abnormality detection, and others. ose debuggers do not incur the overhead
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of accurately capturing causality, but may introduce false positives or negatives in
their diagnostics as a result.
4.5.8 Experience
To check whether DiﬀProv’s diagnostics indeed translates to significant time savings,
we have performed a study with eight graduate students from our department who
specialize in networking research. All participants specialize in networking research,
and have prior exposure to provenance. We presented each participant with an illus-
tration of the SDN1 scenario in Figure 5.1, the controller program, the network’s
intended operation, and we answered any questions they had. We then presented
them with a description of the fault (a packet was routed to the wrong server) and
the corresponding provenance tree. Since the original tree has 156 vertexes and is
thus quite complex, we applied some of the heuristics from Y! [169] (e.g., by sum-
marizing derivation chains in a single super-vertex), yielding a much simpler tree
with 56 vertexes. We asked each participant to diagnose the problem and suggest a
root cause.
Seven of the participants took 20, 20, 24, 35, 40, 45, and 71 minutes (averaging
32minutes) to diagnose the problem; one gave up after 30minutes. We then showed
each participant the output from DiﬀProv, and each quickly agreed that this was
consistent with their understanding of the root cause. We note that this is not a
formal user study; there was no control group, the number of participants is very
small, and the participants were not representative of the likely users of DiﬀProv
(network operators). Nevertheless, our results suggest that diagnosing faults with a
complex provenance tree can take a substantial amount of time, which DiﬀProv’s
much simpler output can help to reduce. We plan to carry out a more detailed user
study as our future work.
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4.6 Related Work
Network diagnostics: A variety of diagnostic systems have been developed over
time. For instance, Anteater [120], Header Space Analysis [101], andNetPlumber [100]
rely on static analysis, while OFRewind [171], Minimal Causal Sequence analy-
sis [151], DEMi [150], and ATPG [174] use dynamic analysis and probing. Unlike
DiﬀProv, many of these systems are specific to the data plane and cannot be used
to diagnose other distributed systems, such as MapReduce. Also, none of these
systems use reference events. As a result, they have the same drawback as the ear-
lier provenance-based systems: they return a comprehensive explanation of each
observed event and cannot focus on specific diﬀerences between “good” and “bad”
events.
A few existing systems do use some form of reference: for instance, PeerPres-
sure [167], EnCore [176], ClearView [141], and Shen et al. [152] use statistical
analysis or data mining to learn correct configuration values, performance models,
or system invariants. But none of them accurately capture causality, or leverage
causality to reduce the space of candidate diagnoses. Attariyan and Flinn [40] does
take causality into account, but it can only compare equivalent systems (e.g., “sick”
and “healthy” computers), not events. NetMedic [97] also models dependencies,
but it relies on statistical analysis and learning to infer the likely faulty component.
e idea of identifying the specific moment when a system “goes wrong” has
appeared in other papers, e.g., in [103], which diagnoses liveness violations by find-
ing a critical state transition. However, [103] does not use reference events, and its
technical approach is completely diﬀerent from ours.
Some existing solutions have packet recording capabilities that resemble the log-
ging inDiﬀProv. For instance, NetSight [87] records traces of packets as they traverse
the network, and Everflow [184] provides packet-level telemetry at datacenter scales.
ese systems reproduce the path a packet has taken, but not the causal connections,
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e.g., to configuration states. Provenance oﬀers richer diagnostic information, and is
applicable to general distributed systems.
Moreover, we note that related work on network provenance has been described
in Chapter 2.
4.7 Conclusion
Diﬀerential provenance is a way for network operators to obtain better diagnostic
information by leveraging additional information in the form of reference events –
that is, “good” and “bad” examples of the system’s behavior. When reference events
are available, diﬀerential provenance can reason about their diﬀerences, and pro-
duce very precise diagnostic information in return: the output can be as small as a
single critical event that explains the diﬀerences between the “good” and the “bad”
behavior. We have presented an algorithm called DiﬀProv for generating diﬀerential
provenance, and we have evaluated DiﬀProv in two sets of case studies: SDNs and
Hadoop MapReduce. Our results show that DiﬀProv’s overheads are low enough to
be practical.
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5
Causal Networks
So far in this dissertation, we have presented systems that can secure high-speed
provenance data in adversarial environments and use the provenance data to iden-
tify root causes of network problems. In this chapter, we take the next step and
leverage the collected provenance data to generate network repairs. is is challeng-
ing because implementing a repair can have network-wide eﬀects – it is important to
ensure that a repair not only fixes the symptom at hand, but also avoids undesirable
side-eﬀects in the network.
Existing approaches [86, 183, 87, 169] have proposed “network debuggers” to
help operators with diagnostics. Analogous to conventional debuggers, network de-
buggers (e.g., ndb [86]) accept a buggy behavior (e.g., an unexpected event or state) as
input, produce a “backtrace” that chronicles what happened in the network, and link
the buggy behavior to certain parts of the network execution and/or its root causes.
But most debuggers only explain how a problem surfaced, but do not consider how
to repair it – the latter is an operator’s ultimate goal, but it is also more challeng-
ing. Recently, researchers have proposed another kind of debuggers [168, 147, 50]
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to generate network repairs in an automated fashion, which can potentially oﬀer
operators a lot more help. However, [147] can only repair static data-plane config-
urations; although [168] and [50] are applicable to distributed systems in general,
they only produce repairs that rectify a single buggy behavior without considering
the side-eﬀects on other parts of the network. As a result, repairs generated in this
way may break the network elsewhere.
Consider a scenario where Alice sees her DNS server S receive a spurious HTTP
packet, and she asks her debugger to generate a repair that prevents the packet from
arriving at S. Since Alice’s request only mentions one goal (removing a packet from
server S), her debugger may produce a repair that simply drops all HTTP packets
at the network ingress, or a repair that disconnects S from its last-hop switch. Both
repairs faithfully remove the packet from S, but both would cause new problems
elsewhere. e ideal repair, on the other hand, may be “change the flow entry at S’s
last-hop switch to forward HTTP packets to a diﬀerent port”. In network opera-
tions, the risk of “death by failure recovery” [79] is non-trivial – some of the biggest
network incidents have resulted from applying an improper repair [62, 71, 72, 129].
erefore, it would be valuable to have a debugger that not only rectifies the problem
at hand, but also minimizes undesirable side-eﬀects elsewhere.
We argue that the problem at its core is that existing debuggers have a very restrictive
interface, which accepts one single buggy behavior as input. As a result, although
Alice has many constraints about what the correct network ought to look like, she
can only convey to her debugger part of the story (i.e., the correct network should
not contain the input event or state). If Alice were able to tell her debugger all of her
constraints – e.g., that HTTP traﬃc should not go to server S, but S0 instead, and
that DNS traﬃc should still be processed by server S – the debugger would have a
lot more information that it can use to generate a successful repair.
We observe that this is analogous to automated program repair [73]. For some
time, the software engineering community has been considering the problem of gen-
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erating program repairs with few side-eﬀects. One eﬀective solution this community
has developed is to tell the debugger not just about the bug itself but about multiple
desirable properties. is extra information can then guide the automated debug-
ger towards a better repair. Our key insight is that it should be possible to adapt
this idea and apply it to the networking domain as well: if network debuggers had
a more expressive interface, operators would be able to articulate more clearly what
they want, and thus obtain better repairs.
In this chapter, we make a case for this new approach, which we call intent-based
diagnostics. We propose Aladdin, a language for describing diagnostic intents. When
an operator sees a network problem, she can use Aladdin to describe in a diagnostic
intent what she wishes to happen instead. is interface is far more expressive than
just one buggy event, because an operator can describe in an intent many events and
how they relate to each other, e.g., HTTP traﬃc should be forwarded to server S0
and DNS traﬃc should be forwarded to server S. Our debugger, NetGenie, can then
leverage all expressed constraints to find a high-quality repair. NetGenie needs to
find a small repair that achieves multiple goals; this can involve a huge search space,
so simply trying random changes would not work. We address this using causal
networks [85], a generalization of network provenance [169] that encodes causality
between many network events. NetGenie then leverages this causality information
to perform targeted repair.
We proceed with an overview in Section 5.1. We then formalize the network
repair problem in Section 5.2, design the NetGenie algorithm in Section 5.3, and
present the evaluation in the context of SDNs in Section 4.5. Finally, we discuss
related work in Section 5.5, and conclude this chapter in Section 5.6.
5.1 Overview
We begin with a very simple scenario in Figure 5.1 that illustrates the type of prob-
lems we are considering. It shows an SDN with three switches and three servers.
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Figure 5.1: An example SDN network.
e operator, Alice, would like requests from a trusted origin (e.g., traﬃc from
10.0.0.0/24) to be load-balanced between servers 2 and 3, and requests from un-
trusted origins (e.g., traﬃc from 1.2.3.0/24) to be processed by server 1 (e.g., because
it is in a DMZ). To implement the security policy, she configured two firewall rules
on S2: a) R1, a rule that forwards the trusted traﬃc to S3, and b) R2, a wildcard rule
that forwards the untrusted traﬃc to server 1. To implement the load-balancing
policy, she configured two load-balancing rules R3 and R4 on S3 to match traﬃc
from 10.0.0.0/25 and 10.0.0.128/25, and forward it to servers 2 and 3, respectively.
However, Alice made a mistake in R1, which was misconfigured to match the sub-
net 10.0.1.0/24 instead of 10.0.0.0/24. As a result, Alice sees a mix of trusted and
untrusted traﬃc at server 1, and she would like to diagnose the problem.
5.1.1 Why are existing debuggers not enough?
Most existing debuggers [87, 86, 28, 169, 66, 183, 161, 180] can explain how an
event in a distributed system came about, in the form of a “backtrace”. For instance,
if a packet p from 10.0.0.1 was misrouted to server 1, ndb [86] would produce a
backtrace like the following: p was received by server 1 at 10:51pm, because 23ms
ago, it was transmitted from switch S2 at port #1 due to a flow entry match; this in
turn was because 40ms ago, S1 transmitted p at port #0 due to another flow entry
match, etc. However, producing a backtrace is only the first step – the operator still
needs to identify the root cause in the backtrace, and decide on a repair.
Recently, researchers have proposed another kind of debuggers that can generate
repairs for distributed systems [50, 168]. Given a buggy behavior, e.g., themisrouted
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Figure 5.2: An example diagnostic intent.
packet p in Figure 5.1, they can propose changes to the network to remove the bug.
However, repairs produced in this way are narrowly targeted at a single event and thus
may break the network elsewhere. For example, in order to remove p, a debugger
might propose to disconnect server 1 from S2, or to drop all packets at S1. Both are
valid repairs in that they successfully remove p, but both have undesired side-eﬀects.
We observe that this is because the operator has many constraints on what a cor-
rect network should look like, but existing debuggers do not have an interface for her
to express them. Suppose that we had a debugger that accepts multiple constraints
of what a successful repair should achieve – e.g., packets in 10.0.0.1 should not be
routed to server 1, but to server 2 or 3 instead; moreover, other packets should still
be routed to server 1 – the debugger would be much more likely to identify the
broken entry at S2 to be the culprit.
5.1.2 Approach: Intent-based diagnostics
We propose to build a new debugger that can generate repairs based on a diagnostic
intent, which is far more expressive than a single event. With this debugger, an
operator’s main duty is to describe what she wishes to happen in her network, using
a language that we call Aladdin. Aladdin supports three simple operators ^ (and), _
(or), and  (not), which can be used to compose complex intents from simple ones.
For instance, to generate a repair for the scenario in Figure 5.1, an operator can write
down her intent, as shown in Figure 5.2: 1) packets from 10.0.0.1 should not have
been processed by server 1; 2) they should be processed by servers 2 or 3 instead;
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Figure 5.3: e workflow of intent-based diagnostics.
and 3) packets from 1.2.3.1 should still be processed by server 1. Our automated
debugger, which we call NetGenie, then takes into account all constraints expressed
in the intent, and suggests repairs that satisfy all of them, as shown in Figure 5.3.
Goals and non-goals: At first glance, the use of a high-level intent might be
reminiscent of network verification or synthesis (e.g., HSA [101], NetGen [147],
NetEgg [173], etc.), which are still restricted to certain types of network [165, 140],
not general distributed systems. But the goal of NetGenie is not to perform full ver-
ification, i.e., to guarantee the correct behavior for all possible packets in the header
space, but rather to repair specific problems that have manifested in the network.
is resembles the diﬀerence between program verification (which is universal but
expensive) and program debugging (which is case-specific and much cheaper). In
other words, a generated repair may not guarantee that Pkt(@Srv1,10.0.0.1) will
never occur again, regardless of network topology, packet history, etc.; however, it
will fix any problems that have aﬀected the packets in this space so far. is is less
ambitious than verification, but in return, NetGenie gains the ability to repair much
more complex networks, and even other kinds of distributed systems (analogous to
[168] and [50]), which is still beyond the reach of current network verification or
synthesis techniques [165].
5.1.3 Would NetGenie be practical?
It is reasonable to ask how common it is for a repair task to have multiple goals. To
answer this question, we reviewed 62 incident reports from Google Cloud Status
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Dashboard [11], which documented major network faults in Google’s data centers,
from April 2014 to March 2016. We found that 46 (74%) of them require two to
ten constraints to hold at the same time in a successful repair. We then formulated
an intent for each scenario, and found that a typical intent can be complex enough
to involve 2 to 17 Aladdin operators.
One might also wonder if NetGenie would be perceived as diﬃcult to use, as
it requires some additional work from the network operators (writing down their
diagnostic intent in Aladdin). To understand this, we studied operators’ common
practices from several sources, including mailing lists [15, 25], surveys [138], online
discussions [24, 163, 106, 93, 112], and made two observations. First, operators
are masters in simple CLI languages, e.g., router configuration languages. As the
Cisco manual indicates, configuring the BGP protocol could involve 59 diﬀerent
commands [9]. Moreover, even a medium-sized network could be configured with
1,500 ACL rules and 757,000 forwarding entries [101, 174]. As a survey with 217
network operators shows [138, 104], operators prefer languages that are “concise,
intuitive, easy to understand”. Second, due to the rise of SDNs, more and more net-
work operators are becoming programmers [138, 106, 166]. We see many operators
transition from NetOps to DevOps [112, 93], and they are frequently learning new
languages [163, 112, 24] such as Puppet [17], Chef [8], Ansible [4], etc.
Given that Aladdin is no more complex than the languages already in use, and
that network repairs can be tricky to get right, we believe that operators’ benefits in
using NetGenie should far outweigh the eﬀort of writing down their intent.
We note that NetGenie does not require operators to write down her intent ex-
haustively, which will likely involve a huge number of constraints, but only a subset
of them. is is similar in spirit with other systems that reason with user-provided
examples, including NetEgg [173] on SDN policies, Foofah [94] on semi-structured
data transformations, QuickCode [78] on string transformations in spreedsheets,
Storyboard Programming [155] on pointer manipulations on data strucutures such
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as linked lists and binary trees, and [154] on number transformations such as format-
ting and rounding. A small number of examples often suﬃces in practice, because
each example tends to cut down the search space quite significantly. For instance, in
FooFah [94], one or two input-output examples are already enough for the system to
find the correct transformation; similarly, in NetEgg [173], each scenario also only
contains one to three examples.
In fact, we have similar observations: in Section 5.4, we will see that relatively
simple intents are also suﬃcient for NetGenie to generate high-quality repairs. at
said, since NetGenie is restricted to work with an incomplete intent, any guarantees
it can provide would only hold on the expressed goals. One implication of this is
that, to be on the safe side, operators are still recommended to manually inspect the
generated repairs before applying them to the running network.
5.1.4 Challenge
Finding a repair that satisfies all constraints could involve a huge search space, so
naïvely trying change combinations would not work. We observe that tracking
causality, as in network provenance [183], can be a useful starting point: if Net-
Genie tracks the causal connections between events and state, it can then pinpoint
just a few places in the network that have aﬀected the event, and perform targeted
repair. However, reasoning about each event separately would not work: a fix that
is eﬀective for one event could cause problem for another. To address this, we use
a data structure called causal networks, a concept in classic causality theory [85] that
can be seen as a generalization of provenance. With causal networks, NetGenie can
find repairs that fix all problems simultaneously.
5.2 Intent-based network repair
In this section, we formalize the problem of intent-based network repair, and we
describe a solution that is based on the concept of causal networks.
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function CN(y, S)
N h /0; /0i
for e in y do
if e 2 S then
hV;Ei  PP(e;S)
else
hV;Ei  NP(e,S)
N EN(N;hV;Ei)
return N
function FR(N;S)
PC PC(O)
OC OC(O)
for each o 2 O do
DC DC[ DC(o)
D /0;k 1;C PC[OC[DC
while D= /0 & NTO do
D FKC(I;k;C)
k k+1
return D
function FKC(I;k;C)
Ik  NKT(I; /0)
while Ik 6= /0, D = /0, NTO
do
PC PC[ PC(Ik)
D FA(C)
Ik  NKT(I; Ik)
return D
Figure 5.4: Algorithms for constructing causal networks, and for finding repairs.
5.2.1 System model
For ease of exposition, we use a declarative model in Network Datalog (ND-
log) [116], because causality is particularly easy to see in a declarative syntax. We
note that provenance is not restricted to declarative languages; it has been widely
applied in many imperative systems [89, 69, 57, 132, 43], and provenance can be
extracted from imperative systems and even black-box applications [180].
In this model, network state and events are modeled as tuples that can either be
externally inserted into the network (i.e., base tuples, such as incoming packets at the
ingress router, initial configuration state, etc.), or generated by the network protocol
(i.e., derived tuples, such as forwarded packets, derived configuration state, etc.).
e network protocol can be seen as a set of NDlog rules in the form of X:-A,B,C,
where X, A, B, and C can be either configuration state or network events, which means
that an X tuple should be generated whenever the network has A, B, and C. Moreover,
tuples are organized into tables, e.g., a packet could be represented by a tuple in the
Pkt table.
e provenance of a tuple can be easily defined based on the declarative rules.
A base tuple’s provenance is itself, since it cannot be explained further. A derived
tuple X’s provenance is its derivation rule (e.g., X:-A,B,C), the tuples that are used to
derive it (e.g., A, B, and C), and, recursively, their provenance as well. erefore, the
provenance of an event ewould be a tree of events and state, where e is the root of the
tree, and e’s children are its immediate causes; each node in the tree can in turn be
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recursively explained by the subtree rooted at it, until we reach a set of leaves, or base
tuples. We can also reason about why an event failed to occur, using a variant called
negative provenance [169]. is is achieved by tracing along the causal connections
that almost derived the desired event, and examining which pre-conditions failed to
hold (e.g., a packet was received, but it never matched any flow entry).
5.2.2 The network repair problem
We now formalize the problem of network repair, using a “possible worlds” seman-
tics [54].
Intents: We distinguish four kinds of atomic repair intents. e first two are used
to describe the desired eﬀects of the repair: the operator can ask for a new tuple to
be created (add) or an existing tuple to be removed (delete). e others are used
to avoid side eﬀects: the operator can specify that an existing tuple should not be
removed by the repair (preserve) or that a non-existing tuple should not be created
(suppress). More complex intents can be described by disjunctions, conjunctions
or negations of these events.
Possible worlds: A network protocol, as modeled by a set of derivation rules R,
induces a set of worlds S that are permitted under this protocol. Each world S 2S
describes a particular state that the network could be in, and can be further divided
into S= Sb[Sd, where Sb is the set of base tuples in the network state, and Sd the set of
derived tuples. Sb represents the set of initial configurations, incoming packets, and
other external inputs to the system. Sd represents the set of derived configurations,
forwarded packets, etc., that can be obtained by recursively applying R to Sb until S
stabilizes.
We say that a world S is sound iﬀ, for each tuple t 2 S, we have either a) t 2 Sb, i.e.,
it is a base tuple, or b) t 2 Sd, and there exists at least one derivation rule t:-t1;    ;tk,
where tk 2 S;8i2 [1::k]. In other words, soundness requires that derived tuples cannot
appear out of thin air, when none of the corresponding rules have fired. We say that
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a world S is complete if we have t1;    ;tk 2 S, and t:-t1;    ;tk, then we also have
t 2 S – in other words, if every derivable tuple has been derived. If a world is both
sound and complete, we call it a possible world.
Network repair: Suppose S0 = S0b [ S0d is the state of the network at the time the
operator requests a repair. en the goal of network repair is to find a set of changes
to base tuples D := ft1 ! t 01;    ;tk ! t 0kg, where t1;    ;tk 2 S0b, that transforms S0
into a possible world S that satisfies the diagnostic intent. We call such a D a valid
repair. If there are multiple valid repairs, the goal is to find the one that changes the
fewest tuples.
5.2.3 Causal networks
Next, we introduce the concept of causal networks, and discuss how we can use this
concept to generate network repairs.
If we only needed to change a single tuple, we could track the tuples’s precondi-
tions in the form of a provenance tree, and either make the tuple appear by adding
all the required base tuples, or make it disappear by removing at least one of them.
For instance, if we know that X:-A,B, then removing either A or B would make X dis-
appear. However, since we need to produce a repair that accounts for all events at
the same time, it cannot consider each event in isolation. e reason for this is that
breaking the pre-conditions of one event might aﬀect other events in unexpected
ways. For instance, suppose we need to remove X and preserve Y, where Y:-A,C; we
cannot do this by first deleting A to remove X, and then adding it back to obtain Y.
To address this, we use a concept that was originally proposed in classic causality
theory: causal networks [85]. A causal network can be seen as a generalization of
provenance. Its vertexes are classified asV =O[ I[C, where a) O is the set of outcome
vertexes, which correspond to the diagnostic events in the intent, b) I is a set of input
vertexes, which correspond to the base tuples in the network state, and c) C is a set
of causality vertexes, which capture the derivations from the inputs I to the outcomes
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(a) An example causal network.
bar(t)':)'D(z,t)'
abc(x)':)'A(x,z),'D(z,t)'
foo(x,y)':)'A(x,z),'B(z,y),'x'<'y'
xyz(x)1,y)':)'B(x,y)'
A(x+1,2*z)':)'C(x,z)'
(b) Derivation rules.
(((((((((((((((((((((((((((Diagnos<c(intent:((
'
'''''''''~foo(1,4)bar(3)abc(1,2)xyz(1,4)'
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''Delete:'foo(1,4)'
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''Suppress:'bar(3)'
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''Add:'abc(1,2)'''''
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''Preserve:'xyz(1,4)'
(c) e repair intent.
Figure 5.5: An example causal network constructed from a repair intent.
O. Given a set of intents (outcome vertexes), we can construct a causal network for
them by gradually adding the dependencies for each outcome vertex, as shown in
the CN procedure in Figure 5.4.
e key benefit of causal networks is that they can encode all dependencies for all
diagnostic events. We have also sketched an example causal network in Figure 5.5.
5.2.4 Generating repairs
With a causal network that encodes all events of interest and their inter-dependencies,
we are now ready to generate network repairs that account for all constraints. is is
done by performing counterfactual reasoning on the causal network, which asks the
question, “what could have happened instead so that the network state would fulfill
the intent?”, and produces a set of network changes as a candidate repair. Below,
we present the algorithm in more detail.
Preservation constraints: We begin with the properties of the network that the
operator wishes to preserve. ese are described with preserve intents, which iden-
tify existing tuples in the network that need to be preserved, and suppress intents,
which identify undesirable tuples that need to be suppressed. erefore, when at-
tempting to find a repair, the algorithm needs to ensure that the changes satisfy these
requirements.
e algorithm achieves this by performing a recursive descent over the causal
network, starting from the preserve and suppress outcome vertexes. For each step,
we collect a set of positive constraints C1 that describe conditions that must hold to
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prevent the preserve tuples from disappearing, and a set of negative constraints C2
that describe conditions that will prevent the suppress tuples from appearing. For
instance, in the example in Figure 5.5,C1 would contain xyz.x==1^xyz.y==4, which
are collected over the outcome vertex xyz(1,4), and C2 would contain bar.x==3,
which is collected over bar(3). e algorithm then follows the causality chains in
the causal network, and recursively explores the set of conditions that need to hold
for the current vertexes’ children; it stops until a set of input vertexes have been
reached. en, when we are generating repairs to the network, we need to ensure
that C1 and C2 always hold for the repaired state.
Objective and derivation constraints: Next, we discuss how the algorithm han-
dles delete and add intents. is step also heavily relies on the causal network as a
guide, and uses a similar recursive descent from the delete and add outcome ver-
texes.
For a delete outcome vertex, we collect a set of constraints that describe the
corresponding tuple and its dependencies, and then negate these constraints to
reflect the fact that this tuple should be deleted. is can be done by examin-
ing the constraints and dependent vertexes for this target tuple. For instance,
consider the outcome vertex foo(1,4) in Figure 5.5, which has been derived by
foo(x,y):-A(x,z), B(z,y), x < y. en, the set of objective constraints would
be (foo.x==1^foo.y==4).
For an add outcome vertex, we collect a set of objective constraints that need
to hold in order for the corresponding tuple to appear in the network state. Since
this tuple does not yet exist, the algorithm must analyze the constraints in the
derivation step counterfactually, somewhat analogous to negative provenance [169].
For instance, consider a missing tuple abc(1,2), and a potential derivation rule
abc(x,y):-D(z,t),A(x,z), the algorithm may find that a dependent tuple A(1,2)
already exists in the network, but an appropriate D tuple is missing. en, we would
collect a set of objective constraints abc.x==1^abc.y==2.
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In order to make the objective constraints hold, it may be necessary to make their
dependencies become true. For instance, to delete an unwanted event from the net-
work, we must delete one or more of its children; to make a missing event appear,
we must add all its missing dependencies. erefore, to satisfy a set of objective
constraints on the outcome vertexes, we need to, recursively, satisfy a set of deriva-
tion constraints that describe how the desirable outcomes can be achieved. To this
end, our algorithm descends from the set of outcome vertexes along the dependency
chains, and collects a set of derivation constraints on each of the causality vertexes.
is can be achieved by propagating the set of objective constraints down the
causality chains. For instance, in order to delete the undesirable tuple foo(1,4), the
algorithmneeds to additional create derivation constraints(A.x==1^A.y==2^B.x==2
^B.y==4); in order to make the missing tuple abc(1,2) appear, the algorithm needs
to additionally create derivation constraints D.x==2^A.y==2. e algorithm re-
cursively walks down the causal chains while propagating the constraints, until it
reaches the set of input vertexes, and return a set of objective and derivation con-
straints over the causal network. Finally, after collecting the preservation, objective,
and derivation constraints, the algorithm can find a repair by jointly solving those
constraints.
Notice that, for each step, instead of naïvely trying out all combinations of possi-
ble changes, the algorithm relies heavily on the causality chains in the causal network
to make targeted changes to the current state.
5.2.5 Generating the minimal repair
Now, another challenge arises: since any repair that satisfies the set of collected con-
straints could satisfy the diagnostic intent, the number of possible repairs can be very
large, or even infinite. Ideally, we would like to find a minimal repair, with a very
small number of changes to the network – that is, we would like the repaired net-
work state to be as close as the original state as possible, except for necessary changes
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to fulfill the diagnostic intents.
erefore, we take an iterative deepening approach [108] to finding the minimal
network repair, as shown in the FR procedure in Figure 5.4. In the k-th
round of the search (initially, k = 1), the algorithm attempts to find a repair with
exactly k changes to the base tuples, or input vertexes; it will only proceed to the
(k+ 1)-th round if the current round cannot produce a repair. If any round finds
a repair successfully, the algorithm terminates and output the D it has found; if the
current k does not yield a repair, then the algorithm increments k and proceeds to
the next round. By so doing, we can guarantee that any repair found would contain
the minimal number of tuple changes possible.
For the k-th round, the algorithm uses a close variant of that in Section 5.2.4
that is parameterized by the number of changes to input vertexes that are allowed.
To do this, it picks k input vertexes from the causal network, and attempts to find a
repair that only involves changing those k input vertexes (besides the changes to the
causality and outcome vertexes as a result). Our algorithm achieves this by expanding
the set of Preservation Constraints (PC) on the input vertexes that are not picked
in this round, analogous to how it handles preserve and suppress events. For
instance, if an input vertex B(2,4) is not picked in the current round, the PC would
be expanded to include B.x==2^B.y==4.
For the input vertexes that are picked in a round, e.g., Z(0,1), we create free vari-
ables associated with each of its fields, i.e., Z.x and Z.y. Notice that, it is possible
that we need multiple copies of Z tuples in order to repair the network. erefore,
our algorithm also accounts for this, by creating multiple copies of a tuple if neces-
sary. Nevertheless, in the k-th round, the number of copies will be exactly k. For
instance, in the second round, the algorithm will not only try to generate repairs by
changing two tuples in D, Z, and B, but also two copies of the same tuple as well.
If the algorithm attempts to change two copies of Z, it will create free variables for
each copy, e.g., Z1.x, Z1.y, etc.
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For instance, in the example in Figure 5.5, the algorithm would suggest a repair
with two changes: a) changing Z(0,1) to Z(0,y),y6=1, which can delete foo(1,4)
while preserving xyz(1,4), and b) inserting D(2,t),t6=3, which can make abc(1,2)
appear while suppressing bar(3).
5.2.6 Properties
Soundness and completeness: e repaired network state is always sound, because
for each tuple t that is added to the network, the algorithm will also add its de-
pendent tuples. Likewise, the repaired network state is also complete, since the
algorithm only makes direct changes to the input vertexes, and the causality and
outcome vertexes are only changed indirectly.
Validity: If the algorithm outputs a repair D, then it always meets the diagnostic
intent. is is guaranteed by the step where the algorithm collects the objective
constraints. If the algorithm does find a repair, then the repair will satisfy the OC
constraints, which in turn guarantee that the repair is valid.
Minimality: e repair D found in this way is always minimal, because the iterative
deepening procedure will make sure that repairs of size k are all explored before
moving on to explore repairs of size k+1.
5.2.7 Limitations
ere are also several limitations of the algorithm, which we discuss below.
Handling user-defined functions: e step where we collect the derivation con-
straints may fail, due to the use of user-defined functions in the NDlog rules. When
we have such functions, the algorithm would not be able to recognize which depen-
dent tuples are needed in order to make a target tuple appear. In such cases, the
algorithm would abort early, reporting the tuples on which it is no longer able to
make progress.
Uniqueness: e repair that the algorithm finds may not be unique. Although the
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function NG(S;Y)
y1_y2::_yt  P(Y)
for yi; i 2 [1::t] do
Ni  CN(yi;S)
Di  FR(Ni;S)
return D= minsizefD1;D2    ;Dtg
function I(t)
PC PC[ PC(t)
for t 0 2 C(t) do
I(t 0)
function P(Y)
y1_y2::_yt  DNFC(Y)
return y1_y2::_yt
Figure 5.6: Pseudocode of the NetGenie algorithm.
algorithm aims to find the minimal repair, there may still exist multiple repairs that
have the same size. In such cases, the algorithm cannot recognize which is the “best”
candidate repair, since all of them satisfy the diagnostic intent.
Wrong intent: If an operator supplies a wrong intent, then the algorithm would
not be able to recognize them. e repair will still satisfy the supplied intent, but it
may not achieve what the operator actually has in mind.
5.3 The NetGenie algorithm
So far, we have introduced the problem of intent-based network repair, and how we
can use the concept of causal networks for this purpose. In this section, we start
with describing Aladdin, a language that can describe diagnostic intents. We then
present several refinements to the basic algorithm in Section 5.2, leveraging unique
properties in the SDN context, arriving at the final algorithm for the NetGenie
debugger.
5.3.1 The Aladdin language
First, we introduce the Aladdin language, which is used to describe an operator’s
diagnostic intent to NetGenie. Its syntax is presented in Figure 5.7. A diagnostic
event can be represented by a tuple with a list of typed attributes a1; ::;ak, with types
T1; ::;Tk, respectively, as defined by the schema of its table; in our system model, this
could denote a network event, such as a misrouted packet in the Pkt table, or a
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Diagnostic event e ::= ha1:T1; ::;ak:Tkij /0
Operator op ::= ^j_ j 
Statement st ::= ej e j(e1^e2)j(e1_e2)
Diagnostic intent Y ::= fst1;st2; ::;stng
Figure 5.7: Syntax of the Aladdin language.
network state, such a flow entry in the FlowEntry table. As a simplified example, a
packet located at switch S can be represented by a Pkt(@S,Sip,Dip,Spt,Dpt,Pro)
tuple, where the location S and the five fields are the packet’s attributes. Aladdin
supports three operators –^ (and), _ (or), and (not), which can be used to compose
statements from events. e overall diagnostic intent is a conjunction of all statements.
5.3.2 Refinement #1: Sub-intents
In an SDN setting, there may exist multiple “versions” of network state that are all
considered to be correct. A simple example of this is load-balancing policies, where
certain packets can be handled by one of several switches or servers. More generally,
such multiplicity can be detected by the use of disjunctions in the intent.
When an intent contains disjunctions, NetGenie can first break it into a set of
“smaller” sub-intents, e.g., Y0 = y1_y2_  _yt , and then constructs a causal net-
work for each yi. By so doing, the size of the causal networks can be reduced for
more eﬃcient reasoning. Since each of the sub-intents can be considered correct on
its own, this partitioning does not violate the correctness of the repair. NetGenie
can generate a set of repairs for each sub-intent, and return the smallest repair as
the final result. is partitioning process can be achieved by a conversion of the
intent into Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) formulas, for which many algorithms
are available.
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5.3.3 Refinement #2: Immutable tuples
In principle, NetGenie can change any parts of the causal network, as long as the
produced repair satisfies the intent. However, not all the base tuples in the network
can necessarily be changed. For instance, suppose the operator would like to suppress
a single DNS packet that was routed to her web server because of a corner case that
was not handled correctly by several aspects of the network configuration. In this
case, a naïve algorithmmight suggest to simply remove the DNS packet itself (which
is represented as a base tuple). However, in practice a repair cannot influence what
kind of traﬃc arrives, it can only change how the network handles that traﬃc.
erefore, our second refinement introduces the notion of immutable tuples.
When generating a repair, NetGenie only considers changes to mutable tuples, not
immutable ones. is is achieved by adding an additional set of “preservation con-
straints” in the FR procedure in Figure 5.4, based on the set of tuples that
are considered immutable. We expect that, in most cases, mutability will be related
to the tuple type and not to individual tuple instances (e.g., configuration entries
are mutable, and packets are immutable); thus, mutability would only need to be
specified once for each network.
5.3.4 The final NetGenie algorithm
With those refinements above, we have arrived at the final version of the NetGenie
algorithm, as shown in Figure 5.6. Overall, NetGenie takes in the current network
state S and a diagnostic intent Y, and it outputs a list of base tuple changes D that
represents the proposed repair. (Derived tuple changes are captured by a combi-
nation of base tuple changes.) e NetGenie algorithm proceeds as follows. First,
it partitions Y0 into a disjunction of sub-intents, each of which describes a “valid”
version of the network of its own, and constructs a causal network Ni for each sub-
intent yi. Finally, it analyzes each Ni to find Di – a set of changes to the mutable
tuples in the network state, such that yi is fulfilled in the repaired network. NetGe-
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nie then returns the Di with the fewest number of changes as the “best” candidate
repair. Finally, NetGenie injects the generated repair to a clone of the network state,
and validates that the diagnostic goals have been met.
5.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate NetGenie with four diagnostic scenarios in the context
of SDNs. Our evaluation aims to answer three high-level questions: a) how well can
NetGenie generate network repairs that account for an operator’s diagnostic intent?
b) does NetGenie incur a reasonable overhead at runtime? and c) how fast can
NetGenie generate network repairs?
5.4.1 Prototype implementation
We have implemented a prototype of the NetGenie debugger with 8752 lines of code
in C++. Our prototype has the following four components:
Front-end: Our front-end accepts Aladdin intents, performs syntax checks, and sub-
intent partitions; it then invokes the back-end debugger to generate network repairs.
e front-end also accepts program written in NetCore (part of Pyretic [131]), and
translates NetCore programs into NDlog rules and tuples using a similar technique
from Y! [169].
Logging and snapshot engines: Our logging and snapshot engines are used to re-
construct a historical state of the network upon diagnostic queries. At runtime,
the logging engine only writes down external inputs to the network in a log, such
as packets arriving at an ingress switch. erefore, it only needs to keep a log for
each ingress switch, not for the internal switches; any internal events are later recon-
structed by the replay engine. e snapshot engine takes periodic snapshots of the
state of the network, so that when it is needed to reconstruct a historical state, we
only need to replay a segment of the log starting from a certain snapshot, not in its
entirety.
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Replay engine: Our replay engine can take in a historical snapshot of the network’s
state, a segment of the log, and reconstruct the network state using deterministic
replay; it is also used to test out a repair by applying it to a network state, and
detecting whether the diagnostic goals have been met. (We note that, however, the
repairs are not directly applied to the running system, but only a clone of its state.)
Since the replay engine is only activated when there is a need to answer diagnostic
queries, it does not incur any runtime overhead. It can also selectively reconstruct
part of the network state to optimize for speed [180].
NetGenie reasoning engine: eNetGenie reasoning engine implements the main
algorithm that we described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, and it has an interface to the Z3
solver [56] for constraint solving. is engine accepts a reconstructed network state
from the replay engine, and performs causal network analysis to generate repairs.
5.4.2 Experimental setup
We conducted our experiments in RapidNet v0.3 [18], a declarative networking
engine, on a Dell OptiPlex 9020 workstation, which has a 8-core 3.40 GHz Intel
i7-4770 CPU with 16 GB of RAM and a 128 GB SSD.e OS was Ubuntu 13.04,
and the kernel version was 3.8.0. We set up the diagnostic scenarios using a similar
OpenFlow model as in Y! [169]. To create realistic background traﬃc, we replayed
a CAIDA packet trace collected from an OC-192 link [7] through our network, in
addition to the test traﬃc we generated in each scenario.
5.4.3 Diagnostic scenarios
We have adapted four diagnostic scenarios in the context of SDNs for our exper-
iments, based on an extended network topology of that in Figure 5.1. Below, we
present the (slightly abbreviated) diagnostic intents, and note that these intents can-
not be expressed to existing debuggers because they contain multiple goals.
• SDN1: Load-balancing policies: Certain requests were received by server 1
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Scenario e1 e2 e3 Naïve NetGenieonly only only
SDN1 12/0 5/1 5/1 25% 1/1
SDN2 12/0 5/1 N/A 25% 1/1
SDN3 19/1 19/1 N/A 11% 1/1
SDN4 19/0 4/3 7/2 23% 1/1
Table 5.1: Repairs generated based on individual intents rarely satisfy the operator’s
overall intent, whereas NetGenie can generate eﬀective repairs for all of our scenarios.
An X/Y entry means that X repairs were generated for the intent in that column,
and Y of them satisfied the entire intent. Scenarios SDN2 and SDN3 only contain
two individual intents. e ‘Naïve’ column shows the probability that a random
combination of repairs for e1–e3 individually will satisfy the overall intent.
(e1=P@S1), but they should have been processed by either of the load-balanced
servers 2 (e2=P@S2) or 3 (e3=P@S3). An operator writes the corresponding
intent as Y= fP@S1^(P@S2_P@S3)g.
• SDN2: Misrouted packets: A subset of HTTP traﬃc was misrouted to a
DNS server S1 (e1=P@S1) instead of the intended HTTP server (e2=P@S2).
To address this problem, an operator specifies the intentY= fP@S1^P@S2g.
• SDN3: Duplicate packets: Certain traﬃc was received by server 1 (e1=P@S1)
and server 2 (e2=P@S2), but it should have been processed by one server only,
e.g., because of a load-balancing policy. en, an operator writes the intent as
Y= f(P@S1_P@S2)^(P@S1^ P@S2)g.
• SDN4: Traﬃc scrubbing: Traﬃc from untrusted origins should have been
processed by a traﬃc scrubber (e1=P@S1), and handled by a server in DMZ
(e2=P@S2), but it was routed to the internal server as a mistake (e3=P@S3).
e diagnostic intent is written as Y= fP@S1^P@S2^P@S3g.
5.4.4 Effectiveness
First, we performed a simple sanity check that is designed to test whether NetGe-
nie can indeed find eﬀective repairs. To test this, we formulated the intents from
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our four scenarios in Aladdin, and we ran them through NetGenie; we counted the
number of repairs that were generated, and we tested whether the repairs did indeed
fix the problem that existed in that scenario. Our results are shown in the last col-
umn of Table 5.1: as expected, NetGenie found a working repair for each scenario.
For instance, in SDN1, NetGenie constructed a causal network with 94 vertexes,
including 21 input vertexes; from this complex network, NetGenie then pinpointed
the flow entry for 10.0.0.0/24 at S2, and changed the next-hop field from port 1 to
port 2. is is the repair that a human operator would probably expect as well.
Next, we tested how much NetGenie benefits from having entire diagnostic in-
tents, rather than individual atomic intents (like the existing solutions). ere are
two concerns here. First, it might be the case that the repairs for the individual in-
tents are already “good enough” in many cases, in the sense that they often already
satisfy the entire intent, even if it is not specified. Second, it might be the case that
the repairs for the individual intents rarely cause any “collateral damage” or are in-
compatible; in this case, one could simply run an existing repair generator on all the
add and add intents separately, and then combine the resulting repairs. (Existing
solutions do not support preserve or suppress intents.)
To answer this question, we performed additional NetGenie runs using each
of the individual delete or add intents ei from each scenario. For instance, for
SDN1, we ran NetGenie three times: once to remove only Pkt(@Srv1,10.0.0.1)
(e1), once to create only Pkt(@Srv2,10.0.0.1) (e2), and once to create only
Pkt(@Srv3,10.0.0.1) (e3). We counted 1) how many repairs were generated for
each individual intent ei; and 2) how many of these repairs happened to satisfy
the overall intent Y. Additionally, we generated all the naïve combinations of the
resulting repairs (for each scenario, a full cross product of the two or three sets of
repairs) and we counted how many of these combinations satisfied the overall intent
Y.
Our results are shown in Table 5.1. e first three columns contain entries X/Y,
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Figure 5.8: e size of snapshots grows (mostly) linearly with the number of flow
entries in the network.
where X is the total number of repairs generated for ei, and Y is the number of these
repairs that happened to satisfy Y; the fourth column shows the fraction of the cross
product that satisfies Y. It is clear that the answer to the first concern is no: in
the overwhelming majority of the cases, solving an individual problem ei did not
serendipitously solve the other problems as well.
As the second-to-last column shows, the answer to the second concern is also no:
in many cases, the repairs for the individual problems are not compatible with the
repairs for the other problems. To use SDN1 as a concrete example, one repair that
was generated for e1 deleted the flow entry for 10.0.0.0/24 at S1; this would stop
such traﬃc from being routed to server 1, but neither server 2 or 3 could receive
those packets either. Another repair for this scenario simply disconnects server 1.
Repairs generated for e2 and e3 include flooding packets from 10.0.0.0/24 at S2
to all ports, or installing a flow entry at S2 that forwards all packets to S3. is
is not necessarily surprising (the repair generator simply does not know about the
operator’s other goals and can therefore satisfy them only by accident); at the same
time, it clearly shows the benefits that NetGenie’s richer interface can provide.
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5.4.5 Runtime overhead
Next, we evaluated the runtime overhead of NetGenie in terms of latency and storage
overheads, and how the sizes of the snapshots scale with the network size.
Latency: To evaluate the latency overhead of NetGenie, we conducted two sets of
experiments. In the first set of experiments, we streamed the CAIDA trace through
the network, and measured the average latency for processing one packet without
logging. In the second set of experiments, we measured the same metric with the
logging engine enabled. We found that logging increased the latency by 3.2%, which
seems reasonable. We also note that further optimizations are feasible, which can
bring down the latency even further [169].
Storage: Next, we evaluate the storage overhead incurred by logging. For each in-
coming packet, NetGenie logged its header, timestamp, the ingress switch ID, and
several other types of metadata; on average, each packet consumed about 136 B
disk space. erefore, for a 10 Gbps switch with 500 B average packet size, the
growth of the log is about 272 MB/s, without any compression or selective sam-
pling. Moreover, it has been shown that packet capture is a common requirement
in large-scale deployments, and that compression and sampling can help reduce the
amount of storage growth [87], and enable packet logging in data centers on a Tbps
scale [184].
Scalability: Next, we measure how the snapshot scales with the complexity of the
network. Since the size of the snapshot depends on the number of flow entries in
the network, we varied the number of flow entries configured in the network from
10 to 1 million, and plotted the growth of the snapshot size in Figure 5.8. As we
can see from the figure, the growth is mostly linear; this is because NetGenie uses a
constant size for each type of configurations (e.g., flow entries, server configurations,
etc.) Since a typical network could contain 289k [120] to 575k [174] rules overall,
NetGenie should be able to scale to that size with a reasonable amount of overhead.
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5.4.6 Repair generation speed
Network diagnostics typically does not require a real-time response; however, it is
still desirable to have a reasonably short turnaround time. To evaluate this, we mea-
sured the time it took for NetGenie to generate network repairs for each scenario.
Figure 5.9 shows the results. We can see that for all four cases, NetGenie finished
within one minute, which seems like a reasonable amount of time for the purpose of
network debugging. Moreover, most of the time has been spent in constructing the
historical network state using replay, and in testing out the repair afterwards. e
actual NetGenie reasoning took much less time.
Figure 5.10 shows a further decomposition of NetGenie’s reasoning time. We can
see that the provenance queries and the causal network analysis took the majority
of the time. Once the causal network is constructed, collecting and solving the
constraints took much less time. Overall, the NetGenie reasoning took less than 2:5
seconds in all scenarios.
5.5 Related Work
Our work is related to provenance in its use of causality, but it generalizes the concept
of provenance to causal networks, which can keep track of causal connections and
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Figure 5.10: A decomposition of NetGenie’s reasoning latency.
inter-dependencies among many events. For a more detailed discussion on related
work on provenance, please refer to Chapter 2. Below, we discuss other related work
of NetGenie.
Network diagnostics: Many debuggers have been proposed for diagnosing dis-
tributed systems. Examples include ndb [86], NetSight [87], X-Trace [66], Cher-
ryPick [161], and SDN traceroute [28], which can produce a “backtrace” for a given
event. is is similar in spirit with provenance-based debuggers, such as [43, 169,
132, 183, 69, 180, 57]. However, all of the above solutions are purely diagnos-
tic; they cannot generate repairs. [168] and [50] can produce repairs, but only
for a single buggy event. Debugging can also be done by dynamic testing, as in
OFRewind [171], ATPG [174], DEMi [150], and MCS [151], or by statistical
learning, as in NetMedic [97] or NetPoirot [39]. ese approaches do not track
provenance or causality; therefore, they can narrow down potential culprits but not
pinpoint root causes or generate a repair for a given diagnostic intent.
Verification and synthesis: Verification can eliminate bugs for certain types of net-
works, such as in Anteater [120], Header Space Analysis [101], NetPlumber [100],
VeriFlow [102], Batfish [65], Libra [175], ConfigChecker [31], FlowChecker [30],
Flowlog [137], NetKAT [35], Kinect [104], etc. However, verification does not
obsolete network repair, as they are orthogonal problems – if the verification pro-
cess finds a violation, one still needs to (manually) roll out a fix. NetGenie is also
123
related to network synthesis, including NetEgg [173] that synthesizes SDN poli-
cies, Condor [149] that synthesizes network topologies, [123] that synthesizes net-
work updates and their ordering, etc. NetGenie does not synthesize a network from
scratch, but a small change to an existing network. is is similar in spirit with
NetGen [147], though the latter only repairs static data planes.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed NetGenie – a new kind of debugger that can
generate network repairs based on an operator’s diagnostic intent. When an operator
sees a network problem, she could describe what she wishes to happen instead using
the Aladdin language. NetGenie then reasons about the diagnostic intent, identifies
the root causes, and suggests a potential repair. In our case studies in the context
of SDNs, we have found that NetGenie can generate high-quality network repairs
that account for an operator’s entire diagnostic intent, unlike existing repair tools
that only fix a single event and may cause undesirable side-eﬀects elsewhere in the
network. Moreover, NetGenie incurs a reasonable runtime overhead, and generates
network repairs within one minute.
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Conclusion
e main goal of this dissertation is to investigate whether provenance can be a
good candidate for supporting the challenging diagnostic and forensic tasks that we
face today. Overall, the results in the above three chapters suggest a positive answer
to this hypothesis. In this final chapter, we reflect on the lessons learned in this
investigation, and we then look beyond on possible future work.
6.1 The benefits of provenance
In retrospect, provenance oﬀers three properties that have proven to be crucial in
supporting diagnostic and forensic tasks.
First, provenance turns out to be a “common core” that underlies many iden-
tified diagnostic and forensic tasks. is is because, at least at a conceptual level,
provenance can be seen as a complete chronicle of everything that happened in the
network; for instance, SPP can capture information about network topology, con-
trol plane configurations, as well as data plane events. erefore, if a diagnostic or
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forensic question can be answered by querying such a “chronicle”, then provenance
would be a natural candidate for providing such support.
Second, provenance comes with a general data model, so users can easily cus-
tomize the provenance model for diﬀerent applications. is is evidenced by the
variety of case studies we have applied provenance to: SPP applies provenance to the
Internet’s data plane, NetGenie focuses on provenance in SDNs, and DiﬀProv uses
provenance in both SDNs and Hadoop MapReduce. is versatility has an impor-
tant implication – research advances in provenance can potentially benefit a wide
range of use cases or applications. In fact, DiﬀProv is an exact case in point – the
same diﬀerential provenance algorithm has proven to be helpful in debugging very
diﬀerent types of distributed systems.
Last but not least, provenance can help weed out irrelevant factors in diagnosis,
which reduces the potential search space as a result. is is because provenance cap-
tures causality, not just incidental correlations. NetGenie, for instance, uses causal
networks as a close guide to generate targeted repairs. Such causality information
also oﬀers a second benefit: it enables a kind of “what-if ” analysis to reason about
potential outcomes of configuration changes – a property that both DiﬀProv and
NetGenie have leveraged to avoid “guesswork”, which is often a major source of
false positives and false negatives.
6.2 Limitations and future work
At the same time, provenance is not without its limitations. First, capturing full,
fine-grained provenance about an entire system can be expensive, as it can require
significant storage space. erefore, in practice, provenance systems may need to
expire old data, or selectively capture a subset of events and states. For instance, SPP
does not capture provenance on the application layer, and it may need to gradually
summarize old data into coarser levels of granularity. As a result, if later, operators
discover that a particular diagnostic task requires analyzing provenance data that
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already expired or were not captured at all, such a task would be diﬃcult to perform.
erefore, reducing the storage overhead of provenance systems is an interesting
research direction. For instance, can we build provenance systems that automatically
recognize what “level of detail” is necessary for a particular set of diagnostic and
forensic tasks, or even systems that can dynamically tune the provenance model at
runtime? Such systems would make it safe to expire certain data without jeopardiz-
ing the ability to answer provenance queries later on. Or, would it be possible to
develop powerful compression techniques on provenance data, so that data deletion
or expiration would not even be necessary?
e second limitation arises when applying provenance to legacy applications.
When the applications’ source code is available, we would need to manually instru-
ment them to extract provenance information. For blackbox applications where only
binary executables are available, we would have to rely on external specifications or
models of an application’s expected behavior for provenance extraction. Both ap-
proaches can be tedious and error-prone; if the instrumentations or external models
are incorrect or incomplete, then this would aﬀect the quality of the captured prove-
nance.
erefore, an interesting question to consider is how we can automate prove-
nance extraction for legacy applications. Here, two techniques could help. First,
static analysis could be a good candidate for automatically recognizing where in the
program to instrument and how, relieving programmers of such a burden. Second,
dynamic tracing may also be helpful – for instance, recent processors have built-in
hardware support for instruction-level program tracing with minimum performance
overhead (such as Intel PT [12] and ARM CoreSight [5]). Such features can be a
fine-grained provenance data source even for blackbox applications.
ird, existing provenance systems assume that the needed provenance data is
always available in its entirety. is is a reasonable assumption for many diagnos-
tic scenarios – for instance, when diagnosing problems that happen in an enterprise
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network. However, there are also cases where (part of ) the provenance data may be
private. In SPP, we have already seen a preliminary version of this problem, where
certain provenance vertexes are only visible to users with privileged views, but not
others. Another example scenario would be multi-tenant data centers – if a tenant’s
VM has a misconfiguration, this may aﬀect the normal operations of the underlying
physical infrastructure (e.g., causing congestion on certain links); or, on the other
hand, if the infrastructure misconfigures a tenant’s access-control list rules, the ten-
ant’s VMs may fail to receive traﬃc. Both scenarios require performing diagnostics
with incomplete provenance data.
To address this, it would be interesting to consider whether we can develop
privacy-preserving diagnostics with provenance. e first step for this would be to
find the right privacy model, answering questions such as “which part of the prove-
nance data should be considered private?”. e second step would be to design
privacy-preserving algorithms on provenance data, where secure multiparty com-
putation or other security protocols may be important building blocks. Last but
not least, it would also be interesting to explore the theoretical limitations posed by
privacy requirements. Since the diagnostic tool only has access to limited data, this
would lead to an inherent limitation as to which types of problems are “diagnosable”.
Finally, existing provenance systems still adopt a human-in-the-loop approach
to diagnostics. For instance, DiﬀProv requires an operator to provide both a faulty
symptom as well as a reference event, and NetGenie requires an operator to write
down a diagnostic intent. Involving human operators in the loop has two potential
downsides: a) the turnaround time for diagnostics is limited by how fast human
operators can identify and respond to network problems, and b) the eﬀectiveness of
the diagnostics depends on the quality of the inputs from operators.
Looking beyond, one interesting approach would be to take human operators
completely out of the loop. Ideally, there would be a fault detection component in
the system that performs real-time problem detection. Upon fault detection, a fault
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diagnosis component would analyze the symptom and identify the root cause of the
detected problem. Finally, a fault recovery component would generate repairs and
inject them to the system to rectify the problem. Here, several interesting questions
arise: a) how can we borrow from the formal methods community and develop spec-
ifications or invariants of “correct” behaviors of a system?; b) how should we assess
the degree of success of fault recovery?; and even c) can we use program synthesis
techniques to synthesize networks that are correct by construction? If we are able
to address some or all of the above challenges, it could substantially enhance the
reliability and security of future distributed systems.
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7
Appendix
In this appendix, we include more example code for building applications on top of
SPP. In Figures 7.1–7.5, we have sketched the code snippets for implementing the
functionalities in Table 3.3.
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void reverse-tracert(Packet *p, Evidence *e) {
IP *prevHop = gatewayIP;
Packet *p0 = p;
do {
query(&p, &e, prevHop);
print(prevHop+" "+(e.time-p0.time));
} while (prevHop != START_OF_PATH);
}
Figure 7.1: Code for tracing a received packet’s reverse path.
void identify-drop(Packet *p, Evidence *e) {
IP *nextHop = gatewayIP;
Packet *p0 = p;
do {
query(&p, &e, nextHop);
} while (e != NULL);
print(nextHop+" dropped the packet");
}
Figure 7.2: Code for identifying the node that dropped a packet.
void attest(Packet *p, Evidence *e) {
IP *nextHop = gatewayIP;
Packet *p0 = p;
query(&p, &e, nextHop);
if (e != NULL)
print("Packet " + p + " had been transmitted.");
else
print("Packet " + p + " hadn't been transmitted.");
}
Figure 7.3: Code for attesting to the transmission of a packet.
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void highestdelay(Packet *p, Evidence *e) {
IP *nextHop = gatewayIP;
Packet *p0 = p;
IP *start[255];
IP *end[255];
int numHops = 0;
double delay[255];
do {
start[numHops] = nextHop;
query(&p, &e, nextHop);
delay[numHops] = e.time-p.time;
end[numHops] = nextHop;
} while (nextHop != END_OF_PATH);
double highest = delay[0];
int linkID = 0;
int i;
for (int i = 0; i < numHops; i ++) {
if (highest < delay[i]) {
highest = delay[i];
linkID = i;
}
}
print("Highest-delay link: " + start[i] + "->" + end[i]);
}
Figure 7.4: Code for identifying the link on a path with the highest delay.
void throughput(Packet **p, Evidence **e, int n, Link l) {
double delaysum = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n; i ++) {
IP *nextHop = gatewayIP;
bool linkIdentified;
Packet *p0 = p[i];
do {
if (l.start == nexthop) {
linkIdenfied = true;
else
linkIdenfied = false;
}
query(&p, &e, nextHop);
if ((l.end == nextHop) & (linkIdentified) ) {
delaysum += e.time-p.time
}
} while (nextHop != END_OF_PATH);
double volume = 0;
int j;
for (j = 0; j < n; j ++) {
volume += p[j].size;
}
double avg = volume/delaysum;
print("Average throughput for the link: " + avg);
}
Figure 7.5: Code for the average throughput of a link.
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